Problems of Communism

Italian Communism
Giacomo Sani

Soviet "Counterimperialism"
Richard Lowenthal

Book Reviews
Carl A. Linden · Barbara W. Jancar
Heinz Timmermann · G. W. Choudhury
W. Raymond Duncan · Paul F. Langer

NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1976

MAO TSE-TUNG

Michel Oksenberg

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Problems of Communism

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NOV-DEC 1976 VOL XXV

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Cover: Mao Tse-tung ponders a decision.
Photo by Sven Simon.

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Mao's Policy Commitments, 1921-1976

By Michel Oksenberg

"Struggle in Peking over Mao's Body." "Mao's Wife Purged." "Moderates Win: Mao's Policies in Jeopardy." Such were the sensational headlines in the Western press shortly after Mao Tse-tung's death on September 9, 1976. The disarray cannot but tarnish Mao's standing in history, for he proved unable to arrange an orderly succession, as founding fathers should. Precisely because Mao's legacies will wax and wane in the hands of his successors, it seems wise to evaluate his performance as policy initiator while our memories remain fresh. To be sure, evaluations without historical perspective cannot place Mao in his appropriate social and cultural context. But an immediate appraisal offers the advantage of minimizing the problems of historiography: the filtering of Mao's record through his successors' interpretations and the use of Mao by future historians to make their political points.

Mao's life fell into three stages of nearly equal duration: the first 27 years spent in search of his calling, the next 28 years as a revolutionary seeking national power, and the last 27 years as a revolutionary leader of the Chinese nation. During his 55-year career as revolutionary and national leader, Mao undertook 33 major policy commitments, and that record provides a firm basis for evaluating his performance.[1] But there are many ways to judge a political record. The most important choice is whether to appraise the record in terms of Mao's goals (whether he attained what he sought to achieve) or in terms of the evaluator's preferences (whether Mao accomplished goals the evaluator believes Mao ought to have pursued). Both criteria are acceptable, but the choice must be made explicit. And for this paper, our criterion is whether, in retrospect, Mao concluded that a given policy commitment was well conceived and achieved the objective he wished.

One problem with this standard, however, is that Mao's attitudes toward his previous decisions are hard to ascertain. To be sure, Mao was self-critical, acknowledged his errors, and adjusted policies accordingly, but as an active political figure, he recognized that candid statements about past actions would affect his immediate status. Therefore, he was prone to distort the historical record. In addition, Mao's self-appraisal probably altered over time. For example, his views on the utility of the Great Leap Forward in all likelihood changed between 1961, during the depth of the economic recession it had helped create, and 1965, after the economy had recovered and after the beneficial legacy of the Leap had become more visible. Finally, in spite of the recent increased availability of Mao's post-1949 writings and speeches, the record at hand is still sparse. For all these reasons, Mao's personal appraisal of most of his initiatives can only be estimated on the basis of his brief references to his previous policies, his continuation or abandonment

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[1] Although the evaluation is that of the author, the article relies heavily upon the monographic work of others in tracing Mao's career. See, in particular, Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung,* New York, Simon and Schuster, 1966, and James Harrison, *The Long March to Power,* New York, Praeger, 1972.

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of a previous policy (thereby indicating whether he considered the policy a success or a failure), or his frequent tampering with the historical record (thereby revealing his recognition of the need to absolve himself of blame).

The outline of this article follows from these considerations. The first and lengthier portion briefly summarizes Mao's 33 major initiatives and assesses his subsequent evaluation of them. This procedure leads to the conclusion that Mao felt his interventions were, on balance, wise in 18 instances and unwise in 15. The second portion of the article places this performance in an overall, comparative perspective. In terms both of the sheer number of initiatives and of the degree of success, Mao's performance must be considered extraordinary. The final portion of the article subjects the policy commitments to quantitative analysis in an effort to gain some insight into the reasons for Mao's perceived triumphs and setbacks. It makes a preliminary analysis of *why* Mao encountered success and failure, by exploring such questions as: Was Mao more successful when initiating polices that primarily affected the rural areas or when initiating policies that primarily affected the urban areas? Did he reveal particular acumen in handling certain kinds of problems? And so on. This analysis tends to reinforce Mao's own self-appraisal, namely, that his performance was best when he was making revolution, when he was dealing with the countryside, and when he was enunciating policies that had popular support.[2] Without more ado, then, let us turn to our examination of Mao's major policy commitments.

Policy Commitments

1. Becoming a CCP revolutionary, 1921. By his presence (as representative from Hunan) at the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai on July 1, 1921, Mao committed himself to the path of revolution through the instrumentality of a Communist party. Yet the crucial decision came only after a two-year drift toward Marxism which probably began with his association with Li Ta-chao in Peking during the winter of 1918-19, and which intensified during his contact with Ch'en Tu-hsiu in Shanghai in the winter of 1919-20. In short, Mao's first major political move resulted from a *protracted* rather than a *brief* process of decision-making—a pattern which was to be repeated continually in subsequent years.

[2] For his overall self-appraisal, see Mao's Jan. 30, 1962, talk "On Democratic Centralism," translated in Stuart Schram, Ed., *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed,* London, Penguin, 1974, pp. 158-87, esp. pp. 172-76. Also, Mao's July 23, 1959, "Speech at the Lushan Plenum," and his Feb. 13, 1964, "Remarks at the Spring Festival," in *ibid.,* pp. 142 and 222.

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

The top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and Madame Sun Yat-sen pay their last respects to Chairman Mao Tse-tung several days after his death on September 9, 1976. Facing Mao's bier, from left to right, are: Ni Chih-fu, Wu Kuei-hsien, Li Te-sheng, Hsü Shih-yu, Wang Tung-hsing, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Yao Wen-yüan, Madame Sun Yat-sen, Yeh Chien-ying, Hua Kuo-feng, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, Li Hsien-nien, Chi Teng-k'uei, Wu Te, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, Ch'en Yung-kuei, Su Chen-hua, and Saifudin.

—Camera Press.

Also, as with many of his other initiatives, Mao was not the first to make the commitment; instead, he swiftly associated himself with the initiatives of others. He was a pioneer but not the pathfinder. To summarize the broad literature on the subject,[3] the major credit for founding the CCP belonged to Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao, and the Soviet advisers on the scene, Grigoriy Voytinskiy and Maring. Moreover, there is no evidence that Mao at the time saw his commitment to the CCP as irrevocable, although it turned out to be so. According to a recent study of the evolution of the Chinese Communists' concept of the party from 1919 to 1934, the CCP's founders, including Mao, did not have a clear vision of what sort of revolution they sought to create.[4] Thus, as with many other initiatives of Mao, his first involved less a precise decision than a commitment to a particular direction—to become a leader of a revolutionary party—with the extent and intensity of commitment left open.

There can be no doubt that Mao looked back upon that first commitment with enormous satisfaction. To be sure, one wonders whether Mao may not have had doubts during the bleak period when Chiang K'ai-shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) nearly vanquished the CCP in 1927-28 and then again during the Long March of 1934-35. And Mao recognized that the Japanese invasion of China helped guarantee the success of his effort.[5] But toward the end of his life, Mao revealed his evident pride at having successfully joined historical currents that, as he admits, he only dimly understood at the time. In 1962, for example, he recalled, "When our Party was founded in 1921 we only had a few dozen members; we were also in the minority, but these few people represented the truth and represented China's destiny." [6] And in 1966, he reminisced, "[In 1921] nobody knew how to conduct the revolution or how to carry on the struggle; only later did we acquire some experience. Our path gradually emerged in the course of practice."[7]

2. Turning to the peasants, 1925-. Mao's next major move was his decision to place heavy reliance on the revolutionary potential of the peasants, although he only gradually came to recognize this potential. As in the case of the founding of the party, much has been written on this topic, with

[3] See, for example, Harrison, *op. cit.*; Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*; and Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, New York, Octagon Books, 1966.

[4] Lawrence Sullivan, "Ideology and the Politics of Cultural Revolution: The Development of Chinese Communist Doctrine, 1915-1934," unpublished PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 1976.

[5] See Mao's comments to Edgar Snow in Snow's *The Long Revolution*, New York, Random House, 1972, pp. 198-99 and 219.

[6] Quoted in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 184. See also the passages on pp. 172-73 and 214.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 271.

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various scholars differing over the precise time when Mao actually turned to the peasants and whether he was original in doing so.[8] All agree, however, that Mao's exploration of the Hunan peasant movement in 1925 and his short stint as director of the Peasant Movement Training Institute in 1926 indicate an early thrust toward the countryside. It is, of course, generally recognized that the Communist revolutionary P'eng P'ai demonstrated an even earlier and deeper interest in the peasantry than Mao and that some of Lenin's writings presaged Mao's later observations. In addition, it seems clear that not until well into the period of the Kiangsi Soviet (1931-34) did Mao foresee that the Communist revolution would proceed entirely from the rural to the urban areas. Nevertheless, Mao did grasp the potential of the peasantry as agents of social change earlier than most of his colleagues, and throughout his life (though not without some ambivalence[9]) he retained confidence in the poorer peasants and in the power that could be generated by capitalizing on the tensions in the countryside. Mao clearly felt that this turn to the rural areas had served him well.[10]

3. *Joining with the Kuomintang, 1923-27.* If Mao gave indications of being more peasant-oriented than many of his colleagues, he showed fewer signs of doubt than many of them about advocating a United Front alliance between the CCP and the KMT. Interestingly, the two positions were related, since Mao believed that "the center of gravity of the KMT" was "hidden among the countless masses of the exploited peasantry." [11] Concerning Mao's strong support for a United Front with even the right wing of the KMT, Stuart Schram has observed: "In thus stressing comradely solidarity with men whom, although conservative, he regarded as sincerely committed to the struggle for the unity and independence of China, Mao clearly demonstrated that he attached (at least for the moment) a higher priority to the national revolution than to the social revolution." [12] Mao's position also revealed that, unlike such others in the CCP as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, he underestimated the dangers that the United Front posed for the CCP, dangers that were not long in materializing. After the alliance fell apart, Mao never again advocated a similar United Front strategy, and he sought to change the historical record concerning his advocacy of cooperation with the KMT. He recognized his errors and adjusted his policies accordingly.

4. *Establishing a rural base, 1928.* Mao's fourth initiative was undertaken more hastily than the previous three. After the debacles of 1927 in Shanghai and Wuhan, the decimated CCP fought to survive and to find a new route to power. For many, the first instinct was to seize a city through mass uprisings assisted by the Red Army, and to use exclusive control of one urban area as a base from which to spread the revolution. Although initial efforts to seize cities in 1927 failed, such attempts persisted into 1930. Mao did not as clearly exhibit this proclivity. Rather, within 90 days of the July 15, 1927, rupture of the KMT-CCP alliance in Wuhan —after which he led an abortive peasant uprising and a faint-hearted effort to seize Changsha city in Hunan—he had ensconced himself in the mountains. He advocated establishing soviets in relatively inaccessible border regions between provinces. In effect, he urged the party to nest itself in the bandit lairs to which rebel brigands had traditionally fled. He derived satisfaction from the wisdom of his move, as ultimately the entire party followed his lead.[13]

5. *The defensive strategy in Kiangsi, 1931-34.* It is difficult to capsulize the positions that Mao took on a variety of social, economic, military, and political issues during the years in Kiangsi (1931-34), when the Kiangsi Soviet was coming under increasing Nationalist pressure, and it is also difficult to evaluate his performance because he himself was losing power. Nevertheless, the character of his defensive strategy is noteworthy. He advocated guerrilla warfare and urged the party to seek support from all rural elements except the most oppressive landlords (at the cost of moderating a radical land-reform policy). While these approaches probably would have been no more effective than the policies actually pursued to try to stave off the vastly superior Nationalist forces, Mao's own political weakness en-

[8] Two classic, contrasting, but somewhat dated views are presented in Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961, and Arthur A. Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964.

[9] On Mao's ambivalence toward the peasantry, see Richard Kraus, "The Evolving Concept of Class in Post-Liberation China," unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1974.

[10] For Mao's nostalgic, retrospective view of those years during which he turned to the peasants, see his Aug. 18, 1964, "Talk on Questions of Philosophy," in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 219.

[11] Quoted in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 76.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[13] Mao's summary of his turn to the base areas is in his 1936 interview with Edgar Snow, given in Snow's *Red Star over China*, New York, Grove Press edition, 1961, pp. 169-71. Mao essentially repeated this 1936 statement in his autumn 1971 discussions with provincial officials, cited in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 291.

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abled him to disassociate himself from the failure to repulse Chiang K'ai-shek.

Three of Mao's specific actions during the Kiangsi period—the ruthless elimination of the rival "A-B Corps" within the CCP, his refusal to cooperate with those KMT leaders who raised a rebellion against Chiang K'ai-shek in Fukien in 1933, and his ultimate antagonism toward the "returned students" who had undergone training in the Soviet Union—merit special mention for the insight they provide into Mao's tactics in pursuing power. Considering the second decision to have been an error, Mao thereafter recognized the importance of forging tactical alliances.[14] In the bloody attack on the "A-B Corps" as well as in his relations with the more powerful "returned students," Mao revealed an inability to share power. The stubborn, even cruel disposition necessary to sustain such a will for power helps explain his ultimate victory in the civil war, but it also explains his most striking failure toward the end of his rule: the inability to arrange for an orderly succession.

A photo of Mao in Juichin, Kiangsi Province, in 1931, where he was experiencing a temporary setback in his personal power within the Chinese Communist Party.

—Camera Press.

Mao's efforts to alter the historical record suggest he was not entirely proud of his policy recommendations during this era. Yet, the objective record indicates that Mao must have demonstrated sufficient political insight during the losing Kiangsi cause to justify his subsequent selection as party leader. Mao probably was not totally disingenuous, then, when in 1971 he recalled that, "during the four years from 1931 to 1934, I had no voice at all at the Centre." [15] On balance, without gross distortion of the record, Mao could derive honest satisfaction though not claim omniscience from his performance during the era.

6. *Guiding the Long March, 1935.* Early on the Long March, at the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935, Mao regained a leadership position in the CCP. One of the decisive moments in the history of the CCP came soon thereafter. The issue at hand was the ultimate destination of the fleeing Communist forces which had joined together in western Szechuan in early 1935 to catch a breath after pursuing different, tortuous paths in retreat from their various base areas in the South.

Essentially, the choice was whether to abandon the struggle temporarily and seek refuge in Sikang or to continue the resistance and seek a stable refuge in the Northwest. Mao, now a leading personage in the Central Committee, bore (with Chang Wen-t'ien) special responsibility for guiding the columns. On this occasion, Mao faced a "crisis" decision. This was not an issue of policy "thrust," involving matters of degree, and there was limited time in which to decide. Under circumstances shrouded in mystery, Mao struck out for Kansu and Shensi provinces, compelling his troops to traverse the dense grasslands. Other troops under Chang Kuo-t'ao and Chu Teh struck westward, perhaps intending to reach a sanctuary in the Soviet Union, but they eventually changed their direction and followed Mao's lead. Mao's initiative proved successful, for it ultimately brought the party first to strategically advantageous Paoan and then to Yenan,[16] whence

[14] William Dorrill has documented Mao's effort to rewrite the historical record to show that he wished to cooperate with the Fukien rebels. The very effort reveals Mao's recognition of the error. In his 1936 interview with Snow, he blamed others for the error. See Dorrill, "Transfer of Legitimacy in the Chinese Communist Party," in John Lewis, Ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 69-113. See also Snow, *Red Star over China*, pp. 186-87.

[15] In Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 291.

[16] For one self-appraisal of his conduct during the Long March, see *ibid.*, pp. 291-92.

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the CCP spread its influence across the North China plain during the war against Japan.

7. Articulating a guerrilla strategy, 1936-40. Mao extended his string of essentially wise initiatives with the strategy for expanding Communist power which he began to articulate soon after arriving in the Northwest. Predicated on the assumption that Japan was inexorably moving toward a concerted attack upon and occupation of North China, Mao's plan was at once bold and elegantly simple. Its audacity lay in its belief that the bedraggled Communist forces could spearhead the opposition to Japan; its simplicity lay in its call for a protracted guerrilla struggle based upon peasant support. Few Communists shared Mao's optimism concerning the long-term opportunities inherent in the bleak reality of 1936. However, Mao's analysis proved substantially accurate for a number of years, though Western analysts have perhaps not sufficiently stressed that his guerrilla strategy was subsequently stymied and that Communist strength actually was eroded from 1941 on. Only after Japanese forces moved south in the 1944 Operation Ichigo offensive against US air bases did the Communists again encounter success.[17] But overall, his guerrilla strategy was successful, and later on Mao derived satisfaction from its becoming a new part of revolutionary doctrine around the world.[18]

8. Renewing cooperation with the KMT, 1937-40. Another part of the Communist strategy as it evolved in Yenan was the United Front with the KMT. In retrospect, the Communists probably placed excessive faith in Chiang K'ai-shek and the KMT from 1937 to 1940. After that time—and especially after the New Fourth Army incident in 1941, in which Nationalist forces vanquished a large Red Army contingent—the CCP increased its vigilance against the Nationalists and began girding for an eventual civil war with them. Where did Mao stand in all of this? Was he overly sanguine in his estimation of the United Front in the late 1930's?

The record, as usual, is ambiguous. On the one hand, so hostile was Mao toward Chiang K'ai-shek that he may have been willing to see violence done to the Generalissimo during the Sian Incident of 1936. (Chiang K'ai-shek was kidnapped by a non-Communist warlord in cooperation with the Communists in order to force Chiang to cease his campaign against the CCP and turn his energies to combating the Japanese.) According to one account, the Comintern ordered Mao to encourage the release of Chiang, much to Mao's consternation.[19] In addition, Mao strongly condemned many in the party who sought to surrender CCP autonomy and place themselves directly under Nationalist discipline as they had in the United Front with the KMT in 1923-27. Mao argued, instead, for an alliance with the KMT that would preserve the CCP's independent military and ideological stance.

Yet Mao did believe that limited cooperation was possible.[20] That he subsequently recognized he had erred is manifest in this revealing 1964 passage:

In January 1941, the KMT launched the South Anhwei incident, in which we lost more than 17,000 men. After this, they staged several more anti-Communist high tides, and thus taught [our] Party a lesson.[21]

Mao's praise of the KMT and Chiang K'ai-shek, even as late as 1940, also revealed some sensitivity to the Kuomintang's role as symbolic leader of the Chinese effort to resist Japan. An indication of Mao's subsequent embarrassment about certain of these statements is that they were deleted from the texts of the speeches in which they had appeared when these speeches were collected and republished in his *Selected Works*.[22]

On balance, then—as we will note in subsequent instances as well—Mao harbored no illusions about any long-term compatibility between the CCP and the KMT; therefore, he resolutely avoided an entangling alliance. At the same time, he believed that his KMT adversaries viewed him as tactically more valuable to them than they actually perceived him to be, and he briefly exaggerated the extent of cooperation he could elicit from his enemies. In part, this miscalculation reflected an inflated sense of his own importance in his adversaries' eyes, stemming from the same self-confidence that yielded the

[17] This point is well developed in James Reardon-Anderson, "The Foreign Policy of Self-Reliance: Chinese Communist Policy Toward the Great Powers, 1944-46," unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1975.

[18] For example, Mao was intrigued to learn that President John F. Kennedy had studied his essays on military operations. See Snow, *The Long Revolution*, p. 201.

[19] Edgar Snow, *Random Notes on Red China, 1936-45*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 2.

[20] This paragraph draws upon Steven Goldstein, "The View from Yenan: Chinese Communist Perspectives on International Relations, 1937-41," unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1974.

[21] Quoted in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 197.

[22] See *ibid.*, Chapter 1.

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guerrilla strategy. In part, it also derived from his belief, implicit but never explicitly stated in his writings, that the KMT, being dependent upon landlord support and thus unable to mobilize popular peasant support, would have to ally with a party capable of organizing the masses in order to resist the Japanese effectively. Mao thought that as long as the latter party—*i.e.,* the CCP—could retain its independence, it could exploit the alliance to its own benefit. At this time, he did not foresee either the KMT's own, albeit limited, success behind enemy lines or the Japanese-American war, which enabled the KMT to hoard its resources for the postwar CCP-KMT struggle.

9. Defining the "mass line," 1939-45. During the Yenan era, Mao firmly defined his "mass line" leadership formula. To sustain the guerrilla military strategy, the Red Army and the party had to elicit mass support. Likening the members of the army to fish in a sea of people, Mao stressed that the party had to advocate policies congruent with popular aspirations, or at least to pursue programs which could be explained to the people in terms they would approve. The "mass line" demanded, in short, that the leaders remain closely attuned to the public's needs, that they play to these needs, and that they not move too far ahead of them.

Mao's decision to articulate this doctrine bears similarity to his discovery of the peasantry. He was not the first to emphasize the dangers of a party isolated from the masses. As Lawrence Sullivan has recently documented, the origins of the "mass line" may very well lie in the experiences of the Shanghai underground apparatus after Chiang's 1927 break with the CCP, and Chang Wen-t'ien—not Mao—may deserve the title, "Father of the Mass Line." In addition, Ilpyong Kim has noted the use of the mass line during the Kiangsi Soviet.[23] Mao's talents in this and other instances were to realize the worth of the idea, to incorporate it into his own pattern of thought, and —most important—to relate the significance of the idea to his total world view. As a result, he could explain the leadership technique with particularly appealing lucidity and conviction.

Mao revealed his satisfaction with the wisdom of his writings in many ways. In meetings with his associates, he recalled with fondness how he had come to draft the pivotal documents that outlined his leadership principles.[24] Several of his writings from this era became standard fare in post-1949 cadre education. But most important, Mao never repudiated the leadership doctrine of this era; to the contrary, he strove to preserve it and to make it the basic CCP organizational tenet.

10. Conducting the rectification campaign, 1941-45. From the time he arrived in Yenan, Mao strove to consolidate his own personal power in the party. He bested Chang Kuo-t'ao in the winter of 1937-38 and then eroded the remaining power of those who had dominated the party apparatus during the Kiangsi Soviet. In the process, he launched a virulent ideological campaign to enhance Yenan's organizational strength over comrades in the scattered guerrilla armies and heterogeneous base areas, and to achieve loyalty and discipline among the disparate lot of urban intellectuals and youths who had flocked to the Communist cause. By 1945 and the Seventh CCP Congress, Mao's ideas had become nearly synonymous with the ideology of the party.

Again, Mao's gradual and protracted strategy exhibited great tactical flexibility. A major reason for his success was that he began to assemble the administrative aides upon whom he relied to varying degrees for the subsequent quarter century until the Cultural Revolution: Ch'en Yun, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Jen Pi-shih, Ch'en Po-ta, Lin Piao, and K'ang Sheng. It was a diverse lot—in temperament, skills, and ideological proclivities. Each contrasted in some important way with Mao and contributed a key ingredient that Mao lacked—Chou En-lai, cosmopolitanism; K'ang Sheng, a sinister manner; Liu Shao-ch'i, organizational talents; Ch'en Yun, knowledge of economics; and so on.[25] This team, with Mao at the helm, established its primacy in the party through the rectification campaign.

Writings by Mao that have recently become available underscore how successful he thought the rectification campaign had been:

[We] had the experience of the Rectification Movement on an all-party scale which lasted from the spring of 1942 to the summer of 1945, altogether three and a half years. . . . [It] helped the comrades of the whole Party to reach unity of understanding.

[23] See Sullivan, *op. cit.*, and Ilpyong Kim, *The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi Under the Soviets*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973.

[24] See, for example, Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, pp. 172 and 218; also Snow, *The Long Revolution*, pp. 206-07.

[25] In a striking way, the casting resembled the characters whom Sung Chiang assembled at Liangshanpo in the novel, *Water Margin;* even the division of labor was somewhat similar.

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Chairman Mao leads a band of peasant fighters in northern Shensi in 1947 during the civil war against Chiang K'ai-shek.

—Camera Press.

The question of how to carry out the democratic revolution, how to the devise the Party line, and various concrete policies were all completely solved at that time.[26]

And years later, he continued to look back upon that campaign as a precedent to be emulated. Thus, in 1962, he noted:

As for how the Party should tackle the problem of revisionism within the country and within the Party and the problem of the bourgeoisie, I think we should adhere to former policies without changing them. . . . We should follow the line of the Rectification Campaign of 1942-45.[27]

11. Seeking US support, 1944-46.[28] As the war against Japan wore on, Mao—unaware of America's development of an atomic bomb—joined the many both within and outside China who thought an American landing on the China coast would be an inescapable part of the US effort to defeat Japan. His dreams were fed, partly deliberately and partly inadvertently, by the Americans, who also promised to plead his case with the Nationalists. For a few months in 1945 and possibly into 1946, he thought the Americans might really assist him because they needed him and recognized his growing power. He configured his forces to maximize his attractiveness without surrendering any autonomy in the process. His hopes for US assistance were dashed and with them any chance of a meaningful CCP-US relationship until the mid-1950's. Count here an error by Mao concerning the importance Washington attached to him. He acknowledged the miscalculation through the wrath he directed at the Americans whom he felt had misled him. And of course, Mao's *Selected Works* contain no hint of the hopeful remarks that Mao had made to American visitors to Yenan.[29] (In

[26] In Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 171. (Mao dated the campaign—which actually began in 1941—from 1942 because that was when it was expanded to a party-wide effort.)

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

[28] For an elaboration, see Reardon-Anderson, *op. cit.*

[29] Some of Mao's remarks are assembled in Joseph Esherick, Ed., *Lost Chance in China, The World War II Dispatches of John S. Service*, New York, Random House, 1974.

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overall terms, of course, the real miscalculation was Washington's for failing to comprehend the China scene.)

12. Going for power, 1946-48. At the end of World War II, the CCP's military forces were, at least on paper, still much weaker than those of its KMT rival. In addition, Americans soon began flying Nationalist troops to occupy China's major coastal cities, and Stalin pressured the CCP to accept a subservient role in a KMT-dominated coalition government. A number in the CCP leadership—perhaps including Liu Shao-ch'i—were inclined to accept Stalin's advice. Mao, however, disagreed.[30] In an easily reversible decision that required a prolonged process of implementation, Mao chose to strike out for power through civil war. His instincts were correct again; in fact, victory came much sooner than he expected, although some evidence suggests he made certain tactical blunders along the way.[31] And fortune, more than wisdom, may have been the key factor, for his adversary also committed major strategic errors.

13. Pushing land reform, 1946-48. From the spring of 1946 until early 1948, the CCP pursued a radical land-reform policy that called for a more rapid, more extensive redistribution of land than had occurred during the 1937-45 era. The pressures for this swing leftward apparently emanated from lower-level cadres and possibly some higher-level officials as well. According to James Harrison's masterful account of this tangled episode,[32] Mao was not at the forefront of the policy, but instead continually warned against alienating the "middle" peasants. On this issue, Mao's verbal position was a moderate one in the political spectrum; he sought to retain wide appeal to most economic strata. How serious his opposition was is open to question. Certainly, he took no known action to curb the leftist excesses, and his verbal pronouncements appear more political posture than a position he sought to enforce. If he was unsuccessful in affecting events in the short run, his more balanced judgment was ultimately vindicated by the party's return to his position in early 1948.

Mao's own evaluation of his performance on this issue is unclear. But the fact that he never asserted any special claim to having played a praiseworthy role, and that he later complained that he had not been sufficiently consulted,[33] seemingly indicates a dissatisfaction with the efficacy of this policy.

(We exclude from our enumeration of major policy commitments Mao's announcement in June 1949 that the CCP would lean in the direction of the Soviet Union in the cold war between Washington and Moscow. To be sure, the act was an exceedingly important one, but we would argue that Mao probably preferred a less entangling relationship with the Soviet Union yet had little real choice in the matter. Circumstances dictated his course. The new Chinese government, which was to formally proclaim the Chinese People's Republic three months later, urgently needed assistance and security. The mutual suspicion and hostility between the Communists and Americans were too deep to be bridged swiftly, and the structure of international affairs at the time would have precluded Soviet economic support for a militarily unaligned China. In addition, many within the CCP felt a strong ideological affinity for the USSR, which Mao was in no position to negate. Mao's dilemma was expressed at the time when he proclaimed his decision to lean toward the Soviet socialist bloc; he said, "There is no third road." [34] *And looking back on this era, in 1962, Mao recalled the situation in this way: "In those days the situation was such that, since we had no experience in economic construction, we had no alternative but to copy the Soviet Union. In the field of heavy industry especially, we copied almost everything from the Soviet Union, and we had very little creativity of our own. At that time, it was absolutely necessary to act thus. . . ."* [35]*)*

14. Entering the Korean war, 1950. The origins of the involvement of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Korean war remain a matter of inference, and the extent of Mao's participation in North Korea's decision to launch the war in June 1950, a matter of conjecture. However, available evidence does underscore Mao's own direct involvement in the decision to commit Chinese troops to battle in October 1950. The story persists that he stayed up all night, pacing to and fro, before rendering his

[30] Mao's 1962 recollection of this era is in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 191.

[31] For example, James Reardon-Anderson argues that Mao supported the costly and unsuccessful Communist effort to hold the strategically important Liaoning city of Ssup'ingchieh in 1946. *Op. cit.*, Chapter 10.

[32] *Op. cit.*, pp. 406-20.

[33] Mao's October 1966 complaint about not being consulted in connection with the "land problem" probably refers to the 1946-48 land reform. See Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 266.

[34] Quoted in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 250.

[35] Cited in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 178.

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final judgment.[36] Here, then, is Mao as a decision-maker in a crisis, facing time constraints and dealing for high stakes with limited information. (Interestingly, during the other two crises for which we have evidence about Mao's personal state-of-mind—the Lushan Plenum of 1959 and the October 1966 Central Work Conference during the Cultural Revolution—Mao also apparently became highly agitated and was unable to sleep.[37])

Mao's calculations regarding the Korean conflict on balance seem wise. Outside observers believe that, although intervention increased Chinese dependence on the Soviet Union and hardened the animosity between the US and China, it established Chinese credibility as a state with military power, preserved a buffer zone between China and overtly hostile forces, and helped unify the nation behind the new government. To Mao, China's entry into the war finally established his credibility in Stalin's eyes and contributed to China's military modernization.[38]

15. Guiding China's development, 1950-53. A virtual lacuna of information surrounds Mao's domestic initiatives from early 1950 to 1953. He probably supported the effort to secure the cooperation of the wealthy industrialists in maintaining production in 1949-50; however, he also approved the harsh campaigns of 1951-52 in the cities. He criticized productions in the film and literary worlds, but he did not strongly enforce his will in such matters. He encouraged the decisive completion of land reform and the formation of mutual-aid teams in the countryside. By late 1952, he showed an interest in agricultural cooperatives, yet he did not see to it that central directives were resolutely implemented. During these years, Mao apparently acted cautiously, feeling his way forward, perhaps partly out of recognition that to a large extent authority resided in the six large administrative regions and that he lacked the organizational capacity to enforce his will. Only toward the end of this era, with his July 1953 enunciation of policy guidelines for the period of "socialist transition" and the December 1953 purge of Kao Kang, did he begin firmly to assert himself.

Mao's policy recommendations during 1950-53 evidently achieved their objective. The transition to Communist rule was well implemented, and by 1953 the leaders of the PRC could begin to address a new range of issues. The few available references suggest that Mao looked back upon his initiatives with satisfaction.[39]

16. Collectivizing agriculture, 1955. Although Mao endorsed an ideological campaign to criticize the traditional Chinese novel *Dream of the Red Chamber* in 1954—a campaign with widespread ramifications—and although he spurred the campaign against the intellectual Hu Feng in early 1955, his next major initiative came when he rapidly accelerated the collectivization of agriculture in the summer of 1955. His intervention terminated a prolonged debate over the appropriate pace of rural transformation, in which some had argued for a slower pace on the ground that mechanization was a precondition for collectivization. Two weeks after the July 1955 National People's Congress, Mao set aside the targets that this body had established for transformation of the countryside and appealed directly to provincial and special district party secretaries to move more rapidly. The transformation of China's rural structure occurred with greater ease and rapidity than Mao had foreseen, and emboldened by his success, he in December 1955 pressed for the socialist transformation of the industrial sector—a task which was also accomplished smoothly. During the same winter of 1955-56, Mao likewise promoted the visionary National Agricultural Development Program (NADP), which called for the transformation of the Chinese countryside within 12 years, the effort to be initiated through mobilization of labor. By March 1956, the NADP was encountering difficulty, and Mao acquiesced in its being temporarily shelved.

Mao's 1955 collectivization initiative differed from most of his interventions. His sudden and not easily reversible decision made him a pathfinder. He was not responding to pressures from below or from his colleagues; he did not seize upon the initiative of others. Of all Mao's decisions, this was the one in which he was most clearly out in front, alone. It may have also been his most incisive, insightful single moment as ruler of China, for his decision consolidated the regime's control over the countryside and

[36] See Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, New York, Macmillan, 1960.

[37] See Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Lushan Conference" and "Summing Up the First Five Months," in Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, pp. 131 and 174. Mao also referred to sleepless nights in connection with decision-making in his January 1962 speech, "On Democratic Centralism," in *ibid.*, p. 187.

[38] For Mao's *in camera* references to the Korean war, see Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, pp. 67, 103, and 191.

[39] See, particularly, his Sept. 15, 1954, speech to the National People's Congress, excerpted in *Current Background* (Hong Kong), No. 891, Oct. 8, 1969, p. 17, and his "On Ten Great Relationships," in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 77.

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enabled it to guarantee minimum welfare and subsistence to all. So accurate was his assessment that he became overly exuberant with his NADP, but he soon tempered himself. Yet, the headiness of his success remained with him and probably helps explain his willingness to endorse those two subsequent upsurges—the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution.

17. Responding to destalinization, 1956. Mao reacted with alacrity to Nikita Khrushchev's February 1956 denunciation of Josef Stalin. Many analysts attribute the nature of his reaction to personal pique and power concerns—to a belief that the Russians should have consulted him and to a fear that the challenge to Stalin endangered his own forceful rule in China. But another, more important factor certainly was at work as well. Perhaps because of traditional Chinese sensitivity to problems of maintaining authority,[40] Mao saw that open questioning of Stalin's wisdom undermined Communist and especially Soviet claims to omniscience and the right to automatic obedience, and thus would over the long run inevitably erode the structure of authority within the Communist bloc. In short, Khrushchev had done irreparable damage to the legitimizing myth of the international Communist movement. To be sure, Mao had long recognized Stalin's shortcomings. After all, he had rejected Stalin's 1946 call for a United Front in China, and he had earlier experienced firsthand the inadequacy of Stalin's efforts to guide the CCP in the 1920's and 1930's. But this was a matter of quite a different order.

In any case, Mao's first response came in the April 5, 1956, commentary, "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," in which he stressed that Stalin's errors were personal and not systemic. The "serious mistakes of Stalin," Mao noted, could be remedied through organizational means.[41] However, the tortuous reasoning of this document showed that Mao knew he had a new problem on his hands. For the next two years, and particularly after the Hungarian uprising, he sought

[40] This is a theme central to Richard Solomon's study, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.

[41] On this document, see Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, Vol. 1, New York, Columbia University Press, 1974, p. 43.

Peasants from East Kwanton Hsiang, near Peking, make application to join a cooperative during the drive to collectivize Chinese agriculture in 1955.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

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Mao gesticulates as he makes a point during talks with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the Kremlin on November 15, 1957.

—Pictorial Parade.

to remedy the damage, analyzing how the bloc might maintain its coherence and what the Soviets had to do to regain leadership over the movement, but by late 1958 he began to conclude that the task was impossible.[42]

18. Encouraging a "Hundred Flowers," 1956-57. In January 1956 Mao delivered a speech in which he suggested an opening to the intellectuals, a theme to which he returned in another speech in June. The latter contained the famous slogan, "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend."[43] While unrest in Eastern Europe during the fall of 1956 caused Mao to let the proposal lie for a time, he returned to it in February 1957 in his well-known speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions."[44] At the outset, Mao simply wished to incorporate the intellectuals more fully into the nation's political life. Acknowledging their disenchantment with the many campaigns and pressures he had directed against them, Mao believed that they still recognized the manifold benefits his regime had bestowed and that they would respond appreciatively to his magnanimity—a few special benefits, a little more freedom, and they would fully contribute their scientific, technical, and creative skills to the nation. Moreover, by 1957 Mao had linked up his opening toward the intellectuals and his efforts against bureaucratism (see below). Despite considerable opposition from his Politburo associates, he called upon the intellectuals to criticize the party and government openly.

Mao's overture proved disastrous, as his regime became the object of vituperative hostility, not friendly criticism. Once again, Mao had overestimated his potential attractiveness to his adversaries. To be sure, Mao resurrected his "100 Flowers" slogan in 1961-62, and during the Cultural Revolution he sought again to involve nonparty members in public criticism of the CCP. But Mao never again trusted bourgeois intellectuals as he had in 1956-57. And he recognized his errors by significantly altering his key February 1957 speech before publishing it in June.

19. Fighting bureaucracy, 1956-.[45] During the 1950's, Mao committed himself to policies in a number of areas—organization, education, public health, industrial management, strategic defense—which he pursued with consistency but fluctuating intensity for the remainder of his rule. These poli-

[42] Mao adhered to his estimate of Khrushchev's destalinization speech for the rest of his life. See, for example, his 1958 estimate in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 99, and his 1963 *On the Question of Stalin*, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1963.

[43] Neither speech has ever become available in its entirety in the West, but we know a good deal about the contents of both addresses. See MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 and 51.

[44] The speech is widely available. See, *inter alia*, Robert Bowie and John Fairbank, Eds., *Communist China, 1955-1959*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962, pp. 273-94.

[45] On Mao's struggle against bureaucratism, see Harry Harding, "The Organizational Issue in Chinese Politics, 1959-1972," unpublished PhD thesis, Stanford University, 1973.

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cies are qualitatively different from the ones described thus far, as they deal with an interrelated set of issues and involve a number of specific interventions by Mao over a 20-year period. While few single interventions were decisive, the cumulative impact was to leave Mao's imprint on a number of issue areas. Let us turn to the first of these areas—the matter of bureaucratic organization.

As Franz Schurmann and Stuart Schram have stressed, Mao's "Ten Great Relationships" speech of April 1956 is a key document for understanding Mao's concerns with regard to this issue area.[46] Crucial was his observation that in the building of a socialist society tensions exist between rulers and ruled. If unchecked, bureaucrats can grow into an oppressive ruling class. Mao, of course, was not the first Communist to voice this fear. Leon Trotsky, Nikolay Bukharin, and Milovan Djilas, after all, expressed similar concerns. But it is nevertheless to Mao's credit that, he too—soon after the nationalization of industrial enterprises in China—recognized this major long-run problem in the building of socialism and increasingly brooded about it during the remainder of his life.

Mao promoted a number of policies aimed at countering the threat: requiring cadres to engage in physical labor, seeking nonroutinized modes of administration, emphasizing mass involvement in policy implementation, maintaining ideological pressure on the bureaucracy, and keeping bureaucracy in a state of perpetual turmoil through constant changes in the allocation of authority. However, he never evidenced satisfaction that his measures constituted sufficient responses to the complex problem. Indeed, events since Mao's death could signal the triumph of organization! Nevertheless, Mao never doubted the validity of assigning primacy to organizational issues and remained convinced that the thrust of his policies was correct.

20. Educating the populace.[47] With regard to the training of the populace, Mao emphasized mass education—the rapid spread of primary rather than higher education, the infusion of political themes into the educational process, and close integration of the educational system with the production process. His objective was to create a new intellectual class in China dedicated to his socialist goal and selfless in its service to society. The formal educational system was but part of the total effort—reflected in the media and arts as well—to foster a new culture. Mao also sought to swiftly elevate the technical capacity of all the people, and to inculcate in them a confidence in their ability to transform their environment. He promoted an educational system, in other words, which would be better at disseminating knowledge than developing it. This investment in human capital paid off. Even Western observers regard it as one of the major reasons that China's agricultural production has kept pace with her population increase. Not only has scientific research in agronomy focused on applied questions, but the peasants are now willing and able to accept new techniques. To be sure, the regime's capacity to disseminate technology is due to more than the educational system, but that system—which owes so much in its conception to Mao—provided an essential precondition for such dissemination.

There is, of course, a long-run question about Mao's wisdom in this area—namely, did he, in pushing his preferences *to the extreme* during the Cultural Revolution, leave the higher educational system in such shambles that China will be unable to generate the technology necessary to sustain her advance and will have insufficient numbers of scientists to assist in the absorption of technology from abroad? Looked at from an outside perspective, Mao's impulses in the educational realm seem to have been roughly suited to current conditions at least until the mid-1960's, but then may not have been congruent with China's long-run developmental needs after that. From Mao's perspective, the education system he advocated was essential for promoting a more egalitarian society. And he clung to this belief to the end of his life.

21. Promoting public health. China's public-health system was a realm in which Mao took special interest, and he more than any other major leader is responsible for its configuration.[48] Mao's specific preferences were to emphasize preventive rather than curative medicine, to preserve traditional medicine and combine Chinese with Western practices, and to attach priority to delivery of services to the rural areas rather than to research and to service in

[46] The speech is in Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, pp. 61-83. See also Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, pp. 76-101, and Stuart Schram, "Introduction," in Schram, Ed., *Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 41-47.

[47] Joel Glassman traces Mao's specific interventions in educational policy in "Implementation of Education Policy in Communist China," unpublished PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 1974.

[48] See David Lampton, "The Politics of Public Health in China, 1949-1969," unpublished PhD thesis, Stanford University, 1973.

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urban areas. He enthusiastically promoted physical education and exercise in a society which had previously disdained sports such as swimming.

Mao's initiatives encountered some resistance within the public-health bureaucracies, but he persisted. Although precise statistics are lacking, impressive results apparently were obtained in eliminating communicable diseases, reducing infant mortality rates, and increasing longevity. The extensive health service delivery system also enabled progress in the all-important area of birth control. While the public-health system will have to change in order to solve a new range of health problems such as cancer and cardiovascular diseases, the system that Mao helped devise certainly attained the goal he envisioned: a more robust, noticeably healthier population.

22. *Managing industry.* Mao's interventions in the industrial sphere revealed a number of consistent preferences in that realm too: for collective as opposed to one-man management practices, for involvement of workers in decision-making, for the minimization of wage differentials, against stratification on the basis of types of employment, against bonuses and profits as the principal means of motivating managers and workers, and against the domination of decisions about the productive process by technicians.[49] Mao's hope was to develop a highly productive, efficient industrial system in which workers had high morale, derived satisfaction from democratic principles of management, and worked enthusiastically for the common good.

While some question remains concerning the degree to which Mao's principles were actually implemented, the evidence suggests that his initiatives did not bring about the results that he wanted. China's industrial system is inefficient, and there have been repeated problems of worker discontent during the post-Cultural Revolution era. That Mao was dissatisfied with the situation was already clear in April 1969, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, when he stated:

You should study the problems of various factories. . . . According to my own observation, I would say that not in all factories nor in an overwhelming majority but in quite a large majority of cases the leadership is not in the hands of the masses of the workers.[50]

And Mao continued to be dissatisfied with the industrial front. In the last year of his life, he voiced dissatisfaction with the inequities he perceived in the industrial wage system but concluded that not very much could be done immediately to reduce them.[51] In sum, this was a realm where Mao enjoyed only limited success in having his initiatives implemented, and even when they were implemented, he felt that the results frequently were counterproductive.

A woman doctor of the People's Liberation Army administers acupuncture treatment to a child at the Canton School for Deaf and Dumb.

—Paul Raffaele/Camera Press.

23. *Securing the national defense.*[52] Mao resolutely sought an independent defense posture for China. He consistently advocated acquisition of a nuclear capability to deter nuclear threats and to give the PRC the symbolic status that goes with nuclear weaponry. Until China acquired a second-strike capability, Mao sought to absorb the damage

[49] Stephen Andors traces Mao's industrial management policy in "Factory Management Doctrine in China, 1949-1972," unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1974.

[50] Quoted in Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 283.

[51] See Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie," *Peking Review*, No. 14, April 4, 1975, p. 5.

[52] For a summary of Mao's writings on strategy, see Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings*, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1966. See also Angus M. Fraser, *The People's Liberation Army*, New York, Crane, Russak and Co., 1973.

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of a potential nuclear attack through the development of a highly decentralized, locally self-sufficient economy and through extensive civil defense measures; however, he believed that the actual likelihood of nuclear war was relatively low. His contingency plans for countering a conventional invasion of China were to fight a protracted guerrilla war by luring his adversary into Chinese territory and destroying the invading forces with the support of the populace and a militia, as he recalled that China had done in defeating Japan. (This recollection may have been somewhat distorted, given the United States' not insignificant role in the Pacific theater during World War II.) It was not a defense posture which assigned much of a role to a modernized ground force or which attached priority to developing the capacity to fight a sustained frontal war. Instead, Mao forged a highly politicized army deeply immersed in societal and economic affairs.

On balance, it seems, Mao's defense posture did not yield the degree of security and military self-sufficiency he had sought. China remains quite vulnerable to non-nuclear war and has little capacity to project her power on a sustained basis beyond the countries on her periphery. It is clear that Mao's military doctrine was never fully accepted among military professionals; moreover, Mao's own chagrin with the PLA's domestic political performance during and after the Cultural Revolution attests to his failure to inculcate military professionals with his political values.

24. Bombarding Quemoy-Matsu, 1958. In August 1958, PLA artillery guns in Fukien Province began a heavy bombardment of the Taiwan-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, as a prelude to a possible attempt to seize the Nationalist bastions. A meticulous reexamination of the crisis by Jonathan Pollack goes far to define Mao's role in the events.[53] Pollack holds that Mao underestimated American resolve to assist the Nationalists, underestimated the will of the Nationalist garrison, and (with his artillery advisers) overestimated the capacity of the PLA to impose a successful blockade. As a consequence of these miscalculations, Pollack concludes, Mao expected a rapid recovery of the islands and did not anticipate the tense situation which emerged. Nevertheless, as the confrontation evolved, Pollack suggests, Mao altered his purposes to take advantage of unplanned opportunities to renew contacts with the US and to deter Nationalist nuisance raids. Since Mao carefully retained the initiative throughout the period and had the capacity to adjust the level of shelling at his will, he was able to control the level of confrontation. Therefore, Pollack convincingly argues, Mao was able to manipulate the situation to secure both external and internal advantages (for example, to help mobilize popular support for the Great Leap). However, these were not the gains he initially sought. Moreover, he paid a high, long-term price for the miscalculation by raising Soviet doubts about the wisdom of assisting China to acquire nuclear weapons and by generating internal opposition to his leadership.

25. Initiating the Great Leap Forward, 1958. In light of his proposals at a series of party meetings beginning in late summer 1957 and continuing through August 1958, Mao must be considered the major initiator of the Great Leap Forward and the attendant program to organize the Chinese people into communes. Mao's objective was to achieve a rapid, simultaneous transformation of the economy and the society primarily through the mobilization of the energies of the people.

Although the Great Leap yielded many side benefits—increased peasant awareness of technology, establishment of many new local industries, recruitment of new local leaders, and creation of the commune framework of local government (which, with modifications, has persisted to the present)—it did not achieve the results Mao had wanted. For a moment in the summer of 1958, Mao evidently believed a genuine breakthrough had occurred in the nation's development, and he became infected by the euphoria he had helped to foster. But, the economy soon sputtered; moreover, society was not substantially altered. Thereafter, Mao abandoned his effort to attain a simultaneous transformation of the economic base and the superstructure. By the spring of 1959 he had admitted his errors, and in 1961 he engaged in self-criticism for his performance during the Leap.[54] The implications of Mao's initiatives were considerable, for the Great Leap failures shattered the underlying consensus on domestic affairs that had previously existed among the top party leaders.

[53] See Pollack's "Perception and Process in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Quemoy Decision," unpublished PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 1976.

[54] See Mao's speech of February 2, 1959, to a Conference of Provincial and Municipal CCP Committee Secretaries, in *Mao Tse-tung Ssu-hsiang Wan-sui* (Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought), n.p., 1969, pp. 271-79. For references to the 1961 self-criticism, see his January 20, 1962, speech to an Enlarged Central Work Conference, in *ibid.*, p. 406.

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26. *Purging foes—the Lushan Plenum, 1959.* Mao's Great Leap policies faced an unprecedented challenge at a plenary meeting of the CCP Central Committee at Lushan in July-August 1959. The attack was launched primarily by Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai and assorted supporters, who also appear to have been critical of Mao's growing hostility toward Khrushchev's USSR (see below). The precise intentions of Mao's detractors are not clear, nor does the record reveal whether Mao had baited a trap for P'eng. In any case, Mao acted swiftly and boldly to rebuff P'eng and his other critics, removing them from their governmental posts and launching a national campaign against P'eng's sin of "rightist opportunism." The memory of that decisive meeting was permanently etched on the minds of Mao's colleagues, who never again dared to openly challenge his claim to embody the interests of the peasants in domestic matters or the nation's interests in Sino-Soviet affairs.

Peasants operate windboxes of their "backyard furnaces" on the Shiu Hsin Commune outside Peking during the Great Leap Forward of 1958.

—Henri Cartier-Bresson/Magnum.

In the short run, Mao's decisions at Lushan accomplished the ends he sought. But the ghosts of that meeting haunted him to his death. For one thing, the "anti-rightist" campaign led to unjustified purges of a host of lower-level cadres, although Mao accepted the rehabilitation of many of these individuals in 1961-62. The thorny issue of "reversal of verdicts" created by the Lushan Plenum remained on the agenda of the Politburo as late as 1975, when some of the military commanders who had been demoted as a result of P'eng's fall were finally rehabilitated.[55] P'eng Te-huai's own fate was also a bone of contention until 1966. The purge proved even more corrosive in its impact on the process of policy formulation, for it chilled subsequent policy debates, forcing all opposition to Mao to take more subterranean and indirect forms. He had driven his opponents underground and therefore was unable to delineate loyal from disloyal opposition. His seeming victory at Lushan ultimately weakened him, in a drama evoking Macbeth.

27. *Modernizing agriculture, 1959-.*[56] As Mao came to recognize that the Great Leap's "mobilizational" approach to hastening agricultural development was ill-suited to China's needs, he signaled a new approach by propounding two slogans: "Take agriculture as the base and industry as the leading factor" and "Mechanization is the way out for Chinese agriculture." These rallying cries accorded increased importance to agriculture and encouraged its technological modernization.

With a supportive bureaucracy and the creation of an appropriate accompanying set of rural small-scale industries, post-Leap agricultural policies turned out to be quite successful. China experienced the first wave of its Green Revolution, and production mounted rapidly through most of the 1960's. Mao's own satisfaction with the agricultural realm is perhaps underscored by the absence of any known subsequent major intervention on his part save for his 1962 veto of proposals to expand the private plots, his 1965 veto of plans to centralize control over tractors, and possibly a post-Cultural Revolution effort to reform the rural income structure.

[55] The author has commented on "reversal of verdicts" as a *sui generis* Chinese political issue in his article, "The Exit Pattern from Chinese Politics and Its Implications," *The China Quarterly* (London), September 1976.

[56] Mao's involvement in this area is traced in Benedict Stavis, "The Political Dimensions of the Technical Transformation of Agriculture in China," unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1972.

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Even these actions were more attempts to prevent erosion of the socialist organization of agriculture than to break new ground. Not until the fall of 1975, with the National Conference on Emulation of Tachai, did the then ailing Mao endorse a basically fresh approach to the modernization of agriculture, and this did not so much signal dissatisfaction with the past record as recognition that production requirements had evolved to a different stage.

28. Breaking with the USSR, 1959-60. Sino-Soviet relations worsened in the winter of 1959-60 as the Soviet Union opted for closer ties with the US and India while China departed ever more sharply from the Soviet conception of relations within the Communist bloc. As Mao later acknowledged,[57] he spent a substantial portion of his time handling China's side of the dispute. A turning point was reached in the late summer of 1960 with the USSR's withdrawal of its advisers from China, but this move had been preceded by a number of acrimonious meetings and by thinly veiled Soviet warnings that a withdrawal was in the offing. A recent careful reexamination by Jamie Horsley of Moscow's and Peking's mutual calculations in 1960—partly based on new evidence—concludes that each side overestimated its leverage on the other and underestimated its adversary's tenacity.[58] Neither appeared really eager for the rupture that occurred, but each thought the other certainly would yield first. In retrospect, Mao felt that the withdrawal of Soviet aid actually proved highly beneficial, for although it caused temporary difficulties, it forced China to become self-reliant and to discover her own strength. From the 1960 watershed, for example, flowed the frenzied and ultimately highly successful efforts to develop the nation's petroleum resources. But Mao had not fully anticipated these beneficial results, and he had not foreseen either the short- or long-term costs of the rift. Here was a miscalculation, albeit one which was understandable as an expression of national pride and autonomy.

29. Combating Soviet "imperialism," 1962-. As he brooded over the causes of the Sino-Soviet rift, Mao increasingly attributed the conflict to the internal dynamics of Soviet society. In his view, a new, exploitative class had consolidated its rule under Khrushchev and was pursuing its narrow interests both internally and externally. With the proclamation at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the CPSU was a party of the "whole people," Mao concluded that Khrushchev had abandoned the Soviet party's claim to represent the revolutionary interests of the working classes. Mao had long held that socialism could never be built through consensual politics, yet that was what Khrushchev was advocating. The result, Mao believed, would inevitably be the consolidation of power in the hands of the rulers and the cessation of social ferment and change. Moreover, Mao argued that the inevitable tensions which would accumulate within the static, oppressive Soviet system would be projected onto the world scene, as Russia's rulers would seek to enhance their own power and wealth and to dispel domestic discontent with foreign gains. This assessment culminated in China's open, vitriolic polemics against the USSR and in Mao's efforts to commit his successors to an unyielding stance against the Soviet Union.

Outside analysts may contest the accuracy of Mao's class analysis and trace the roots of Soviet policy to legitimate pursuit of national interest or to the dynamics of Soviet bureaucratic politics. Nonetheless, Mao died certain of the accuracy of his judgment, and little the Russians did from 1963 to 1976 departed from his predictions regarding the Soviet thrust. Among the notable developments were the Soviet quest for military bases in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; the expansion of the Soviet navy; the Soviet search for temporary agreements of advantage with the United States; and the Soviet pressures that led to discontent among recipients of Soviet aid.

Many outside observers believe Mao did not manage the Sino-Soviet dispute well. They contend that his biting polemics exacerbated the dispute. He was too clever by half, for he failed to see that his ideological rhetoric, when coupled with the internal chaos of the Cultural Revolution, would generate a rapid Soviet military buildup. In addition, Mao may have missed opportunities to respond to moments of Soviet flexibility, such as when Khrushchev was overthrown. But Mao's self-perception was that he had foreseen the inexorable expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union before many others. Events, he felt, bore him out, and his only concern was lest his successors should succumb to Soviet blandishments and threats.

30. Sustaining socialist development, 1963-66. Mao also astutely identified the implications of the

[57] See *Mao Tse-tung Ssu-hsiang Wan-sui*, n.p., 1967, p. 259.

[58] See Jamie Horsley, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Withdrawal of the Soviet Advisers from China, July 1960," unpublished MA essay in Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1975.

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Soviet experience for his own society. The problem was to prevent the emergence of a new bureaucratic class in China, and from 1963 through 1965 he urged a number of policies to this end: the Socialist Education Campaign to reinstill ideological commitment among rural and urban local cadres, the campaign to "train revolutionary successors" (aimed at the young), programs to give a more equitable cast to the nation's public-health and educational systems, efforts to encourage cadres to spend time in physical labor, reforms in the cultural realm to inject more "revolutionary" themes into artistic works, and so on.[59]

For complex reasons, these policies made slow headway, and Mao grew impatient. By 1966, he concluded that his policy initiatives had failed and that another approach to deter "revisionism" was necessary. The irony may be that while Mao judged that his initiatives had been thwarted, his programs in fact were well designed and were securing the maximum gains possible under the circumstances. Yet the criterion for evaluating Mao's performance in the present analysis is whether *he* believed his policy commitments had yielded their intended result. Therefore, his 1963-65 initiatives must be classified as failures. This is perhaps the only instance in which Mao underestimated his success.

31. Launching the Cultural Revolution, 1966-69. It is impossible to summarize briefly Mao's evaluation of the events he helped to unleash with his purge of the Peking party apparatus in June 1966, his demotion of Liu Shao-ch'i in August of the same year, and his subsequent blessing of the Red Guards. For one thing, only a few statements and actions are available on which to judge Mao's assessment. Moreover, the Cultural Revolution (CR) was a multifaceted, protracted affair about which no one could make a simple evaluation. Yet, some observations are possible. In the first place, Mao probably did not anticipate the full fury which the CR unleashed; he confessed as much at the October 1966 Central Party Work Conference. His meeting with students in July 1968 and his interview with Edgar Snow in 1970 both revealed his disappointment with the behavior of the Red Guards during the course of the CR and his awareness that the CR had brought China to the precipice of civil war. His at least temporary willingness to rehabilitate a principal victim of the CR, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and his countenancing of the 1970 purge of the CR's major ideologue, Ch'en Po-ta, also suggest his desire to minimize the political damage caused by the Cultural Revolution. Finally, brief quotations from Mao in 1974-75 reveal deep regret for the social and economic disruptions which the excesses of the CR caused.[60]

At the same time, there was ambivalence. For Mao never openly repudiated the Cultural Revolution, and he certainly sought to retain many of the "newborn socialist" practices which emerged in its course: reforms in the educational and cultural realm, the May 7th cadre schools, the sending of urban youths to the countryside, and so on. More significant, he did not abandon his notion that the quest for socialism required periodic campaigns which heightened social tensions and mobilized the masses to struggle against enemies.[61] After all, he did lend weight to the "Criticism of Lin, Criticism of Confucius" campaign which began to surface in 1973. Finally, he did not rush to Teng Hsiao-p'ing's rescue in February 1976.

As with the collectivization of 1955-56 and the Great Leap of 1958, so during the Cultural Revolution Mao supported policies which inherently risked severe excesses. It remains unclear whether: (a) Mao underestimated the risks and was really overwhelmed by events—in which case he did not understand the system he had helped create; (b) he thought the risks worth taking, verbally cautioned against them, but took no measures to minimize them—in which case he was administratively negligent; or (c) he knew that excesses would occur, but thought the gains would outweigh the costs and positioned himself so he could shift blame onto others—in which case he miscalculated, since he was not totally able to absolve himself of responsibility. The outside observer cannot tell which of these three by no means mutually exclusive possibilities pertain, but no matter what the combination, Mao ends up having blundered.

32. Turning to the US, 1971-74. As is well known, Mao and Chou En-lai on the Chinese side and Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger on the American

[59] For a discussion of this era, see Richard Baum, *Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1975.

[60] On the October 1966 statement, see Schram, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 271. For July 1968, see *Mao Tse-tung Ssu-hsiang Wan-sui*, 1969 ed., pp. 687-717. For 1970, see Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution*, p. 174. For 1974-75, see *The Washington Post*, Dec. 18, 1974, and *The New York Times*, May 5, 1975, and Oct. 26, 1976.

[61] See "Mao Tse-tung's Talk to 'Liberated Cadres' and 'Wuhan Cadres,' " delivered in mid-1974, in *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), February 1975.

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side initiated the process of normalization between the two countries. It was primarily a common concern with the Soviet Union that drove the two sides together; each hoped to use the other as a counterweight in dealings with the USSR. Other lesser Chinese motivations appear to have been the desire for technology and the hope of making progress over the Taiwan issue. Mao probably died disappointed with the US, most particularly with its apparent lack of resolve against the Soviets. Watergate and the American debacle in Vietnam had taken their toll. Besides these external setbacks, the Mao-Chou initiative encountered opposition in Peking. In fact, the failure to establish full US-Chinese diplomatic relations was a function of domestic political problems in both countries. For complex reasons, then, Mao did not in his lifetime secure the gains he had anticipated from one of his boldest moves, although this does not necessarily preclude realization of those gains under post-Mao Chinese and post-election US administrations.

33. *Arranging for succession.* One of Mao's greatest frustrations lay in his inability to come up with a successor he deemed satisfactory. Two arrangements—involving Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao—went awry, as Mao concluded that each man was unworthy to take over the leadership. The possibility of an orderly transition managed by Chou En-lai passed with the Premier's death, and Mao himself helped reject Teng Hsiao-p'ing as Chou's substitute. Historians will note the debilitating, intense power struggles which characterized Mao's last decade. And the spectacle of his successors squabbling over the disposition of his decaying remains—whether to cremate or mummify his body—is also now indelibly recorded in history. Within days of his death, four Politburo members whom he had elevated and sustained in office—possibly because of their flattery, deceit, and manipulation of him—were purged.

In his last months, Mao turned to Hua Kuo-feng. During the Communist takeover of Hunan during 1949-50, Hua had received the distinct honor and responsibility of becoming the party first secretary in Mao's home county of Hsiangt'an, and he came to Mao's attention soon after that, if not before. He probably was Mao's compromise candidate for the No. 2 spot during the stormy party meetings of February and April 1976.[62] Hua's bold effort to rapidly forge a viable and talented Politburo and to eliminate his potential rivals—even if they could claim close links to Mao—suggests Mao in the end may have identified a worthy successor. But for the moment what one recalls is the Chairman's ten years of anguish in doing so.

[62] For a splendid summary of the period, see Parris Chang, "China's Politics and Policies. Mao's Last Stand?" *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1976, pp. 1-17.

The Overall Record

Thirty-three major policy commitments during a 55-year political career constitute a spectacular performance. To be sure, a critical assessment of these 33 commitments—in vastly oversimplified terms—suggests that Mao was satisfied with the results that they produced in 18 cases, dissatisfied in 15 (see Table 1). Many Western critics of Mao focus upon his numerous failures as evidence of a mediocre performance. Perhaps they implicitly apply standards from the sports world, where a 50-50 won-lost percentage is not championship caliber. In this author's opinion, however, what first commands attention when one views Mao from an overall perspective is the sheer number of his major involvements. This is a tribute to Mao's stamina, breadth of vision and interests, and political acumen in being able to bring his will to bear so many times. It also reflects the acoustical quality of the Chinese political stage, which enabled Mao's voice to reverberate on an unprecedented scale.

To place Mao's performance in comparative perspective, it is essential to remember that among the great leaders of the modern era only Chiang K'ai-shek and Winston Churchill were vital political forces for more than 50 years, and neither, to put it vulgarly, approached Mao's 18-15 won-lost record. In fact, Churchill attained immortality essentially with only one "right" decision—opposition to Hitler. If we look for policy commitments on the scale of those by which we are evaluating Mao, Franklin Roosevelt is considered a great American president for articulating only four—the first wave of New Deal legislation in 1933-34, the so-called second New Deal of 1934-36, the sounding of the alarm for the somnolent American people to the growing Nazi and Japanese threats in 1938-41, and the strategy for World War II. John F. Kennedy ends up with only one—his cool determination during the Cuban missile crisis; Abraham Lincoln, with three—deciding to preserve the Union, to eliminate slavery by decree, and to adopt General Grant's strategy for defeating the South. Although V.I. Lenin's career spanned

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Table 1: Mao's Major Policy Commitments:

Policy commitment	Result	Decision time	Issue area	Means of enforcement
Pre-1949				
1. Becoming a CCP revolutionary, 1921	successful	protracted	social change	coercion
2. Turning to the peasants, 1925-	successful	protracted	revolution	remuneration
3. Joining with the Kuomintang, 1923-27	unsuccessful	protracted	revolution	normative appeal
4. Establishing a rural base, 1928-	successful	brief	revolution	coercion
5. Defending the Kiangsi Soviet, 1931-34	successful	protracted	revolution	coercion
6. Guiding the Long March, 1935	successful	brief	revolution	coercion
7. Articulating a guerrilla strategy, 1936-40	successful	protracted	revolution	coercion
8. Renewing cooperation with the KMT, 1937-40	unsuccessful	protracted	revolution	normative appeal
9. Defining the "mass line," 1939-45	successful	protracted	revolution	normative appeal
10. Conducting the rectification campaign, 1941-45	successful	protracted	social change	coercion
11. Seeking US support, 1944-46	unsuccessful	protracted	foreign policy	remuneration
12. Going for power, 1946-48	successful	protracted	revolution	coercion
13. Pushing land reform, 1946-48	unsuccessful	protracted	social change	remuneration
Post-1949				
14. Entering the Korean war, 1950	successful	brief	foreign policy	coercion
15. Guiding China's development, 1950-53	successful	protracted	social change	remuneration
16. Collectivizing agriculture, 1955	successful	brief	social change	remuneration
17. Responding to destalinization, 1956	successful	protracted	revolution	normative appeal
18. Encouraging a "Hundred Flowers," 1956-57	unsuccessful	protracted	social change	normative appeal
19. Fighting bureaucracy, 1956-	successful	protracted	social change	normative appeal
20. Educating the populace	successful	protracted	social change	normative appeal
21. Promoting public health	successful	protracted	social change	remuneration
22. Managing industry	unsuccessful	protracted	economics	remuneration
23. Securing the national defense	unsuccessful	protracted	foreign policy	coercion
24. Bombarding Quemoy-Matsu, 1958	unsuccessful	brief	foreign policy	coercion
25. Initiating the Great Leap Forward, 1958	unsuccessful	protracted	economics	remuneration
26. Purging foes—the Lushan Plenum, 1959	unsuccessful	brief	scoial change	coercion
27. Modernizing agriculture, 1959-	successful	protracted	economics	remuneration
28. Breaking with the USSR, 1959-60	unsuccessful	protracted	foreign policy	normative appeal
29. Combating Soviet "imperialism," 1962	successful	protracted	foreign policy	normative appeal
30. Sustaining socialist development, 1963-66	unsuccessful	protracted	revolution	normative appeal
31. Launching the Cultural Revolution, 1966-69	unsuccessful	protracted	social change	normative appeal
32. Turning to the US, 1971-74	unsuccessful	protracted	foreign policy	remuneration
33. Arranging for succession	unsuccessful	protracted	social change	normative appeal

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A Half Century of Involvement, 1921-76

(Policy number)	Traditionality	Popularity	Party elite's attitude	Policy agent	Primary target	Affected milieu
Pre-1949						
1	nontraditional	unpopular	support	party	(not applicable)	urban
2	traditional	popular	opposition	party	supporters	rural
3	nontraditional	popular	support	party	adversaries	urban
4	traditional	unpopular	opposition	army	colleagues	rural
5	traditional	popular	opposition	army	colleagues	rural
6	traditional	(not applicable)	opposition	army	colleagues	rural
7	traditional	popular	support	army	adversaries	rural
8	nontraditional	popular	support	party	adversaries	urban
9	nontraditional	popular	support	government	supporters	rural
10	nontraditional	(not applicable)	support	party	colleagues	rural
11	nontraditional	popular	opposition	army	adversaries	urban
12	nontraditional	unpopular	opposition	army	colleagues	urban
13	nontraditional	unpopular	opposition	party	supporters	rural
Post-1949						
14	nontraditional	popular	support	army	adversaries	(not applicable)
15	nontraditional	popular	support	government	supporters	(not applicable)
16	traditional	popular	opposition	party	supporters	rural
17	traditional	(not applicable)	opposition	party	colleagues	(not applicable)
18	nontraditional	popular	opposition	party	adversaries	urban
19	nontraditional	popular	opposition	government	supporters	urban
20	traditional	popular	support	government	supporters	rural
21	traditional	popular	opposition	government	supporters	rural
22	nontraditional	unpopular	opposition	government	supporters	urban
23	traditional	(not applicable)	opposition	army	supporters	(not applicable)
24	traditional	(not applicable)	support	army	adversaries	rural
25	nontraditional	popular	opposition	party	supporters	rural
26	traditional	unpopulàr	opposition	party	colleagues	(not applicable)
27	nontraditional	popular	support	government	supporters	rural
28	traditional	popular	support	party	adversaries	urban
29	traditional	popular	support	government	adversaries	(not applicable)
30	nontraditional	unpopular	support	party	colleagues	urban
31	nontraditional	unpopular	opposition	army	colleagues	urban
32	traditional	popular	opposition	government	adversaries	urban
33	traditional	unpopular	opposition	party	colleagues	urban

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28 years, the bulk of his decisions were crammed into the 1917-23 era, and most of his many brilliant decisions were tactical. But at the strategic level, his initiatives numbered five: to establish the Bolshevik Party, to seek total power through revolution in 1917, to take Russia out of World War I, to consolidate power from the cities outward, and to regenerate the economy through the New Economic Policy (NEP).

In short, few national leaders have exhibited political astuteness in more than four or five major programmatic initiatives over their careers (in American history, Jefferson may be the exception), and success in one instance is sufficient to qualify for inclusion in political history books. Without making a general value judgment (for it is important to bear in mind that countless numbers suffered and died from Mao's successes), one must nonetheless deem Mao's record extraordinary.

Disaggregating his record into discrete policy commitments, as we did in the first portion of this article, tends to detract from our capacity to evaluate Mao as a whole, for his various interventions and their specific goals were related to his broader search for national security, prosperity, and socialism. One must also ask, therefore, whether the parts sum into a whole with which Mao was satisfied. Did he move China in the overall direction he sought? The answer would have to be "yes." He left a more unified, wealthier, stronger, and more equitable society than he had found. He sought to restore national dignity, to terminate a century of foreign privilege, and to give China a voice in world affairs; he and his generation succeeded. But Mao acted upon a broader vision, too, revealed in his search for a nonbureaucratic mode of policy implementation, his desire for a technologically proficient society with a low division of labor, and his effort to foster a new socialist man. Mao accomplished most of the ambitions of his youth and his middle age, but as Benjamin Schwartz and Stuart Schram have stressed,[63] Mao changed over time. As he neared attainment of some goals, others became more important to him—particularly the desire to commit his successors to his quest, as he described it in July 1957, for a society "both democratic and centralized, both disciplined and free, both with a general will and yet in which the individual would be at ease." [64] This unyielding hope that those who followed him could continue his effort to reconcile what remained currently irreconcilable made Mao's last years seem a frustrating chase of the setting sun.

Explaining the Record

Thus far, our evaluation has been essentially descriptive. Now, let us turn to analysis. What explains Mao's record? The problem is that no all-encompassing single factor was at work. For example, one might assert that Mao did well because his Marxist framework of analysis yielded him special insight. One problem with this explanation is that Mao's colleagues used the same theory of contradictions but frequently came to different conclusions; another is that Mao's framework often produced disastrous results. One might also claim that Mao simply possessed special insight into Chinese society or that he had a keen sense of how to use power. These claims have considerable merit; yet they, too, must be tempered, for as we have noted, Mao made some colossal blunders as well. We need an explanation that accounts for both successes and failures.

One way of proceeding is to examine Mao's 33 policy choices from a number of standpoints and to identify the circumstances under which he encountered success more frequently. Did he, for example, score triumphs more consistently before or after 1949? Did he handle certain kinds of issues better than others? Was he more likely to encounter success when his policy recommendations had wide popular support? And so on. The effort, in short, is to explain Mao's accomplishments by explaining the variance in his performance as well.

A trial run at such an evaluation is presented in Table 1. Mao's 33 major commitments are classified in terms of 11 dimensions. The first is whether Mao retrospectively thought the commitment produced successful results or not, and the other ten are somewhat overlapping independent variables. They include: (1) the decision time—whether Mao expressed his preference in a crisis or arrived at his conclusion through protracted analysis; (2) the

[63] In particular, see Schram's "Introduction," to his *Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China*, and Schwartz, "China's Development Experience, 1949-1972," in Michel Oksenberg, Ed., *China's Developmental Experience*, New York, Praeger, 1973, pp. 17-26.

[64] The excerpt comes from a speech delivered in July 1957 to a party meeting in Tsingtao, the full text of which is still unavailable. Parts of this speech are in *Mao Tse-tung Ssu-hsiang Wan-sui*, 1967 ed., p. 16.

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historical era—whether the commitment was made during Mao's pursuit of power or during his years as leader of China; (3) the issue area—whether the prime issue at stake involved strategy of revolution (problems concerning seizure of power), strategy of social change (problems concerning the use of power to transform culture and society), economic development, or foreign policy; (4) the means of enforcement—whether the main means to be used in implementing the policy was coercion, remuneration (the offering of material benefits), or normative (ideological) appeals; (5) traditionality—whether Mao's policy preference was in keeping with traditional Chinese policy and administrative preferences for harmony, cultural independence, and hierarchy, or whether it seemed to depart from traditional political ways; (6) popularity—whether or not his policy seems to have had widespread popular appeal; (7) the attitude of the party elite—whether his policy recommendations had near unanimous support or widespread opposition within the CCP Central Committee and Politburo; (8) the policy agent—whether the prime agency for implementing the policy was the army, the party, or the government; (9) the primary target—whether the prime group whose behavior Mao sought to alter was his colleagues and close allies in the CCP leadership, his supporters at lower levels of the CCP and in society, or his adversaries; and (10) the affected milieu—whether the major location to be affected by the decision was urban or rural.

Before reporting the results of this analysis, the author should register three caveats about it. First, any effort to simplify complex phenomena for the sake of classification and evaluation rests on somewhat shaky intellectual foundations. After all, as we have already noted, Mao regarded most of his policies as partially successful and partially unsuccessful. Similarly, to describe a mode of implementation as either "traditional" or "nontraditional" is simplistic, for a goal or administrative mode can partake of both. Moreover, the highly diverse Chinese tradition obviously sustained a wide range of administrative practices. Second, the 33 commitments are not all really comparable with one another. Some, such as Mao's commitments during the Kiangsi era or during the 1963-66 period, refer to a number of separate recommendations over a discrete time period; others—*e.g.*, his public-health or educational policies—refer to a number of interrelated commitments over a long time period; still others refer to specific decisions. Nor are all 33 of equal importance; hence, treating them as statistically equal amounts to lumping apples and oranges together. Third, information on such matters as the degree of popular support or the extent of opposition by the party elite is often scanty. Only rough estimates are possible, and other observers could legitimately disagree with the assessments set forth here. As a consequence, the figures presented below are, at best, only suggestive. Recognizing all these severe limitations, however, the author has chosen—despite the risk of controversy—to try to quantify Mao's performance to see whether such a different mode of analysis yields new questions and/or new insights. A comforting aspect of the results is that they tend by and large to confirm conventional wisdom.

Without further ado, here are the findings regarding the circumstances in which Mao was more —or less—successful in accomplishing his ends:

1. Decision time. Of the 33 initiatives, 27 involved protracted elaboration of complex policies, while six were swiftly rendered decisions. This finding in itself is interesting, for it supports Allen Whiting's contention that Mao sought to avoid crisis decision-making.[65] Mao tried to control the flow of events so as to determine the timing, intensity, and extensiveness of policy implementation. However, as Table 2 suggests, Mao actually turns out to have been effective in swift decisions; in four out of the six instances, he achieved his objective.

2. Historical era. Was Mao better as a revolutionary or as the leader of the entire nation? Table 3 indicates that he displayed greater insight before 1949 than after. The reasons for this are probably numerous. For one, the number and complexity of the tasks after 1949 were greater. Mao may also have become increasingly isolated and removed from the realities of his society. And the criteria by which he measured his own success grew more demanding—it may be easier to pursue power through revolution than to try to commit one's successors to building socialism.

3. Issue area. The next finding reinforces this last observation. Of the four issue areas into which his 33 policies were classified, Mao was by far most effective in handling problems of revolutionary strategy (see Table 4). He was also fairly successful in engineering social change. He achieved least suc-

[65] *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975.

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Table 2: Time Mao Took to Make Decision

	Policy Commitments		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Brief	4 (67%)	2 (33%)	6 (100%)
Protracted	14 (52%)	13 (48%)	27 (100%)

Table 3: Period of Mao's Decision

	Policy Commitments		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Pre-1949	9 (69%)	4 (31%)	13 (100%)
Post-1949	9 (45%)	11 (55%)	20 (100%)

Table 4: Issue Area

	Policy Commitments		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Foreign Policy	2 (29%)	5 (71%)	7 (100%)
Economics	1 (33%)	2 (67%)	3 (100%)
Social Change	7 (58%)	5 (42%)	12 (100%)
Revolution	8 (73%)	3 (27%)	11 (100%)

Table 5: Means of Enforcement

	Policy Commitments		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Coercion	8 (73%)	3 (27%)	11 (100%)
Remuneration	5 (50%)	5 (50%)	10 (100%)
Normative Appeal	5 (43%)	7 (57%)	12 (100%)

Table 6: Traditionality in Policy Implementation

	Policy Commitments		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Traditional	10 (63%)	6 (37%)	16 (100%)
Untraditional	8 (47%)	9 (53%)	17 (100%)

Table 7: Popularity of Policies

	Policy Commitments [a]		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Popular	12 (63%)	7 (37%)	19 (100%)
Unpopular	3 (33%)	6 (67%)	9 (100%)

[a] The dimension examined does not pertain to five policies.

Table 8: Party Elite's Attitude on Policies

	Policy Commitments		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Support	9 (64%)	5 (36%)	14 (100%)
Opposition	9 (47%)	10 (53%)	19 (100%)

Table 9: Policy Agent

	Policy Commitments		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Government	7 (77%)	2 (23%)	9 (100%)
Party	5 (36%)	9 (64%)	14 (100%)
Army	6 (60%)	4 (40%)	10 (100%)

Table 10: Prime Target of Policies

	Policy Commitments [a]		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Colleagues	6 (60%)	4 (40%)	10 (100%)
Supporters	8 (67%)	4 (33%)	12 (100%)
Adversaries	3 (30%)	7 (70%)	10 (100%)

[a] The dimension examined does not pertain to one policy.

Table 11: Milieu Affected

	Policy Commitments [a]		
	Successful	Unsuccessful	Total
Urban	3 (23%)	10 (77%)	13 (100%)
Rural	11 (79%)	3 (21%)	14 (100%)

[a] The dimension examined does not pertain to six policies.

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cess in the foreign policy and economic realms. Indeed, his self-acknowledged ignorance about economic matters helps explain why he undertook only a few major initiatives in this sphere. Reluctant to intervene in this area before the mid-1950's, he became even more inclined to shy away from it after the failures of the Great Leap.

4. *Means of enforcement.* As Table 5 suggests, Mao achieved his greatest success when he employed coercion, an often underestimated facet of his rule. By contrast, his performance was just moderately successful when he relied primarily on material rewards and even less successful when he resorted to ideological appeals for enforcement. This runs counter to two contradictory conventional wisdoms about Mao—namely, that his great strength was his ideological appeal and that he failed so frequently because he did not rely sufficiently on material incentives. While, as noted at the outset, our findings are more suggestive than conclusive, they do tend to show that in this case the conventional wisdoms deserve more careful scrutiny.

5. *Traditionality.* Did Mao register more success in the short run (whatever the long-term risks entailed for his goals of social change) when he implemented his policies through traditional means rather than through nontraditional means? Table 6 reveals that Mao was somewhat more successful when he went *with* rather than *against* tradition, but another implication of the table is that Mao was neither consistently traditional nor consistently nontraditional in his approach to rule. Here, too, perhaps some rethinking is necessary about the extent to which he drew upon and rejected traditional approaches to rule. In many instances, as Mao's biographers have noted [66] and the data suggest, Mao successfully drew upon tradition in pursuing his objectives.

6. *Popularity of the policy.* In one of our strongest correlations, and one that needs little amplification, Mao was more likely to achieve his goals when the objectives and the manner of policy implementation were popularly supported. Here, then, we see the significance of Mao's increasing isolation as an aging ruler. In his later years, he may have found it increasingly difficult to assess the nation's mood (see Table 7).

7. *Party elite's attitude.* One plausible hypothesis which both Parris Chang and Byung-joon Ahn have implicitly advanced is that Mao's failures, at least in his last years, resulted from his disregard of his colleagues' advice.[67] Not only were his subordinates well informed, but since the Chairman depended upon them for implementation of his policies, they were able to subvert those recommendations with which they strongly disagreed. Our analysis lends some but not decisive support to this interpretation. As Table 8 indicates, Mao encountered more success with policies which his associates supported; however, about 50 percent of the time he was successful in the face of opposition. Support was helpful yet not necessary.

8. *Policy agent.* Mao had to rely upon three great administrative hierarchies—the party, the army, and the government—to enforce his will. Did it make a difference which one was the prime implementer of his policies? Table 9 suggests a qualified "yes." Mao was most successful when the army or government was his prime agent, and he was least successful when he used the party—the organization upon which he rained his wrath during the Cultural Revolution. No doubt there is an interrelationship between this finding and our earlier finding about the lower effectiveness of ideological appeals in enforcing policy: such appeals are usually issued by the party. Again, our data are suggestive, not conclusive, but they do raise questions about which of the three great hierarchies was his most responsive and effective agent.

9. *Prime target.* Mao seemingly was at his best in manipulating his supporters and colleagues and least successful in dealing with his adversaries (see Table 10). This is a fascinating finding, which goes far toward explaining his political longevity. As we have noted elsewhere, Mao was a superb politician who knew, for much of the time, how to dominate his Politburo.[68] But as indicated here, he performed less well in handling his opponents. He tended to overestimate his own capacities, to underestimate theirs, and to assume that their calculations coincided with his.

10. *Affected milieu.* Was Mao better in dealing with urban or rural areas? Here we have one of the

[66] See Schram, *Mao Tse-tung;* also, Jerome Chen, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution,* London, Oxford University Press, 1965.

[67] See Chang, *Power and Policy in China,* University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975, and Ahn, *Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution,* Seattle, University of Washington Press, forthcoming.

[68] See the author's "Policymaking Under Mao, 1949-68: An Overview," in John Lindbeck, Ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society,* Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971, pp. 79-115.

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

Lines of militia maintain order during a massive rally of Red Guards in Peking during the Cultural Revolution.

—Ciao Garruba/Camera Press.

strongest correlations with common wisdom—namely, Mao was much more successful in devising effective politicies for rural areas than for urban areas. Mao understood the countryside but not the city (see Table 11).

Conclusion

This mode of analysis tends to produce three major explanations for Mao's successes. First, he knew particularly how to control his colleagues and supporters and to use force when necessary. Second, he had special insight into revolutionary strategy and the countryside, but when he strayed into areas in which he possessed lesser competence —economic policy, foreign affairs, urban problems —his recommendations frequently yielded unsatisfactory results. In most cases, however, he tended to intervene periodically rather than to administer constantly, for he apparently recognized that he was better as a strategist than as a formulator of precise decisions. Third, Mao frequently enunciated policies that successfully tapped the hopes of the populace and his colleagues. As with any ruler, Mao's capacity for accomplishing his ends depended largely on a combination of his own knowledge and the support his policies commanded, and when he judged these factors accurately, he was usually effective. Thus, his astute sense of the nature of his society contributed significantly to his success. And perhaps the major reason for his outstanding record, compared to the records of other political figures, is that he assessed the opportunities before him more accurately than most politicians. To be sure, he frequently did not recognize the constraints confronting him, and erred as a result. But his bold will to test the limits enabled him to lead his nation into a new era.

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The PCI on the Threshold

By Giacomo Sani

On August 10, 1976, Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), rose in the House of Deputies to announce that the 228 Communist members of the House would abstain in the vote of confidence on the new Cabinet led by Christian Democrat Giulio Andreotti. Observers could not but agree with Berlinguer's statement that this represented a significant development—a turning point that ushered in a new phase in Italian politics. It marked the first time the PCI had been consulted prior to the formation of a Cabinet by the Premier designate; it was the first instance since 1947 that the PCI had abstained rather than vote against the proposed Cabinet; it was the first time that Communist action in Parliament had been crucial to the survival of the Cabinet; and, finally, it was the first occasion on which a Christian Democratic Premier had not rejected as unwanted and unnecessary the votes of the PCI. To be sure, the bargaining strength of the Communist Party resulted in part from the refusal of the Socialists (PSI), the Social Democrats (PSDI), and the Republicans (PRI) to join the Christian Democrats (DC) in another "center-left" coalition; nevertheless, given the balance of power resulting from the parliamentary election of June 20, 1976, and the positions taken by the other parties, Berlinguer was entirely correct in asserting: "Everybody knows by now that if we voted against, the government would fall immediately." [1]

To some observers, the behavior of Italy's major parties indicated that a "historic compromise" had begun;[2] to others, it appeared that the election had opened a new and transitional phase in Italian politics which would eventually bring about a major realignment of political forces. No one, however, could deny the novelty of the situation or ignore the important questions arising from it. These include: What factors are responsible for the increase in the strength of the PCI in Parliament and in many regional, provincial, and communal councils? Is the PCI on the verge of assuming direct governmental responsibilities at the national level? If so, how will support of the government by the PCI affect domestic and foreign policy? To what extent will the PCI itself be affected by change in its role in the political system? And, more generally, what are the implications of recent developments for a possible restructuring of the party system and realignment of political forces? It is these questions with which the present article will deal.

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The Pattern of Growth

When democratic political life resumed in Italy at the end of World War II, the PCI emerged as the third largest party (after the Christian Democrats and the Socialists), receiving 18.9 percent of the popular vote for the Constituent Assembly in the

[1] The text of Berlinguer's speech was reported in full in *l'Unità* (Rome), Aug. 11, 1976; the quotation is from page 12.

[2] The meaning of the term "historic compromise" will be discussed later.

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election of June 2, 1946. (See Figure 1.) The party's strength, however, varied considerably in different areas of the country (see the illustration on p. 29). In general, the party was considerably stronger in the central regions, especially in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, than in the Northeast and in the South, with intermediate strength in the industrialized areas of the Northwest. The ensuing 30 years have brought major alterations in this picture. In the parliamentary election of June 20, 1976, the PCI garnered 34.4 percent of the total popular vote (see Figure 1). Moreover, the party has made substantial gains in all regions, consolidating and expanding its support base in the areas where it had its initial strongholds and successfully penetrating other regions (see the illustration on p. 29). While there is still a certain unevenness in the distribution of its strength, the disparity is considerably less pronounced than was the case in earlier years. As a consequence of this expanded electoral base, the PCI now occupies positions of power at the subnational level in a large number of political domains—including seven regions, almost all of the large cities (Turin, Milan, Venice, Bologna, Genoa, Florence, Rome, and Naples), more than 35 provincial capitals, and countless smaller communities.[3]

Figure 1: Trends in the Electoral Strength of the Three Major Italian Parties, 1946-76



SOURCES: Data for 1946-72 were taken from Mario Caciagli and Alberto Spreafico, Eds., *Un sistema political alla prova* (A Political System Under Trial), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1975, page 61, Table 7. Data for 1976 were from election results published in the Italian press; see, for example, *Corriere della sera* (Milan), June 23, 1976. Points in the figure represent percentages of total vote polled by the respective parties in the 1946 Constituent Assembly election and in subsequent elections to the Italian House—elections with the broadest voter franchise. In 1948, the PCI and PSI ran on a joint ticket, which polled 31 percent of the vote. In 1968, the PSI united with the Social Democrats under the banner of the Unitary Socialist Party (PSU), which polled 14.5 percent of the vote.

Analysis of the pattern of growth of PCI electoral strength leads to several conclusions. First, the increase in the PCI's strength has been gradual but steady over time (see Figure 1). Until the elections of the mid-1970's, the support base of the party had been widening slowly, without sudden expansions. The overall gain reflects a series of small increments from election to election rather than massive surges followed, and partially offset, by sudden declines. To be sure, in certain areas the party has occasionally suffered some losses, but these reversals have generally been modest in size and have been more than made up in subsequent elections.

Second, the expansion of the party's base of support has been general in geographical terms. Growth has been more pronounced in the regions where the party was initially weaker, but it has by no means been confined to these areas (Table 1, p. 30). If the PCI has made greater strides in the South and in the Northeast, doubling and even tripling its share of the vote, it has also registered considerable gains in the areas where it was originally strongest. For example, the growth of support was such that in 1976 it came very close to polling a majority of the votes in Emilia-Romagna (48.5 percent), Tuscany (47.5 percent), and Umbria (47.3 percent).

Third, the expansion of the PCI has not taken place along narrow class lines. The party has succeeded in attracting the support of voters from different social groups, as Palmiro Togliatti had envisioned it might when he put forth the strategy of the "new party" in the early postwar period.[4] A precise assessment of the social composition of the Communist electorate is difficult; however, studies based on both survey and aggregate data indicate that while the PCI receives a disproportionately high share of support from less privileged social groups, it also attracts significant support from segments of other social groups which cannot be considered part of the "working class" in the traditional sense of

[3] Information on the changes in local governments resulting from the 1975 regional, provincial, and communal elections can be found in *Almanacco PCI 1976* (PCI Almanac 1976), Rome, January 1976, esp. pp. 178-81.

[4] For discussion of the PCI strategy in the postwar period, see Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1967; Donald L. M. Blackmer, *Unity and Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1968; Donald L. M. Blackmer, "Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1972, pp. 41-56; and Donald L. M. Blackmer, "Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism," in Donald L. M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Eds., *Communism in Italy and France*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 21-68.

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

ELECTORAL STRENGTH OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN 1946, 1963, AND 1976*

* For 1946, the vote for the Constituent Assembly; for 1963 and 1976, the vote for the Italian House (the chamber elected on the basis of a broader franchise). Abruzzi and Molise formed a single electoral region prior to the 1970 elections.

Percent of Vote for PCI

0 - 9.9
10 - 19.9
20 - 29.9
30 - 30.9
40 - 40.9
PCI vote not separable

SOURCES: Prepared for *Problems of Communism* by the Department of Geography, University of Texas at Austin, from compilations by the author. Data for 1946 and 1963 were from Giorgio Galli, Ed., *Il comportamento elettorale in Italia* (Electoral Behavior in Italy), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1968, p. 334; for 1976, see the reports in the Italian press, *e.g.*, *Rinascita* (Rome), July 2, 1976, p. 8.



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Table 1: Increase in the Electoral Strength of the PCI by Region, 1946-76

Region	Difference between PCI's percent of vote in 1946 and in 1976	Rate of increase (in percent)
Northwest		
Piedmont	+14.6	70.2
Liguria	+10.7	37.7
Lombardy	+11.5	57.2
Northeast		
Trentino-Alto Adige	+ 5.1	63.0
Veneto	+10.1	73.7
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	+13.4	101.5
Central		
Emilia-Romagna	+11.0	29.3
Marche	+18.1	83.0
Tuscany	+13.9	41.4
Umbria	+19.3	68.9
South		
Lazio	+21.8	154.6
Campania	+24.9	336.5
Abruzzi-Molise [a]	+23.0	227.7
Puglia	+17.0	115.6
Basilicata	+20.3	156.0
Calabria	+20.8	170.5
Sicily	+19.6	248.1
Sardinia	+23.1	184.8

[a] While Abruzzi and Molise formed separate regions in 1976, they constituted a single region in 1946. Therefore, they are treated as one region for purposes of this particular analysis.

SOURCES: Calculated by the author on the basis of data in Giorgio Galli, Ed., *Il comportamento elettorale in Italia* (Electoral Behavior in Italy), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1968, p. 334, and in official reports of the results of the June 1976 election, published, *inter alia*, in *Rinascita* (Rome), July 2, 1976, p. 8.

the term—that is, from white collar workers, teachers, shopkeepers, artisans, and the like.[5] Thus, in terms of the social composition of support, the PCI's profile is not much different from that of Italy's other major party, the DC, and it is reasonably close to the profile of the electorate as a whole (see Figure 2). In 1944, Togliatti had urged the party to move beyond the recruitment of workers and to attempt to attract "the peasantry, the masses of intellectuals, . . . professional men, technicians, clerks . . ."; [6] after the electoral successes of the mid-1970's it would appear that the PCI has come close to achieving that goal. Today, from the point of view of its base of support, the Italian Communist Party can be described more accurately as a "catch-all" party—or, as Sidney Tarrow has recently proposed, as a "populist" party [7]—than as a "party of the working class."

Lastly, the growth of the PCI has taken place concurrently with the gradual decline of the Socialist Party (see Figure 1). At the beginning of the postwar period, the two major parties of the Left were approximately equal in terms of support, with the Socialists enjoying a small lead. By 1953, when the two parties contested the national election separately after an unsatisfactory experience with a *Fronte Popolare* in 1948, the Communist Party had taken a sizable lead. Ten years later, the PCI's share of the vote was approximately twice as large as that of the Socialists. By 1972, there were three Communist voters for every Socialist voter, and the 1976 election tilted the balance even more in favor of the PCI (34.4 percent to 9.6 percent for the PSI).

These two opposite trends should not, of course, be taken to mean that the growth of the PCI is due entirely to shifts in the allegiance of Socialist voters. Although such shifts have occurred, internal shifts within the Left are, as we shall see, only one component of the success of the Communist Party. The point here is that as a result of its gradual gains, and the concomitant decline of the Socialists, the PCI has established itself as the leading force of the Italian Left and the major opposition party. Hence, it has become a rallying point for many progressive voters who desire the implementation of social and economic reforms and who do not see a viable and realistic alternative to the PCI.

As suggested earlier, the gains that the Com-

[5] For analyses of the social composition of the electoral base of the PCI, see Mattei Dogan, "The Social Stratification of the Voters," in Alberto Spreafico and Joseph LaPalombara, Eds., *Elezioni e comportamento politico in Italia* (Elections and Political Behavior in Italy), Milan, Edizioni di Comunita, 1963; Lawrence E. Hazelrigg, "Religious and Class Bases of Political Conflict in Italy," *American Journal of Sociology* (Chicago), January 1970, pp. 496-511; Samuel H. Barnes, "Italy: Religion and Class in Electoral Behavior," in Richard Rose, Ed., *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*, New York, The Free Press, 1974; Paolo Sylos Labini, *Saggio sulle classi sociali* (Essay on the Social Classes), Bari, Laterza, 1975; Giorgio Galli, *Dal Bipartitismo imperfetto alla possible alternativa* (From Imperfect Bipartisanism to a Possible Alternative), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1975; Livio Maitan, *Dinamica delle classi sociali in Italia* (The Dynamic of the Social Classes in Italy), Rome, Savelli, 1975; Giacomo Sani, "Mass Level Response to Party Strategy," in *Communism in Italy and France, supra,* pp. 456-503.

[6] The quotation is from a speech by Togliatti on "The Tasks of the Party in the Current Situation," delivered Oct. 3, 1944, in Florence and reprinted in *Critica Marxista* (Rome), Nos. 5-6, September-December 1963, p. 336.

[7] "The Italian Party System Between Crisis and Transition," paper delivered at the panel of the Conference Group on Italian Politics, American Political Science Association meeting, Chicago, Ill., September 2-5, 1976.

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munists made in the 1976 election (3.5 million votes more than they received in the preceding parliamentary election in 1972 and an increase of 7.2 percent in share of the total vote) were considerably higher than the gains that they had registered in past elections. One might therefore wonder whether the response of the electorate in the mid-1970's signals a departure from the pattern of the past. For insight into this question, it is essential to look at the specific factors that have contributed to these overall results. The present author has set forth a detailed analysis of such factors elsewhere,[8] and it may be summarized here.

In the interval between the last two parliamentary elections, seven cohorts of new voters, or approximately 5.5 million people, came into the electorate (three as a consequence of the extension of suffrage to people 18 years of age). During the same period, the names of more than 2 million older electors were removed from the electoral registry because of death. Thus, there was a very large turnover of voters, with a net increase of the electoral body roughly twice as large as the mean increase recorded in the past. The import of these changes in the composition of the electorate becomes obvious when another fact is taken into consideration—namely, that the distribution of party preferences among the younger and the older generations differs substantially. Among the younger electors, sympathies for the parties of the Left and especially for the PCI are much more common than they are among voters over 50 years of age. This, of course, means that the electoral turnover did not affect all parties equally. Some parties acquired a disproportionately large share of the new votes available, and they lost fewer votes because of the passing away

[8] See "Secular Trends and Party Realignments in Italy," paper delivered at the American Political Science Association meeting in San Francisco, Sept. 2-5, 1975, published in Italian as "Electoral Returns and Party Identifications: Toward a Hegemony of the Left?" *Rivista italiana di scienza politica* (Bologna), No. 3, 1975, pp. 516-44; and "The Italian Election of 1976: Continuity and Change," paper delivered at the American Political Science Association meeting in Chicago, Sept. 2-5, 1976, published in Italian as "The Elections of the Seventies: Earthquake or Evolution?" *ibid.*, No. 2, 1976.

Figure 2: Social Composition of the Italian Electorate, 1975

(in percent)



SOURCE: The three profiles were prepared on the basis of 1975 survey data made available to the author by Giovanni Sartori and Alberto Marradi. Respondents were assigned to social strata by the author on the basis of their occupation or that of the head of the household.

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Leaders of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) celebrate their June 1976 election gains from the balcony of party headquarters in Rome. In the center (in the dark suit) is PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer. To his right are Giorgio Amendola and PCI President Luigi Longo; to his left, Luigi Lama, Secretary-General of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL).

—Fabian/Sygma.

of electors from the older generations. The PCI appears to have been one of the main beneficiaries of the turnover, with a net gain of about 1.5 million votes—a figure of some consequence. However, the PCI's total gain was 3.5 million, so one must still account for 2 million votes. Survey data and the electoral results themselves suggest that approximately half these votes represented defections from parties of the Center-Right, while the other half reflected internal shifts within the Left, *i.e.*, transfers of allegiance from the Socialist Party or other minor leftist parties. Of the increase of 7.2 percent in the PCI's share of the total vote, then, 3.2 percent can reasonably be attributed to turnover of the electorate; 2.0 percent, to defections of moderate voters; and 2.0 percent, to internal shifts within the Left. In short, the PCI would clearly have increased its strength without the beneficial impact of turnover, but its success would have been less spectacular.

While further and more detailed investigations might necessitate some modification or revision of these estimates, it seems unlikely that they would produce major alterations in the picture. The chief sources of the PCI's growth in recent years have been, in combination with the high stability of the Communist vote, the party's ability to attract a disproportionate share of younger voters and the success of its appeals to segments of both moderates and Catholics in the electorate. These last two factors provided the element of novelty in the 1976 election. They can best be understood in the light of the new image of the PCI that has been emerging over the last few years.

The Changing Image of the PCI

The evolution of the PCI's image also bears on the issue of whether the party may enter the government in the foreseeable future. For three decades, the PCI has been confined to an opposition role in the Italian political system because of what other parties have regarded as its "special nature," which denied it full democratic legitimacy. While it has been allowed to survive, organize, contest elections, and prosper, there have been considerable doubts about the wisdom of allowing it to acquire positions of power at the national level. Given the availability

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of parliamentary majorities without PCI votes, the question of the right of the party to enter the government did not explicitly come to the fore for many years. Now, however, that situation has altered, for the PCI commands the support of more than a third of the electorate and has great influence in the country. Yet, what kind of responsibilities the PCI assumes in national affairs continues to depend in large measure on the attitudes of non-Communists toward it.

For most of the post-World War II period, the PCI suffered from a negative image among the non-Communist segment of the electorate. This image had—and has—several components. Perhaps the most important of these was that the PCI, despite its pronouncements, was not truly committed to the rules of representative democracy—that its conception of democracy differed from the Western tradition and that its acceptance of the democratic creed was a tactical ploy rather than the expression of a genuine and profound belief. The fear that once in power the PCI would institute systemic changes (or, as Giovanni Sartori put it, that it "would replace the system as well as the people" [9]) was reinforced by the PCI's close ties with the international Communist movement, particularly the Soviet Union. This linkage was generally interpreted as signifying subservience to Moscow's dictates and the party's intention to transform Italian society to conform with the general pattern of Communist societies in Eastern Europe. That this transformation was likely to be revolutionary and violent in nature added a third dimension of apprehension and suspicion, particularly poignant for those who could remember the confrontations and violence of the early 1920's or the mid-1940's. Additional negative aspects of the PCI, with perhaps different degrees of significance for different segments of the electorate, were (a) its anticlericalism (combined with the general limitations on religious freedom under all existing Communist regimes) and (b) implicit threats to private property in its programs of economic reorganization and redistribution. Finally, the PCI's strong organization, its possession of able leaders and a large number of committed militants, its reliance on the theory and practice of "democratic centralism," and its crushing of internal dissent—all made the PCI appear to be a powerful and well-oiled machine, a dangerous foe that could not be taken lightly.

This multifaceted image of the PCI reflected, as the present author has tried to show elsewhere, the debates, polemics, and confrontations which had taken place among parties during the first two decades of the republican regime.[10] In short, it embodied many echoes from the past: the political violence of 1945-46, the anticlerical posture of the Popular Front during the 1948 campaign, the accounts of terror in the Soviet Union under Stalin, the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and so on.

By 1972, however, popular attitudes toward the PCI were growing increasingly differentiated, and not all electors of the Center and Right displayed strong misgivings about the party. At the elite level,

Figure 3: Trends in Religious Practice and in the Perceived Compatibility of Communism and Catholicism



SOURCES: Data on weekly church attendance are from various surveys reported in *Bollettino Doxa* (Milan) and *Ricerche demoscopiche* (Milan), from a 1959 survey by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, and from 1968 and 1972 surveys by the author and Samuel Barnes. Data on the compatibility issue are from surveys reported in *Bollettino Doxa* and from the 1972 survey by the author and Samuel Barnes; points on the solid line are the percent of respondents answering "Yes" to the question "Can one be a good Communist and a good Catholic at the same time?"

[9] "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Eds., *Political Parties and Political Development,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 137-76.

[10] "Mass Level Constraints on Political Realignments: Perceptions of Anti-System Parties in Italy," *British Journal of Political Science* (London), Vol. 6, 1976, pp. 1-31.

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new orientations were even more pronounced. Data of more recent origin, as well as impressionistic observations, suggest that the erosion of the anti-Communist barrier has accelerated since 1972 and that preclusions against the Communist Party are weakening.[11]

Let us briefly review some of this evidence. In doing so, it is important to bear in mind that changes in mass attitudes tend to lag behind modifications of ideas and beliefs among the elite and the relatively small strata of the attentive public. Large segments of the electorate are poorly informed and insulated from the mass media, so their images of parties alter very slowly.

If we begin with objections to the PCI based on the ground that the party is hostile to religion, we can see a fall over the last 15 years or so in the portion of the public that perceives an incompatibility between communism and Catholicism (Figure 3, p. 33). This trend reflects the growing secularization of Italian society, evidenced also by the decline of "clericalism,"—*i.e.*, a greater unwillingness on the part of segments of the Catholic electorate to be guided in political matters by the directives of the Church. There are reasons to believe that the trend has become even more pronounced since 1972. During the 1974 campaign preceding the referendum on the divorce issue, there emerged a group of dissenting Catholic intellectuals. While no wholly reliable estimates exist on the number of practicing Catholics who voted against the guidelines of the Church and the CD in the referendum, survey data collected during the campaign prior to it indicate that as many as 30 percent of the Christian Democratic electorate might have cast their ballots in favor of the divorce law. It is even more difficult to estimate the impact of the weakening of the religious preclusion against the PCI in the regional elections of 1975 and in the parliamentary election of 1976, but it is noteworthy that in the latter election there were a number of well-known Catholic intellectuals who were included on the Communist electoral lists, though they were elected as independent deputies. While claims made by these people that the bulk of the voters who shifted to the PCI in 1976 were Catholics are probably exaggerated,[12] their own candidacies and the switches of Catholic voters to the PCI that did occur constitute a clear indication of the erosion of the Catholic tradition and of the growing inability of the Church to channel the elec-

[11] A discussion of recent changes in the image of the PCI is presented in the author's chapter, "The New Image of the PCI and the Italian Electorate," in Donald L. M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Eds., *Il comunismo in Italia ed in Francia* (Communism in Italy and France), Milan, Etas/Libri, forthcoming (a revised and updated version of the English edition, *supra*).

[12] See, e.g., Raniero La Valle, "The Shift Is from the Catholic Vote," *Rinascita* (Rome), June 25, 1976, p. 4.

Three of a number of prominent Catholics who in 1976 ran for election as independents on the lists of the Italian Communist Party: from the left, Raniero La Valle; Miss Paola Rinonapoli; and General Nino Pasti, former Deputy Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

—Wide World, Steven V. Roberts/*The New York Times*, and Alain Nogues/Sygma.

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toral choices of the Catholic masses away from the parties of the Left.

A similar evolution has taken place with respect to other negative components of the image of the PCI. Looking at the answers to a question on the nature of the Communist Party posed to a sample of Italian electors toward the end of 1975, we find that the party was viewed as "revolutionary" by approximately half of the non-Communist respondents, while the rest either were uncertain about (24 percent) or denied the validity of (25 percent) the statement. Furthermore, only 47 percent of the non-Communist voters interviewed in the same study accepted the characterization of the party as "non-democratic." Of the remainder, 25 percent rejected it, and the rest did not express an opinion.[13] The significance of such findings is highlighted by the fact that these are not the answers of voters who had already switched to the PCI, but of electors who, as of 1975, still preferred other parties. This suggests that the improvement in the image of the Communist Party is not limited to converts, but affects other, larger segments of the electorate.

Additional data from other studies confirm this gradual transformation of the party's image at the mass level. In 1970, 45 percent of the people interviewed by the Demoskopea Institute agreed with the statement that "the Communists are still a serious danger for our freedom, no agreement with them is possible;" by 1974, only one-fourth of the respondents interviewed in another survey by the same organization chose that statement as the best description of what they thought of the PCI.[14] From 1972 to 1974, opposition to a "historic compromise" between the PCI and DC and the entry of the Communists into a governmental coalition with the Christian Democrats dropped significantly.[15] Correspondingly, between 1972 and 1975 there was a decrease in the general level of hostility expressed toward the Communists on questions having to do with the degree of sympathy with the PCI.[16] Finally, recent surveys have shown an increased willingness on the part of the public to attribute positive traits—such as "efficiency," "capacity to maintain order," and "honesty"—to the party. The Doxa Institute of Milan in September 1976 published figures drawn from surveys conducted between 1967 and 1976 which summarize this evolution of the electorate's views of the PCI rather well.[17] As one can readily see from Table 2, during the period covered there has been a general improvement in the image of the Communist Party with respect to virtually all of the traits about which respondents were queried. The only one where there has been little change—and perhaps even a slight reversal—is the party's unity (a point to which we shall return later). Because of the large number of non-responses, these data must be approached with great caution; nevertheless, they appear to confirm the observations already made on the basis of other studies. And the improvement in the image of the PCI stands out even more in light of the concomitant deterioration of the popular image of other parties, particularly the DC.

Table 2: The Changing Image of the PCI, 1967-76

	1967	1974	1975	1976
Communists . . .		(In percent [a])		
"are honest"	22	28	29	45
"have many good ideas"	21	34	45	60
"are 'simpatici' "	15	24	27	34
"are against violence"	16	26	31	43
"are competent"	. .[b]	43	44	65
"are young, youthful"	32	39	54	. .[b]
"are modern"	23	41	46	. .[b]
"are united"	60	56	59	. .[b]
"defend people like us"	29	39	45	. .[b]

[a] Figures represent percent of respondents in a nationwide sample agreeing with the statements.
[b] Question not asked.

SOURCE: *Bollettino Doxa* (Milan), Sept. 1, 1976.

Can one conclude from this brief review that the PCI has won its long struggle to make itself acceptable to wider segments of Italian society? There can be little doubt that in the mid-1970's Italian voters look at the PCI with different eyes, and that they see a party considerably different from that of the late 1940's. However, not all reservations have vanished, and the preclusions which once constituted a formidable barrier to the PCI have not entirely disappeared. Perhaps the aspect of the party's negative image which has persisted most tenaciously relates to its dedication to the preservation of freedom. Of all the major parties in the Italian political spectrum only the Neofascists (MSI) inspire less confidence

[13] See Sani, "The New Image of the PCI . . .," Tables 6 and 7.
[14] These findings were published in the bulletin of the Demoskopea Institute, *Ricerche demoscopiche* (Milan), Nos. 1-2, 1975.
[15] Sani, "Secular Trends . . .," Table 14.
[16] Sani, "The New Image of the PCI . . .," Table 8.
[17] *Bollettino Doxa* (Milan), Sept. 1, 1976.

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Table 3: Perceptions of the Italian Populace Concerning Party Attitudes toward the Preservation of Freedom, 1976

(in percent [a])

	Italian Parties [b]						
	PCI	PSI	PSDI	PRI	DC	PLI	MSI
The party wants to defend freedom	39	62	56	56	60	48	12
The party wants to limit freedom	45	18	20	11	25	25	66
Don't know, no answer	16	20	24	33	15	27	22
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

[a] Figures represent percent of responses in a nationwide sample.

[b] Initials, from left to right, stand for the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Republican Party, the Christian Democratic party, the Liberal Party, and the Social Movement.

SOURCE: *Bollettino Doxa* (Milan), Sept. 1, 1976.

on this score than does the PCI (see Table 3). Other lingering misgivings about the Communists arise from the possibility that their advent to power might bring about serious disorders, the collapse of the economy, the confiscation of private property, and the nationalization of all industry.[18] In sum, then, while the attitudes of the mass public toward the PCI have changed, fairly sizable segments of the electorate still harbor many doubts about the party. It seems likely that these lingering suspicions were responsible for the successes of the DC's *opposti estremismi* (oppose extremisms) strategy in 1972 and relatively strong anti-Communist stance in 1976.

Reasons for Alterations in Image

How does one account for these important, if still not total, changes in the mass image of the PCI? Since, on the one hand, a party is a complex and nonhomogeneous social phenomenon and since, on the other, a societal image in a sense represents the aggregation of a large number of individual "visions," answering this question is a very difficult task. Nevertheless, it would appear that four developments have contributed to the evolution of mass attitudes toward the PCI.

First, there is no doubt that the statements made by the Communist leaders and the positions taken by the party in the last few years represent a departure from the past. Even before the decision to abstain on the vote of confidence on the Andreotti Cabinet, the PCI had been progressively softening its opposition to successive DC-dominated governments. It has moderated its anticlerical polemics and endeavored to reach a compromise with Catholics, first, on the divorce issue, and, later, on legislation concerning abortion. It has repeatedly stressed its autonomy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It has explicitly indicated its acceptance of political pluralism, fundamental freedoms, and individual rights. It has offered reassurances to the non-Communist elements of society in the areas of economic plans, social reforms, and private property. It has argued for acceleration of the process of European integration. It no longer objects to Italy's membership in NATO and, more generally, in the Western "camp." [19]

Scholars who follow PCI developments closely might argue that these steps do not really involve much in the way of innovation and that the party has essentially been traveling the path charted earlier by Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti. But apart from the fact that the recent pronouncements are far more explicit than those of the past, one must bear in mind that previous statements buried in

[18] *Ricerche demoscopiche*, Nos. 1-2, 1975.

[19] Changes in the PCI's position on a number of issues have been widely reported by the press. For an overall picture of the party line in the mid-1970's, see Enrico Berlinguer's report to the 14th PCI Congress, which took place in Rome on March 18-23, 1975. This speech is reprinted in *XIV Congresso del Partito Comunista Italiano* (The 14th Congress of the Italian Communist Party), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1975, pp. 15-76. The PCI's official position at the recent Berlin Conference of Eupropean Communist Parties is summarized in Sergio Segre, "The Berlin Conference," *Rinascita*, July 9, 1976, p. 1. See also Antonio Rubbi, "Berlin Behind the Polemics," *ibid.*, July 30, 1976, p. 9. On the international positions of the PCI, see Donald L. M. Blackmer, "The International Strategy of the Italian Communist Party," in Donald L. M. Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, *The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France*, Cambridge, Mass., Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Press, 1975.

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abstruse party documents are quite a different matter from recent declarations such as those made by Berlinguer at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or in joint communiqués with Georges Marchais (of the French CP) and Santiago Carrillo (of the Spanish CP), or from the rostrum of the Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties. In other words, the PCI is for the first time taking advantage of events widely covered by the mass media to try to reach broad audiences. This effort in itself is a departure from the past.

The second development has to do with the attitudes of the mass media and with the content of the political messages that they transmit to the mass public. In a recent debate on the Italian situation, political scientist Giovanni Sartori has pointed out that an assessment of the PCI's current stances depends in part on the position of the observer, and he ventures the opinion that observers have changed more than the party.[20] While one might disagree with his conclusion, Sartori's basic point underscores the significant role played by the channels through which society receives information about parties and politicians. A party could drastically change its policies, but if messages transmitted to the public through channels of political communication do not reflect the new situation, it is unrealistic to expect the public to become aware of modifications in the party's stance. In this connection, it should be noted that for a considerable portion of the postwar period most mass media in Italy were under the control of industrial groups or the Christian Democratic party;[21] moreover, the general picture of the PCI painted by the government-controlled radio and television network and by large segments of the press was a negative one. While it is true that the PCI had over the years built up an imposing network of political communication of its own,[22] the messages that the official daily and the other newspapers, popular magazines, and highbrow journals of the PCI diffused reached primarily people who were already sympathetic to the Communist Party. Thus, the non-Communist electorate was largely insulated from the PCI network and not subject to exposure to, and influence by, messages conducive to positive orientations toward the party.[23]

In the last few years, however—let us say since the late 1960's—there have been considerable changes in this picture. Many intellectuals, critics, and journalists who work for radio, television, and the mass-circulation press have shown a more sympathetic attitude toward the PCI. Union-controlled committees of journalists and printers have increased their power vis-à-vis editors and publishers and now have more control over what is written and printed; consequently, coverage of the PCI has become more extensive, and interviews with party leaders are now quite commonly found in publications that in the past tended to ignore the party. In short, much, if not all, of the negative bias has disappeared and has been replaced by at least a neutral and in some cases a positive orientation.[24]

This observation should not be taken to mean that the changes in the popular image of the PCI are due simply to the new attitude of the media. Among other things, the circulation of newspapers is still fairly limited, and even the radio and television network reaches only a portion of the electorate. Furthermore, mass media probably reinforce, or erode marginally, mass attitudes more than they bring about sudden conversions. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that the images which the channels of communication have projected have had some positive impact on popular orientations toward the Communist Party.

The third development contributing to alterations in the public image of the PCI lies in modifications in the behavior toward the Communists of segments of the non-Communist political, social, and religious elite. We would expect Socialist or moderate voters, for example—at least those among them who are

[20] Giovanni Sartori, "Reviewing Polarized Pluralism," in Fabio Luca Cavazza and Stephen Graubard, Eds., *Il caso italiano* (The Italian Case), Milan, Garzanti, 1974, p. 210.

[21] Studies of the press include Ignazio Weiss, *Politica dell'informazione* (The Politics of Information), Milan, Edizioni di Comunita, 1961; Paolo Murialdi, *La stampa italiana del dopoguerra* (The Italian Press of the Postwar Period), Bari, Laterza, 1973; Vittorio Capecchi and Marino Livolsi, *La stampa quotidiana in Italia* (The Daily Press in Italy), Milan, Bompiani, 1971; Gaetano Fusaroli, *Giornali in Italia* (Newspapers in Italy), Parma, Guanda Editore, 1974; Valerio Castronovo and Nicola Tranfaglia, Eds., *La stampa italiana del neo-capitalismo* (The Italian Press of Neocapitalism), Bari, Laterza, 1976.

[22] *La presenza sociale del PCI e della DC* (The Social Presence of the PCI and the DC), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1968; Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1970.

[23] Giacomo Sani, "Channels of Political Communication and the Orientations of the Electorate," *Rivista italiana di scienza politica*, No. 2, 1974, pp. 371-86.

[24] Discussing changes in the press, Luca Pavolini speaks of "steps forward" and "more objective information," in "The Press and Democracy," *Rinascita*, Aug. 27, 1976. For other evidence of changes and discussion by different political observers, see the debate in *Panorama* (Milan), No. 488, 1975; and Peter Lange, "What is To Be Done—About Italian Communism?," *Foreign Policy* (New York), Winter 1975-76, pp. 224-40.

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reasonably well informed about interparty dialogue —to perceive the Communist Party differently to the extent that Socialist and DC leaders treat the Communists differently. For these people, party leaders constitute significant reference groups; sources of cues, explanations, clarifications, hints of future developments; etc. And there can be little doubt that many of the political, social, and religious elite who for most of the postwar period had stressed hostility and total opposition to the PCI have in recent times modified their attitudes at least to some extent. For example, the Socialist Party has called for greater assumption of governmental responsibilities by the PCI; the Christian Democrats have put forward the notion of a *"confronto,"* a constructive dialogue with the PCI; segments of the clergy have evinced considerably diminished hostility toward the party; and sectors of the business world have demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to enter into dialogue with the PCI on matters of mutual concern.

One might be tempted to see these new postures as natural consequences of the increased bargaining strength of the PCI resulting from the advances that it has made,[25] but the softening of the stands of non-Communist as well as Communist elites actually preceded the PCI's successes of 1975 and 1976. In any event, the point is that the acceptance of a dialogue with the PCI by segments of the non-Communist elite tends to accelerate the process of legitimation of the party at the mass level. It helps to weaken preclusions against the PCI that the anti-Communist elite had in the past reinforced by its behavior and pronouncements.

The last development that has helped alter the PCI's image has been changes in the electorate—changes in the political audience, so to speak—which have facilitated the reception and acceptance of new ideas and, conversely, have diminished the efficacy of the political appeals of the past. It is impossible to discuss at length here the political implications of the socio-cultural transformations which have occurred in Italy over the last 15 years, partly as a result of the so-called "economic miracle," but several quick comments about these transformations are in order. To begin with, there has been a dramatic turnover in the composition of the electorate. About half of the voters who witnessed the harsh political confrontations and the bitter polemics of the mid-1940's are no longer around. More important, 60 percent of the 1975 electorate has been added to the electoral registry since 1946. Many people who voted for the first time in the mid-1970's had not yet been born when Stalin died; others were too young to remember the Soviet intervention in Hungary or even the building of the Berlin Wall. The political memories of these voters thus differ significantly from those of the older cohorts. To the youth of 1976, communism is no longer the subversive, anti-clerical force that frightened their fathers. It is not difficult to see why political messages which are effective with the generations socialized in the 1940's and 1950's might be less relevant to those who have come of age politically during the years of Vietnam.[26]

One must also take into account the impact of the social changes that have accompanied the modernization of Italian society: higher levels of education, massive internal migrations, increasing urbanization. These are all phenomena that tend to break down the ties between individuals and their traditional political subcultures, rendering them open to new political appeals. Similarly, the widespread perception of social inequalities, coupled with rising expectations deriving from a period of substantial prosperity, cannot help but strengthen the appeals of those political forces which emphasize the ideal of a just and fair society and whose record is not marred by a credibility gap between promises and accomplishments.

Lastly, secularization has increased, with a consequent decline of the Catholic tradition in political matters. The proportion of people who attend mass and perform the religious injunctions of the Church regularly is shrinking. Among those who still engage in religious practice, many no longer heed the precepts of the clergy in political matters. Catholic organizations which in previous periods played an important role are either less effective or less flexible. The influence of the clergy in the process of political socialization appears to be declining.[27]

In sum, it seems that many of the trends in

[25] For an analysis of the PCI strategy and "opening" toward the middle classes, see Stephen Hellman, "The PCI's Alliance Strategy and the Case of the Middle Classes," in *Communism in Italy and France, supra,* pp. 373-419.

[26] On the distribution of values among Italian youth, see Carlo Tullio Altan, *I valori difficili* (The Difficult Values), Milan, Bompiani, 1974.

[27] On the role of the clergy and Catholic organizations in the recent elections, see Arturo Parisi and Gianfranco Pasquino, "The 20th of June: Political Structure and Electoral Behavior," *Il Mulino* (Bologna), May-June 1976, pp. 342-86.

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Italian society over the last decade or so, together with the other factors mentioned above, have provided a favorable climate for change in the popular perceptions of the PCI and, consequently, for new directions in political behavior. One might offer a final observation that helps to explain why the continuous erosion of the moderate electorate has benefited the Communist Party primarily rather than other parties of the Left, such as the Socialists. To put things simply, the PCI has a number of positive assets that even its enemies have long recognized. It has performed reasonably well in cities, provinces, and regions where it has held positions of governmental responsibility. It has a sizable core of competent party officers and a large number of committed militants. It enjoys the support of most intellectuals. It has fashioned, maintained, and expanded a strong and efficient organizational network which is of great significance for harnessing popular support. The party's leadership is of high quality, and it has not so far been paralyzed or pulled in contradictory directions by the factionalism which has plagued other parties. Moreover, the weakening of preclusions against the PCI has brought with it an emphasis on the party's strength, unity, efficiency, and commitment. It is understandable, therefore, that voters who no longer have doubts about the PCI's democratic character, its autonomy from the Soviet Union, and its commitment to preserve the nation's fundamental freedoms and to live by the rules of pluralistic democracy might see good reasons to cast their ballots for the Communists rather than for the Socialists.

Toward the "Historic Compromise"

Whatever the reasons for the PCI's success at the polls in 1976, the party interpreted that success as confirmation of the correctness of the strategy that it had adopted in the early 1970's. The leadership could argue that the party's mass following had endorsed the strategy, that the strategy had helped attract new voters, and that it had increased the party's strength to a point where, in light of the distribution of seats in Parliament, the PCI had greater bargaining power than ever before. The longstanding claim to be a party destined to govern (*"un partito di governo"*) began to seem more valid. Given the balance of forces resulting from the election, the Christian Democrats enjoyed little room for maneuver; conversely, the PCI had an excellent opportunity to press its traditional antagonist to take steps in the direction of the broad coalition which the Communist leadership had been proposing since 1973: the *"historic compromise."*

Few expressions in Italian political discourse have elicited as many comments, polemics, and debates as has "historic compromise." Not unexpectedly, interpretations of the PCI proposal bearing this name differ. For some, it amounts to little more than another version of the "opening to the left" that the PCI has long advocated; for others, it represents a momentous change. Some believe that its realization would mark the triumph of Marxism in Italy; others see it as definitive proof that the PCI has accommodated itself to the existing system and has abandoned its original goal of a drastic transformation of Italian society. It is impossible to analyze here all the different interpretations that have been propounded—in part because the debate is still in progress—but it is useful, in order to discuss the implications of the current situation and prospects



PCI Secretary-General Berlinguer ponders the party's future.

—Fabian/Sygma.

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for the future, to look briefly at the arguments on which the Communist leadership has grounded its strategy and at the responses of other political elites to the strategy.

Although the term "historic compromise" appeared for the first time in a series of three articles that Enrico Berlinguer wrote for the party's weekly *Rinascita* in the fall of 1973,[28] the main components of the PCI proposal can be found in earlier documents and pronouncements by party leaders (most notably those stemming from the 13th Party Congress in March 1972). Indeed, Berlinguer himself has stressed that continuity exists between his proposal and ideas which have been part of the PCI philosophy for a good many years and which can be traced back to the theoretical works of Gramsci and Togliatti.

At the core of the argument for a "historic compromise" advanced in 1973 by the PCI Secretary are the following propositions:

To be successful, a Communist party's strategy must be realistic—*i.e.*, it must take into account the particular conditions of the country in which the party operates, the history of the country, the internal distribution of social and political forces, and, last but not least, the international context. Leftist movements in the capitalist world which attempt to transform their respective societies without considering powerful conditioning factors—both domestic and international—are likely to suffer major defeats, as the case of Greece in the 1940's and the recent example of Chile demonstrate.[29] Great changes cannot be brought about by antagonizing powerful oppositions, by splitting, as it were, society into two hostile "camps." Rather, such changes can be accomplished only by forging alliances with a variety of different social groups and with the mass parties which represent them. In Italy, the progressive-oriented proletarian class constitutes only a minority of the population. Between the working class and its antagonist, the bourgeoisie, there are intermediate strata whose support is crucial to Communist efforts to change society.[30] Hence, the Italian party should strive to promote a convergence of interests between these intermediate groups and the working class—that is, it should seek reforms which will improve the position of the latter without harming the position of the former.[31] In this regard, considerable attention must be paid to the "priorities and timing of social transformations . . . , not merely in order to prevent the collapse of the economy but, rather, to insure its effectiveness during the critical phase of transition to a new socialist order." [32]

Social alliances, the Secretary went on, cannot be brought to fruition without the involvement of all political forces which represent broad masses. Despite its connections with the bourgeosie and its hostility to socialist movements, the Christian Democratic party is a force with considerable influence not only among the intermediate strata but also among Catholic members of the working class; therefore, it follows that the DC, regardless of its ambiguous and contradictory nature, must not be excluded from the new and effective social bloc that the PCI is endeavoring to weld together. To fail to include it would be to encourage conservative elements within the DC to push their party and the intermediate groups it represents further away from the working class movement.[33] Eventually, this would bring about a deep division of the country into two blocs, a polarization of political life which would entail serious risks for the survival of a democratic regime. Under such conditions, it would be an illusion to think that even if the parties of the Left were to obtain 51 percent of the seats in Parliament a leftist government could survive and prosper after taking power.[34] The conclusion is inescapable: "The seriousness of the country's problems, the ever-present threats of reactionary groups, and the necessity to open the way for economic development, social change, and democratic progress of the nation" underscore the need "for that which can be defined as a new, great 'historic compromise' between the forces which represent the great majority of the Italian people." [35]

In the course of the debate both within and without the PCI that followed the publication of Berlinguer's articles, other aspects of the party's strategy came into focus. Was the encounter with Catholic forces to result in an agreement between the DC and the PCI that would exclude other parties? The answer was a clear "no," since the PCI had always considered the Socialists "an essential component" of

[28] The texts of Berlinguer's articles ("Reflections on Italy after the Chilean Events") are now reprinted in a collection of speeches and other documents edited by Antonio Tato, *La "questione comunista"* (The "Communist Question"), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1975, Vol. 2, pp. 609-39.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 618-19.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 629.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 631.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 632.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 636.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 633.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 638-39.

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any alliance, having, like other "democratic forces" (Social Democrats and Republicans), "a peculiar and irreplaceable role to play." [36]

To the charge that the strategy in effect resulted in PCI acceptance of the DC "as it was," with all its defects, ambiguities, and hostility toward the Left, the reply was that the "historic compromise" did not imply that the PCI would renounce its right to criticize the Christian Democrats. To the contrary, the party would use its critiques to stimulate growth of the popular, democratic, and anti-fascist elements within the DC and to isolate its reactionary segments.[37] In this connection, Berlinguer contended that when groups of the New Left shouted slogans proclaiming that unity of the working class should take place against the DC, they only appeared to be revolutionary and were in fact taking a meaningless "sectarian" posture. According to Berlinguer, such an approach played into the hands of domestic and international forces that stood to benefit from a deep division of Italian society.[38]

What did the encounter with the Catholics imply in terms of PCI relations with the Church? On this point, it was argued that an alliance between the PCI and the Church was out of the question, but that at the same time the party had to recognize the role and needs of the Church in Italy. Therefore, the party should follow a line designed to prevent a "break between believers and nonbelievers, Catholics and non-Catholics, between the Church and the State"—a development that would have tragic consequences for the country and, above all, for the working class movement.[39]

What relationship did the "historic compromise" have to the development of socialism in Italy? The leadership maintained that domestic and international constraints made it unrealistic to expect that Italy could become a socialist society in the short run. Hence, the immediate task was the introduction "into the general functioning of society of elements of socialism." [40] This was possible because certain social and economic reforms which could be supported by forces outside the socialist movement inevitably would bring about changes in "production relationships, distribution of wealth, consumption patterns, and life style" along socialist lines.[41]

What were the implications of the "historic compromise" with regard to foreign policy, specifically the position of Italy within NATO and within the European Economic Community? On this point, the premise of the PCI's argument was the continuation of détente, with less rigid juxtaposition of the two political and military blocs in Europe making possible a greater degree of autonomy for individual countries. However, since the blocs still exist and progress in negotiations on arms reduction depends on the maintenance of parity in military strength, "it is not realistic to think that single countries can unilaterally leave either one of the two camps." [42] In this situation, the PCI no longer objected to Italy's participation in the NATO alliance, although the party insisted that its acceptance of the alliance must be accompanied by sustained efforts to improve relations between the two blocs and ultimately to make military alliances unnecessary. Similarly, with reference to the EEC the leadership stated: "Certainly Italy cannot leave the European Economic Community; but within it there is a need for a democratization of its organs, and there is also a need to diminish the power of the large national and multinational groups which operate within the Community." [43]

Finally, to answer those who objected to the term "compromise" (including the PCI's President Luigi Longo), Berlinguer said that the expression did not necessarily have a derogatory connotation, that compromises are not all alike, and that as Lenin had shown, compromises at certain critical historical junctures can have revolutionary consequences.[44] In any event, he maintained, the "historic compromise" was not to be a narrow pact, a mere device for sharing power and its spoils, but rather "the result of efforts of mutual understanding, of an encounter and agreement reached by different popular democratic forces on issues of fundamental importance for the future of the country." [45]

Berlinguer's avowed intention was to provoke a debate on the PCI's proposal, and he succeeded in doing just that. Among the points made by politicians and non-Communist elites, the following were the most common: (1) The basic philosophical tenets and *Weltanschauungen* of the PCI and DC are funda-

[36] Enrico Berlinguer, "For the Transformation of the Schools and Education, for the Renewal of Italy," speech delivered in Bologna on Oct. 27, 1973, in *ibid.*, p. 647.
[37] See *ibid.*, pp. 657-58.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 648, 643.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 656-57.
[40] Berlinguer's report to the Central Committee in preparation for the 14th Congress, Dec. 10-12, 1974, reprinted in *ibid.*, p. 868.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 877.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 879.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 626-27.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 649.

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mentally opposed to each other and hence incompatible.[46] (2) An agreement involving the two major parties and the intermediate political forces (Socialists, Social Democrats, Republicans) would for all practical purposes eliminate legitimate, democratic opposition to the government, with serious consequences for the future of pluralistic democracy in the country.[47] (3) The PCI was seriously miscalculating in assuming that the "historic compromise" would make possible significant changes in Italian society in a socialist direction. Those who attributed primary responsibility to the DC for the national crisis that had developed could not believe that the process of systemic decay could be halted without smashing the mechanisms on which the DC had built its power base—that is, without replacing the Christian Democratic-dominated government entirely with a coalition of the Left.[48] To these and other observers, the "historic compromise" smacked of "transformism," an operation designed to make possible a sharing of the spoils by the two major parties.[49] (4) The PCI proposal would alter the existing balance of forces at the international level; hence, it would not be welcomed by the US or the USSR, both of which, according to this line of argument, have an interest in preserving the division of Europe into two spheres of influence. (5) At least in the short run, there were questions about the feasibility of the PCI proposal. According to some commentators, the DC could not afford an encounter with the PCI without risking the loss of a sizable portion of the moderate electorate; by the same token, the PCI would run a risk—although to a lesser extent—of delivering a shock to, and causing a trauma for, many Communist militants if it entered a government coalition with the Christian Democrats.[50] (6) In a future situation of severe economic crisis and mounting social unrest, the PCI would have primary responsibility for insuring the survival of the country, and the party might not be able to restore order and revitalize the economy without recourse to strong methods. Projecting the final consequences of this scenario, Giovanni Sartori has written: "The DC will lose its power; the PCI will lose its soul (or will find again its Stalinist soul); and 99 percent of Italians will lose whatever they still have."[51]

While intellectuals and politicians of different persuasions debated the merits of the "historic compromise," the three major political parties—the DC, the PCI, and the PSI—came gradually to define their positions on the issue. Their pronouncements were not always free of ambiguity, and they occasionally made minor changes and adjustments in their stances. But by the spring of 1976 the fundamental postures of the three had crystallized and had received formal sanction in solemn declarations at the national congresses of the respective parties.

Not surprisingly, the PCI was the first to firm up its position. Berlinguer's articles were debated by the Central Committee of the party during 1974, and whatever internal differences there might have been were resolved before the 14th Party Congress in March 1975—at least there was no indication of divisions within the leadership in the discussion on the issue at that meeting.[52] The function of the congress was to ratify Berlinguer's strategy and to explain its rationale and implications to the party's cadres and mass following. PCI successes in the nationwide regional elections held in the late spring of that year helped validate the strategy and reinforced the determination of the PCI leadership to proceed on the road of encounter with the Christian Democrats.

Given the heterogeneity of the DC, it was easy to predict that Christian Democrats would not react in a single way to the PCI proposal of a "historic compromise," and, in fact, even a cursory survey of the positions taken by DC leaders and spokesmen shows considerable variation in approach. The more conservative elements of the party argued for maintenance of a firm stance against the PCI reminiscent of the staunch anti-Communist posture of the past. For other, more moderate segments of the Christian Democratic party, the step suggested by the PCI appeared premature; yet they felt that the DC could

[46] See, *e.g.*, Giuseppe De Rosa, "Operation Suicide," in the discussion of the "historic compromise" in *Biblioteca della liberta* (Turin), July-August 1974, pp. 38-42.

[47] See, *e.g.*, Nicola Matteucci, "Preserving the Liberal Democratic Model," in *ibid.*, pp. 65-67.

[48] This is the central thesis advanced by a group of intellectuals who have formed an association to promote a "left alternative" (*Azione e Recerca per l'Alternativa*). Reports presented at a meeting of the association in Milan on April 18-19, 1975, are reprinted in Massimo Teodori, Ed., *Per l'alternativa* (For the Alternative), Milan, Libreria Feltrinelli, 1975.

[49] See, *e.g.*, Gianfranco Pasquino, "The Italian Political System Between Neotransformism and Consociational Democracy," *Il Mulino*, July-August 1973; and the same author's "Compromise and Order," *Biblioteca della liberta*, July-August 1974, pp. 81-85.

[50] See, *e.g.*, Giovanna Zincone, "A Worrisome Majority," in *ibid.*, pp. 118-21.

[51] In *ibid.*, p. 98.

[52] The discussion of the political document prepared by a special committee headed by Alessandro Natta was quite brief. In content, the document was very similar to the report by Berlinguer. For text of the document, see *XIV Congresso del Partito Comunista Italiano, supra*, pp. 639-57.

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not ignore the existence of a party influential with the unions and with a growing percentage of the electorate. Still other DC leaders openly acknowledged that the Communist Party had changed and that it no longer was the anti-systemic, demagogic force of the early postwar period; nevertheless, they too maintained that the proposed coalition was for the moment premature and suggested, instead, that the DC should open the door for a dialogue, for a *confronto*, for a discussion of the positions of the two parties on the major issues and problems facing the country.

Predictably, the official stand taken by the DC at its national party congress in March 1976 was a mixture of these different reactions. Although the left-wing of the party scored a victory in getting Benigno Zaccagnini reconfirmed as Secretary-General, the policy document the congress approved was hardly a triumph for those who had hoped for a less equivocal and perhaps more favorable response to the PCI. Perhaps because of widespread rumors of the possibility of an early election, the DC rejected the "historic compromise," on the ground that the Communist proposal would create unacceptable confusion between the concepts of government and opposition. For the DC, the Communists had not changed enough and were not fully trustworthy. Thus, for the time being the two parties could engage in dialogue and compare and contrast their positions, but anything beyond that was premature. At the same time, the DC repeated its urgent invitation to the Socialists to reconsider the possibility of renewing cooperation with it—a step which, Zaccagnini insisted, was of fundamental importance for the future of the country.[53]



Premier Aldo Moro (left) and party Secretary-General Benigno Zaccagnini seen at the 23rd Congress of the Christian Democratic party of Italy in March 1976.

—Keystone.

The response of the Socialists to the Communist proposal of a "historic compromise" was a complex one reflecting the variety of viewpoints, experiences, and expectations of different components of the PSI leadership. To understand the response, it is important to keep in mind that in the mid-1970's the Socialists found themselves at a difficult juncture. Although the party had been an important component of a ruling center-left coalition since the early 1960's, this alliance had not borne fruit from the PSI's standpoint. The party had found itself in a position of subordination to the DC; it had suffered increasing frustration at its inability to bring about the social and economic reforms which it deemed essential for the country's progress; and its leaders sensed that they were losing credibility and influence among those segments of the electorate who had believed in the PSI's capacity to bring about such reforms.[54] If the PSI, logically, identified the DC as the major villain in its failure to turn things around in Italy, it also bore some resentment toward the Communist Party. In the eyes of the Socialists, the PCI was not competing fairly, so to speak. The PCI benefited from being formally in opposition, yet it helped keep the DC afloat by cooperating with the Christian Democrats in arenas shielded from public view (such as

[53] The deliberations of the DC congress were widely reported by the press. See also Paolo Scandaletti, *Le tentazioni del compromesso: anatomia dei partiti politici* (The Attractions of the Compromise: Anatomy of the Political Parties), Turin, SEI, 1976, esp. Chap. 4. For a comprehensive analysis of the DC strategy during and after the 1976 campaign, see Giuseppe Di Palma, "Christian Democracy: The End of Hegemony?" in Howard Penniman, Ed., *Italy at the Polls: The Parliamentary Election of 1976,* Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming.

[54] For a sample of Socialist views on the failure of the center-left coalition and on prospects for the future, see Piero Craveri, "The Alternative and the Italian Socialist Party," and Giuseppe Tamburrano, "From the Center-Left to the Alternative—Times, Means, and Phases of Transition," both in *Per l'alternativa, supra,* pp. 53-76 and 112-22.

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Francesco De Martino, Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy (PSI), addresses the 40th Congress of the PSI in March 1976.

—Keystone

certain parliamentary committees) and in local governments (the realm of "invisible politics").[55] Thus, the Socialists felt that they were taking the blame for the government's inability to govern, for the decay of the economy, and for the lack of progress in social reform, while the forces primarily responsible for the general state of affairs were consolidating their positions of power (the DC) or monopolizing the symbolic role of opposition (the PCI).

Two additional factors complicated the picture further. First, the PSI had considerable misgivings about the consequences for its own integrity and survival of any agreement between the two major parties. Second, there were large segments of the PSI which did not really believe that the Communists would be able to induce the DC to reform and renew itself. For these Socialists, who extrapolated from their own experience with the center-left coalitions of the past, nothing short of a removal of the DC from power could bring the country out of crisis.

The decisions taken by the delegates to the 40th National Congress of the Socialist Party in the early part of March 1976 reflected the complexity of the situation and the variety of viewpoints just mentioned. Essentially, the line established by the Congress was: (a) the PSI would no longer engage in the kind of collaboration with the DC that it had undertaken in the past; (b) the "historic compromise" was not acceptable to the Socialists as a long-range strategy designed to transform Italy along socialist lines; (c) while the PSI realized that an "alternative of the Left" was not in the cards in the short run, it preferred such a strategy for the long run. To solve the problems of its relations with the two major parties at one stroke, the PSI pressed the DC to drop its preclusions toward the Communists and to take steps to involve the PCI in the government, at least indirectly. This demand for an emergency coalition the PSI made repeatedly to the electorate during the campaign that followed two months later.[56]

By late spring of 1976, then, it was clear that the positions of the three major parties had created an impasse, a stalemate in which at least one of the protagonists rejected solutions advanced by the others. The continuation of the coalition formula of the preceding decade, favored by the DC, was no longer satisfactory to the Socialists, not to mention the PCI. The "alternative of the Left" proposed by the PSI was firmly rejected by the Communists, who, rightly or wrongly, feared a possible polarization of the political system and its consequences. Finally, the "historic compromise" was ruled out by the DC at least for the time being and was unacceptable to the Socialists as a long-range solution.

In light of the disagreements among what we might call the "three reluctant partners," some observers predicted even while the campaign was still in progress that the post-electoral negotiations would prove difficult. Putting together—and keeping together—a functioning government would require considerable effort and some softening of the positions of the country's three major political forces. The results of the election confirmed this prediction. The Socialists, who had anticipated an increased share of the vote on the basis of pre-election polls and had counted on an improvement in their posi-

[55] On the role of the PCI in Parliament, see Giuseppe Di Palma, *Surviving Without Governing: The Italian Parties in Parliament*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif., University of California Press, forthcoming.

[56] The debates of the Socialist congress were widely reported in the press. See, *e.g.*, *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), March 3-8, 1976.

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tion to augment their bargaining power vis-à-vis the Communists and Christian Democrats, were disappointed.[57] Immediately after the counting of the votes there was a feeling of euphoria among the Christian Democrats because the DC had maintained the strength it had demonstrated in 1972 and because the PCI had not become the single largest vote-getter. But this initial elation soon evaporated with the realization that the substantial growth of Communist strength in Parliament meant that no Cabinet could be formed—let alone survive—without the cooperation of the PCI. In short, while it was gratifying to discover that the DC had not lost the election, it was less pleasant to face the fact that the Communis Party had for practical purposes won it.

The minority Cabinet that emerged in the summer of 1976 as a result of an informal agreement was, in the view of most observers, the only possible solution available, given the attitudes of the major parties. Andreotti's Cabinet was confirmed by a parliamentary vote which the Premier himself characterized as stemming from "a lack of no confidence." [58] As part of the bargain which had been struck, the PCI received explicit recognition of its increased importance in the House and Senate. It obtained the chairmanships of several important committees, extensive representation in others, and, above all, the highly prestigious chairmanship of the House, which went to one of its most distinguished and respected leaders, Pietro Ingrao.

Some observers have regarded the events of the summer of 1976 as the beginning of a new phase in Italian political life, a period of transition during which the parties will adjust their lines and gradually accommodate themselves to what has been called an "inescapable conclusion." Others have felt that the process is far more advanced than that and that the "historic compromise" is already a reality—a conclusion epitomized by a somewhat ironic allusion to the Catholic liturgy which appeared on the cover of

[57] Most opinion polls taken during the campaign had indicated that the PSI share of the vote would run 3-6 percentage points higher than it actually did. See the figures reported by Parisi and Pasquino, "The 20th of June . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 345.

[58] The expression was used by Andreotti in his speech in Parliament on Aug. 4, 1976.

Pietro Ingrao, a leading PCI figure who was elected President of Italy's House of Deputies on July 5, 1976, talks with Italian President Giovanni Leoni at the Quirinale Presidential Palace on the following day.

—Wide World.

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a popular magazine: *Ite compromesso est.*[59] In any event, no one can deny that after a "long march" of 30 years the Italian Communist Party stands on the threshold of power.

Implications for the Future

What are the implications of the recent developments in Italian politics that we have been examining, and what are the prospects for the Italian political system? These are questions being asked by a good many citizens, politicians, and observers both in Italy and abroad. They are intriguing and difficult questions, partly because of the novel nature of Italy's internal situation and partly because future developments will depend on how domestic and international forces react to unfolding events which cannot be foreseen at the present time. Because of the uncertainty involved, no definitive answers are possible. Nevertheless, some tentative observations might be useful.

To begin with, it seems reasonably safe to assume that in the initial stages of this new phase of Italian politics the major political parties will act rather cautiously and will watch each other's moves carefully. The PCI considers recent developments a partial victory, a collapse of the longstanding preclusion against its participation in the government. Therefore, despite its claim that the Andreotti government is not fully equal to the tasks it faces, the party has no interest in provoking a more marked realignment of forces in the short run. It is true that the PCI cannot continue to support the present Cabinet without being able to offer proof that the government is moving in the "proper direction"; hence, the party needs some evidence—legislation or at least firm commitments on the part of the Cabinet—that certain key problems are being addressed.[60] But since the PCI sees the present phase as just the beginning of a long and difficult process, its leaders are more likely to proceed gradually, to smooth the way for and defend the government, rather than to make things difficult for Andreotti and provoke a collapse of the fragile experiment now under way. In brief, there are reasons to believe that, short of a total failure on the part of the Cabinet to take some substantive initiatives and make at least minimal symbolic gestures acknowledging the Communists' enhanced position, the PCI will not "rock the boat." Indeed, events of the first few weeks after the installation of the new government appear to confirm this conclusion.

As to the likelihood of DC or PCI moves which might result in a Cabinet crisis, it seems to the present author that little will happen until the Christian Democrats have resolved a number of internal questions concerning the redistribution of offices within the party hierarchy. All of the major segments of the DC now control positions in the Cabinet, and it is not clear that any of them would benefit from a reopening of negotiations for a new governmental coalition with the PSI. Nor are the Socialists likely to act. There is a segment of the PSI which favors a return to the government, but at the time of this writing the party leadership has indicated that for the moment such a policy would be premature.[61]

Finally, some observers believe that the international situation also is favorable to the continuation of the present Italian experiment. Changes are unlikely pending a definition and clarification of American policy toward the phenomenon of Eurocommunism, which, presumably, will not come until the first part of 1977.

In conclusion, then, it would seem that the present balance is less precarious than it looks at first glance. To be sure, Andreotti's task is not an easy one. The state of the economy is worrisome, and there are other potentially explosive issues—such as legislation on abortion or revision of the 1929 Concordat between the state and the Church—that might seriously jeopardize chances for the current Cabinet's survival. But all things considered, it would appear that the factors favoring a continuation of the existing situation outweigh those pulling in the opposite direction.

Thus, it seems reasonably safe to predict that in the short run there will be no major changes in Italy's domestic or foreign policies. Such a judgment may offend both those who fear that indirect support of the government by the PCI will have serious negative consequences, and—even more—those who believe that the Communists have the capacity to solve

[59] *Il Mondo* (Milan), Sept. 1, 1976. Toward the end of the Mass, the priest employs the phrase, *Ita missa est,* to indicate that the Mass is completed.

[60] The PCI attitude toward the government in the new parliamentary situation can be inferred from a number of articles that have appeared in *Rinascita* since the election. See, *e.g.,* Giorgio Napolitano, "Program, Consensus, Participation," July 16, 1976, p. 3; Gerardo Chiaromonte, "The Government and the PCI," Aug. 6, 1976, p. 1; Alfredo Reichlin, "A Difficult Test on Uncertain Terrain," Aug. 20, 1976, p. 3.

[61] See the statement by Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Socialist Party, reported in *Corriere della Sera,* Sept. 24, 1976.

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the nation's problems and therefore look at the current experiment with great hopes. Nevertheless, in the author's view, the judgment is supported by a realistic assessment of (a) the conditions under which the present fragile balance survives, and (b) the nature of the problems which Italy confronts. On the first point, it is clear that the resolution of many problems will depend on the ability of the forces which directly or indirectly support the government to successfully mediate conflicting interests. Since few reforms are painless from a material point of view, and since none is devoid of symbolic costs, it follows that progress will come very slowly and that decisions will be the result of difficult bargaining among the major protagonists. Under such circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect decisive and clear-cut outcomes. The recent compromise might well turn out to be "historic," but there is no reason to believe that the process and nature of decision-making involved will differ from the pattern that obtains in most political systems under coalition rule.

As far as the second point is concerned, we should not forget that while many of the country's difficulties are indeed the results of mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiency during 30 years of Christian Democratic rule—as critics from all quarters have pointed out—many of Italy's problems are intractable in nature and not susceptible to easy solution, and many of the difficulties involved are not peculiar to Italy but are to be found in other, relatively more advanced Western countries such as Great Britain, France, and Denmark. This observation is not intended to absolve the Christian Democrats of their responsibilities, which are considerable, but to point out the objective difficulty of running a society in which national resources are not accumulated and invested at the rate required to satisfy increasingly higher popular expectations, and in which numerous and often conflicting demands are simultaneously pressed upon the government. As the Socialists found out in the course of their experience with the center-left coalition, access to the "control room" and good will are necessary but not sufficient conditions of success, especially when one is in the company of another party that drags its feet.

The Communists are undoubtedly aware both of the intrinsic difficulty of the issues with which they will have to cope and of the fact that their partners will not always be willing to move in certain directions or to move with all necessary speed. A number of recent statements seem to be aimed at deflating whatever high expectations PCI members and electoral supporters might have about the possibility of a quick and easy solution to Italy's problems.[62] All of this suggests that the PCI itself will not press for the implementation of drastic measures but will be satisfied with presenting to the government selected demands spaced out over time.

Longer-Range Prospects

What reasonable conjectures can be made about developments beyond the initial phase which we have considered so far? In political affairs, peering into the future is often a risky undertaking. However, the author would contend that the range of plausible developments includes three "scenarios." The first is simply continuation and intensification of the trend now in progress. After an initial "trial run," with some tensions but no dramatic confrontations, the situation produced by the arrangement effected last summer would stabilize. Then perhaps there would be a reshuffling of the Cabinet, with the re-entry of the PSI into the government but with the PCI still providing external support. The establishment of formal ties between the Cabinet and the Communist Party might follow. In the second scenario, the DC and the PSI, afraid of the growing influence of the Communists, would manage to patch up their differences and decide to share power and responsibilities while leaving the Communists in opposition. The third scenario involves the collapse of the fragile and informal arrangement of 1976. In this scenario, the leaders of the three major parties would find themselves unable to handle internal tensions; some critical issue would explode; and a confrontation with bitter and frontal attacks would ensue. After efforts to find a solution satisfactory, or at least acceptable, to all proved unsuccessful, new elections would be called, again ahead of schedule.

Although these alternative scenarios would have different consequences, none of them would substantially affect the position of strength that the PCI has achieved in recent times. The first would bring the party close to achieving the goal that it has pursued throughout the entire postwar period. The second would relegate the PCI to the position that it has occupied over the last decade—a setback, to be sure, but not a defeat with lasting consequences. It is unrealistic to think that the return of a center-left cabinet would be more than a temporary solution: a

[62] *E.g.*, Reichlin (*loc. cit.*) speaks of a "hard" and "risky" test.

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coalition including the DC, PSI, PSDI, and PRI would have only a narrow majority in Parliament; it would have great difficult in dealing with the unions; and it would offer an excellent target for renewed attacks by the PCI, which would once again monopolize the opposition role. Nor would the consequences of the third scenario be particularly worrisome to the PCI. An election called after a breakdown of the present informal collaboration would hold no more risks for the Communists than for the other two major parties. Perhaps it would not result this time in a marked increased in the strength of the party, but in view of the historical record and of the circumstances under which the election would be called, it would be rather naive to expect the PCI to suffer a major electoral defeat.

On balance, this author feels, developments in the foreseeable future appear likely to bring about a consolidation of the role of the Communist Party in the political system of Italy. As a result, we need to consider a last set of questions. Are there tensions, problems, and difficulties connected with passage of the PCI out of the opposition into the "governmental area"? Are there any consequences of the party's success which might have negative implications? In what respects and to what extent might the "historic compromise" change the PCI and alter the entire Italian Left? On these issues it is only possible here to offer some brief observations, intended to stimulate further reflection.

Both theory and the observation of PCI behavior during the last few months suggest that the transformation of the Communist Party into a governmental force has the potential of giving rise to increased tensions in four major areas. The first is relations between the party and the unions. Over the years, there have been periods of close collaboration between the PCI and the trade union movement (especially the largest of the labor confederations, the Italian General Confederation of Labor—CGIL), as well as moments of some friction.[63] However, on most issues and for most of the postwar era, the PCI and the unions have been on the same side—*i.e.*, in a position of antagonism toward private and public

Representatives of Communist and Socialist trade unions take to the streets of Rome on July 24, 1974, for a one-day strike protesting austerity measures taken by then Premier Mariano Rumor.

—J. Pavlovsky/Sygma.

enterprises during the negotiation of labor contracts. Moreover, since Italian unions have often concerned themselves with broad political issues such as economic and fiscal policy, national planning, and social reforms, the PCI and the unions have normally fought political battles against the government together. Specialists on the labor movement might point out fine distinctions between positions taken by the unions and the parties of the Left, but when we paint the picture on a broad canvas we arrive at the conclusion that until recently the two groups have shared a fundamental similarity of positions, if not a formal alliance.

The changing role of the PCI threatens to crack this solidarity, or at minimum to produce strains in the relationship of far greater magnitude than were present in the past. To put things in perhaps oversimplified terms, the PCI will be asked to contribute to and support governmental decisions which, at least in some cases, will run counter to demands of the unions on wages, work conditions, labor mobility, and the like. Even a semigovernmental role will impose upon the PCI the burden of setting, or accepting, priorities—that is, of making or acquiescing in decisions concerning the time schedule for social

[63] Joseph LaPalombara, *The Italian Labor Movement: Problems and Prospects*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1957; Daniel Horowitz, *The Italian Labor Movement*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963; Sergio Turone, *Storia del sindacato in Italia* (History of the Labor Unions in Italy), Bari, Laterza, 1973; Peter Weitz, "The CGIL and the PCI: From Subordination to Independent Political Force," in *Communism in Italy and France*, *supra*, pp. 541-74.

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and economic reforms. This means that the party will be asked to defend, directly or indirectly, deferral of certain gratifications for (or imposition of sacrifices on) one or another group of workers, with the distinct possibility that it may antagonize sectors of the union movement. Heretofore, it is true, the PCI has shown great skill in playing a brokerage role in mediating between conflicting interests—especially in areas of the country where it has been in power at the local level. But while the talent of PCI personnel is undeniable, the nature and magnitude of the problems now involved pose a far greater challenge than the party has ever faced before. Clearly, confronting the hard choices implicit in the question of "capital accumulation" is not a comfortable task for a party of the working class.[64]

A second area in which an expanded governmental role for the PCI has the potential for producing new tension is relations among different groups within the PCI. The external visibility of these groups is quite low. From the outside, the party appears to solidly support the leadership's decision to pursue the "historic compromise" strategy; but the absence of outspoken critics does not mean that there are no doubts about the wisdom of the choice within the PCI. Hostility toward the Christian Democrats is too deeply rooted to suppose that it could have evaporated in a few weeks. And Andreotti is, after all, the same man who not too long ago resurrected the "centrist" coalition formula against which the PCI mobilized and waged a bitter fight. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable for many Communists to be suspicious of the DC and to fear that the Christian Democrats will attempt to coopt and tame the PCI in the same way that it did the Socialists 15 years ago. In short, it seems likely that there are segments of the party which view recent developments with considerable skepticism, and perhaps even a core group of Communists who, while they eschew open dissent, do not agree with the official line.

The top PCI leadership is obviously aware that the rank and file need to be persuaded to rally behind the "historic compromise" strategy, and it made considerable efforts during the summer of 1976 to stimulate a discussion within the party of the issues raised by the new parliamentary situation. For the moment, only minor tensions have surfaced. But the potential for their intensification is certainly there, and it could increase as time goes by.

Under what conditions are such tensions likely to grow? Briefly put, the party leadership's strategic line is now under test. For years, the leadership has argued that if the party had governmental responsibilities, things would change in Italy, and the fundamental causes of the country's crisis could gradually be eliminated. Failure to satisfy expectations raised by the strategy would therefore cast doubt on the leadership's choice and reinforce the position of those who had argued from the very beginning for a different course of action. To be sure, tensions are not likely to reach significant levels immediately. For one thing, the leaders will be able to explain possible shortcomings of the strategy as a matter of time; for another, there will always be at least another party, and possibly more than one, to blame for partial failure of the experiment. But the possibility that serious internal conflict (not necessarily unmanageable) will eventually arise in the PCI is undoubtedly there. While the party was in opposition, internal tensions could be projected outside; with the party in the government, internal strains, whatever their origin, can no longer be vented entirely on other political actors.[65]

The likelihood of overt internal conflict within the PCI is in fact reinforced by rising discord in the third area in which the PCI's new political role has created potential for growing tensions—relations between the PCI and other forces of the Left, primarily but not exclusively the Party of Prcletarian Unity (PDUP), the Radicals (PR), and other minor ultraleft groups. Until the late 1960's, no political force had challenged the PCI from the left, a fact that had given

[64] A diagnosis of the economic ills of Italy is contained in a report prepared by the PCI Center for the Study of Economic Policy (CESPE); Section 27 of the report deals with the problem of capital accumulation. See "Report on the Economy," *Rinascita*, Aug. 6, 1976, pp. 9-12. In connection with this issue, Aldo Bonaccini has written: "The working class cannot act as if the only problems ['*questioni*'] were those of income redistribution." *Rinascita*, Sept. 3, 1976, p. 6. See also the comment on the same theme in Luciano Barca, "From Polemics on Stagnation to Struggle for a New Course," *ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1976, p. 3.

[65] Evidences of grumbling among PCI members appeared in a report on workers' meetings held in Genoa and Venice after the new government's adoption of austerity measures. See *l'Unità*, Oct. 4, 1976. As part of the party leadership's effort to cope with such discontent, Giorgio Napolitano paid a visit to Naples in late October to address the PCI's grass-root supporters and try to convince them of the necessity of making sacrifices. See *Corriere della Sera*, Oct. 25, 1976.

It should also be noted that at a meeting of the PCI Central Committee in late October, there were open signs of disagreement within the leadership about the austerity measures, with Luigi Longo arguing against supporting them and Giovanni Amendola maintaining that they were essential. Berlinguer seemed to be mediating between the two in the discussion. See *ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1976.

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the party a solid monopoly of that portion of the political spectrum. Since then, however, several small groups to the left of the PCI have emerged, and some of them have managed to obtain parliamentary representation. If their challenge in terms of numbers is insignificant—PDUP and PR have only a handful of representatives in Parliament—they are more than just a nuisance, for they raise issues and publicize stands that might place the PCI in an unfavorable light. Their strength lies partly in their high visibility in the political arena (a status which all of them, and especially the Radicals, have self-consciously pursued), partly in their choice of issues, and partly in the fact that they have limited mass followings, no organizations to speak of, and hence very little to lose in taking extreme positions. While the PCI was solidly installed in opposition, there was little room for these groups, and they constituted a colorful but irrelevant fringe of the system. But as the PCI moves away from its traditional role, it leaves empty, so to speak, a portion of the political spectrum which remains a significant point of reference for part of the left-oriented electorate.

The acrimonious debates which have taken place between *l'Unità* and the daily of the extreme Left (*Il Manifesto*) in recent years and the polemics which have occasionally flared up between the Communists and the Radicals indicate the presence of significant tensions, it not overt conflict, within the Italian Left. It seems likely that these will mount as the PCI seeks an accommodation with the DC on economic policies and "clerical" issues and thus provides the PDUP and the PR with additional themes upon which they can seize in their efforts to embarrass the Communists.[66] The fact that a number of the concerns of these ultraleft parties are shared by some Socialist leaders and by many Socialist intellectuals increases the probability of confrontation and sharp polemics involving the different components of the Italian Left.

The fourth and final area in which expanded responsibilities for the PCI involve additional potential strains is relations between the PCI and the international Communist movement—particularly the PCI's relations with the Soviet Union. Despite the PCI's long-standing assertion of autonomy, the party's ties with the USSR have not visibly deteriorated, and the formation of an Italian Cabinet not explicitly "closed" to the PCI did not appreciably alter the situation. In fact, Soviet reaction to this development was a positive one. But it is not difficult to imagine circumstances that would produce growing friction between the PCI and the USSR. For one thing, criticism of the Soviet Union—especially on the issues of civil rights and individual freedom—has cropped up more and more often in recent times, and this trend seems likely to intensify as Italian Communists attempt to emphasize aspects of the "Italian way to socialism" which might reassure an uneasy public opinion.[67] For another, the younger generation of PCI leaders and party members are far less attached to the "myth of the Soviet Union" than the older cohorts which they are gradually replacing;[68] it follows that, less restrained by ties of the past, they will be less reluctant to engage in a confrontation with the USSR. Furthermore, the emergence and consolidation of "Eurocommunism" might spare the PCI the risk of total isolation in Communist circles in case a controversy with the Soviet Union did arise. What is involved here, however, is—in the author's view—not so much the willingness of the PCI to increase its distance from Moscow as the emergence of international issues that might force the party to take positions antagonistic to the USSR. A break would be costly, and PCI leaders would clearly be reluctant to accept the unpleasant consequences entailed unless forced to do so.[69] For this reason, the likelihood of a break developing remains fairly low.

In any event, it seems evident that the PCI can defend its autonomy and assert its right to define a peculiar socialist model only so long as Italy remains outside the "socialist camp," and Berlinguer has openly recognized this fact.[70] It is ironic that NATO,

[66] That the PDUP and PR intended to attack the PCI became clear soon after the new Parliament convened. The speeches of these groups' leaders in the debate preceding the vote of confidence on the Andreotti Cabinet were highly critical of the PCI and PSI.

[67] For examples of recent critical PCI assessments of the situations in the USSR and some Eastern European countries, see Franco Bertone, "Poland: The Cost of 'Truth in Pricing,'" *Rinascita*, July 2, 1976, p. 17; and Lucio Lombardo Radice, "Czechoslovakia: But Why Life is Elsewhere," *ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1976.

[68] According to statements of PCI officials reported by the press, most PCI militants and low-level cadres have joined the party since 1968. See *Corriere della Sera*, Oct. 8, 1976.

[69] See, *e.g.*, the recent exchange between Alberto Jacoviello, a Communist journalist who has criticized the USSR, and *l'Unità* editor Luca Pavolini. The former argued that the PCI should strive to improve its relations with the Chinese Communist Party even if such an effort led to a confrontation with the CPSU. The latter argued for maintaining "friendship" with all Communist parties. See *Corriere della Sera*, Sept. 30, 1976.

[70] In a recent interview, Berlinguer said: "I feel that since Italy does not belong to the Warsaw Pact, . . . we are absolutely certain that we can proceed on the Italian road to socialism without any constraint. . . . I want Italy not to leave the Atlantic Pact 'also' because of this. . . . I feel safer being on this side." Interview with Gianpaolo Pansa, *ibid.*, July 15, 1976.

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PCI chief Enrico Berlinguer, center facing camera, at the June 1976 Conference of European Communist Parties at the Stadt Hotel in East Berlin, where he articulated his party's line on relations within the international Communist movement. To his right (wearing eyeglasses) is Sergio Segre, and to his left (seen in profile) is Giancarlo Pajetta, both fellow members of the PCI delegation.

—Alain Nogues/Sygma.

which the PCI bitterly opposed in 1949, turned out to be the shield that made the party's move toward autonomy possible. In this context, it is worth noting that the PCI's present interest in accelerating the process of European integration also stems from recognition that such integration would keep Italy outside the Soviet sphere of influence over the long run.

Do the areas of potential new tension just reviewed constitute a threat to the unity of the Italian Communist Party? How likely is it that realization of the "historic compromise" in the not too distant future would result in a restructuring of the entire Italian Left? The author's impression is that by pursuing the strategy they have chosen, PCI leaders are running greater risks than they have in the past on both counts. It is reasonable to expect that the party will come under attack from both the Right and the Left, and it would not be surprising if the appeals of the latter were to find fertile ground among Communists disillusioned and frustrated by the results of compromise with the DC. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the bond between the PCI leadership and the party's membership is strong and that the leadership has in the past demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to persuade the rank and file and retain their support in difficult situations. The leadership also controls a vast and effective organizational network that can be utilized—as it has been in the past—to minimize losses and isolate deviants. More important, there is at the moment no serious, credible alternative to following the party line. Groups of the New Left remain small, poorly organized, and divided among themselves.

All things considered, one is led to conclude that a restructuring of the Left in Italy is not very probable in the near future. Thus, the PCI will remain a major force to be reckoned with on the Italian political scene.

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Soviet "Counterimperialism"

By Richard Lowenthal

At the 25th Soviet Party Congress in February-March 1976, Premier Aleksey Kosygin took the occasion to reaffirm the Soviet Union's interest in "having its cooperation with the developing countries take the form of *a stable and mutually advantageous division of labor,*" [1] as well as to proclaim Soviet success in concluding long-term agreements in recent years on that basis. This unobtrusive passage referred, in fact, to the concept and results of a significant new Soviet Third World strategy focused particularly on a number of adjacent developing countries—a strategy that had been quietly initiated about a decade earlier with the aim not just of winning political or ideological influence in the Third World, but of strengthening the Soviet bloc's economic base and reducing the economic superiority of the West. The 24th Party Congress of 1971, best remembered for its approval of the larger concept of détente with the West based on the achievement of approximate military equality, had been the platform for the first public proclamation of this new anti-Western strategy—then too made in Kosygin's government report—after the strategy had been tried out for several years in practice. On that occasion, Kosygin announced:

In the coming five-year period, the further expansion of the USSR's foreign economic ties with the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is planned. With respect to many of them—India, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, *and others—our trade and economic cooperation are entering a stage in which we can speak of* firmly established mutually advantageous economic ties. Our cooperation with these countries, *based on the principles of equality and respect for mutual interests,* is acquiring the nature of a stable division of labor, counterposed to the system of imperialist exploitation, *in the sphere of international economic relations. At the same time, through the expansion of trade with the developing countries,* the Soviet Union will receive the opportunity to satisfy the requirements of its own economy more fully." [2]

This passage differed from previous and contemporary Soviet official statements on Third World policy in three respects. First, the countries specifically named by Kosygin as having forged firm economic ties with the Soviet Union were obviously singled out not because they had chosen a noncapitalist path of development—as were those mentioned in Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev's report at the same Congress—but rather because they formed part of one of three zones of pronounced Soviet interest: South and Central Asia, the countries of the CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) alliance (among which it would have been justified to mention Turkey along with Iran and Pakistan), and the "progressive" Arab states (which alone qualified for the "noncapitalist" label). Second, the emphasis had clearly shifted from the use of economic aid as a means of gaining political influence to the use of

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[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), March 2, 1976. Emphasis added.
[2] *Ibid.*, April 7, 1971. Emphasis added.

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political and economic influence as a means of securing privileged economic advantages for the Soviet Union and its bloc. Third, Western imperialist power was to be restricted not by relying on the classical weapons of propaganda and support for nationalist movements alone, but by "counterposing" to it a "stable division of labor" between the Soviet Union and its bloc on one side and the developing countries in the USSR's emerging zones of influence on the other. Taken together, these changes amounted to a distinct shift in strategy from old-style Soviet anti-imperialism to what can best be described as "counterimperialism"—that is, a strategy of fighting Western imperialism by using the familiar "imperialist" methods of establishing zones of political and economic influence linked to the Soviet Union by "firm ties." [3]

The New Sphere of Interest

Though the formulations used by Kosygin in 1971 to generalize the new strategy were new, its elements had in fact been developing over the preceding five years as a result of a variety of considerations. The decision to concentrate Soviet efforts vis-à-vis the Third World in a few zones adjoining the Soviet Union must have been taken soon after the fall of Khrushchev as a reaction to his inclination toward "global" adventures as well as in response to the special opportunities Moscow then perceived in the Middle East. It was also Kosygin who, addressing the Egyptian National Assembly in Cairo in April 1966, spoke for the first time of the desirability of a bloc of "progressive" Arab states leaning on the "socialist camp"—thus signaling the transition from a pure strategy of denial aimed at preventing the consolidation of Western influence in the area to a positive bid for a reserved sphere of Soviet power.[4]

While the project to create such a sphere in the Arab Middle East was based on countries listed by Moscow as following the "noncapitalist road"—primarily Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—the same year, 1966, saw the beginning of a similar concentrated effort among a group of non-Arab Southwest Asian countries that not only had given preference to a capitalist road of development but were linked to the Western powers by the CENTO alliance: Iran, Pakistan, and finally Turkey. The Soviets had clearly come to a triple conclusion: (1) that they could not afford to pursue an aid policy based on exclusive priority for "noncapitalist" countries whose potential instability had just been demonstrated by the collapse of Sukarno's regime in Indonesia in 1965 and of Nkrumah's in Ghana in 1966; (2) that the role of "state capitalism" in some of the other Third World countries offered a basis for increasing their independence from the West and that this tendency might be strengthened by providing aid to their state sector;[5] and (3) that, in the region bordering Russia to the south, there were hopeful signs of a growing will to attain such independence and a corresponding interest in improved relations with the Soviet Union.

In the case of Iran, the Shah's decision of September 1962 against allowing American rocket bases on his soil was seen in Moscow as the beginning of a turn toward reducing his pro-Western commitments,[6] and his 1963 program of internal reform—the so-called "White Revolution"[7]—was viewed by the Soviets with corresponding interest. By 1966, Moscow was ready to make a first, massive commitment equal to US$289 million for major development projects in Iran, including a steel works, a machine-building factory, and a gas pipeline for deliveries across the border, followed by further credits equal to US$50 million in 1967 and $200 million in 1968.[8] In 1967, favorable articles about the progress of Iran's development began to appear in Soviet periodicals,[9] and Moscow's new solicitude toward the

[3] Some of the developments discussed in this essay have been previously noted by American scholars, notably by Elizabeth Kriedl Valkenier, "New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations," in Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Eds., *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Chicago, Aldine, 1971; and by Roger E. Kanet, "The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: Policy or Policies?" in Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, Eds., *Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World*, New York, Praeger, 1975. They are treated here in a somewhat different context.

[4] The shift to this bolder strategy may have been inspired by the takeover of power in Syria by a left-wing Baath regime with Communist participation in February 1966. For Kosygin's Cairo speech, see *Pravda*, May 18, 1966.

[5] See V. M. Kollontay, *Puti preodeleniya ekonomicheskoy otstalosti* (Roads to the Overcoming of Economic Backwardness), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1967; R. A. Ul'yanovskiy, "Several Features of the Contemporary Stage of the National Liberation Movement," *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 5, 1967.

[6] See *Pravda*, Sept. 17, 1962, and A. Z. Arabadzhyan, "Soviet-Iranian Economic Cooperation," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1968.

[7] The term has been widely used to describe the major land distribution imposed by the Shah at the expense of the big landowners.

[8] For the Soviet aid figures given here, see the tables in *Monatsberichte* (published by the Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn), March 1975.

[9] See, *e.g.*, the section entitled "Iran, Our Neighbor to the South" in *Aziya i Afrika segodnya* (Moscow), October 1967; M. Ivanov, "Tendencies in the Development of Iran's Economy," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya* (Moscow—henceforth cited as *MEMO*), December 1967.

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Shah's regime was reflected in an announcement by Chairman Reza Rakhmanesh, of the illegal Iranian Communist Tudeh Party, that his party was adjusting its policy to a "constructive" attitude vis-à-vis the Iranian government.[10] By 1968, the time was considered ripe for Kosygin to pay a state visit to Tehran (in April), and for the Shah to visit Moscow (in October).

Pakistan was likewise a focus of Soviet interest and concern—especially since it had become a point of convergence of the hostile influences of both the West and Communist China. However, it was not until Pakistan's acceptance of Soviet mediation in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war that Moscow finally discerned a propitious opportunity to develop its own influence in that country. Accordingly, following the successful Tashkent mediation negotiations in January 1966, the Soviet Union that year granted its hitherto hostile Southwest Asian neighbor credits amounting to US$85 million—more than had been approved in all previous years put together. In the ensuing Soviet-Chinese aid competition for Pakistan's favor, Moscow granted Pakistan US$200 million in 1971, balancing an equivalent amount given by Peking in 1970. In total aid, however, Moscow has stayed ahead.

With respect to Turkey, the Soviet Union perceived a similar opportunity in the course of that country's recurrent conflicts with its NATO ally, Greece, over Cyprus. Though Soviet attempts to intervene as a diplomatic mediator were unsuccessful, Kosygin was able to visit Ankara in December 1966 as a demonstration of improving Soviet-Turkish relations, and a massive Soviet credit to Turkey equal to US$200 million for eight industrial construction projects, including a steelworks, an aluminum works, and an oil refinery, followed in 1967. As in the cases of Iran and Pakistan, the Soviet Union stressed that an improvement of Turkey's relations with the USSR was compatible with a continuation of good relations between that country and the West, but Moscow's implied intention clearly was to bring about a loosen-

[10] This announcement was published in *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), November 1967.



Technical assistance from the USSR facilitated negotiation of difficult terrain such as that shown in this 1970 photo during construction of a pipeline for delivery of Iranian natural gas to Soviet Siberia.

—A. Akhmedzyanov/TASS via Sovfoto.

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Traffic—traditional and modern—on a new highway built with Soviet aid through the mountains between Afghanistan's capital of Kabul and the port city of Shirkhan on the Oxus River opposite Tadzhikistan in the USSR.

—Camera Press.

ing of Ankara's ties to the West by making them less one-sided.[11]

In contrast to the CENTO countries, Afghanistan and India had been among the favorites of the USSR's foreign aid program from its beginning in the mid-1950's. However, in the different context of the late 1960's, the Soviet Union's interest in its small Central Asian neighbor and in China's big South Asian rival likewise assumed a new character and new dimensions. In May 1969, Kosygin put forward his proposal for a pact of regional cooperation linking the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Iran—regardless of the obvious fact that Pakistan's continuing conflicts with India on one side and Afghanistan on the other left little hope for an early fulfillment of such a plan.[12] The clear intention behind this initiative, since underlined by the growing Soviet naval presence in South Asian waters, was to stake out the Soviet Union's claim to become the hegemonic power—or, if one prefers, the main guardian of a peaceful order—in the entire region between its own borders and the Indian Ocean and to announce its interest in controlling the risk of armed conflicts in that area.[13]

In sum, when these Soviet moves in South and Southwest Asia are viewed in conjunction with Moscow's efforts to consolidate its influence in the Arab Middle East, there emerges a strategy aimed at creating beyond the USSR's southern borders a zone of Soviet penetration different in nature from the Communist-controlled European glacis to the west but somewhat analogous in its imperial function—a zone of influence whose limits would stretch from the Mediterranean through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean.

If recognition of the limited effectiveness of the

[11] In his report to the 25th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev went out of his way to refer to Turkey, stating that "cooperation is gradually being extended from the sphere of chiefly economic matters to political questions as well" (*Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976). However, he made no similar reference to Iran.

[12] The relation between Kosygin's initiative for South Asian regional cooperation and Brezhnev's proposal for an Asian collective security pact was discussed in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 20, 1969.

[13] Brezhnev, in his 25th Congress report, referred to the "positive process" of "important changes that occurred in the direction of normal relations between the states in that part of the world [South Asia] and expressed his "satisfaction that to some extent we were able to contribute to this" (*Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976).

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"noncapitalist" model of development in the Third World was one line of thought that led the Soviets to increase their efforts in adjoining capitalist—and particularly "state-capitalist"—developing countries, Soviet anticipation of increasing conflicts between those countries and the industrially advanced Western powers was another.

The Third World and the West

Once the Soviet Union's hope of persuading more and more of the developing countries to "break" with the capitalist world market proved an illusion—if only because the Soviet Union and its bloc could not possibly replace the capitalist world either as a source of aid or as a market for trade—the alternative and much more realistic hope arose among the Soviet leaders that the conditions of trading with, and borrowing from, the Western imperialists would prove increasingly burdensome for their underdeveloped clients. Given the fact that the developing countries needed the West more than the West needed them (as a growing number of Soviet analysts themselves had come to recognize), might not the Soviet Union have more to gain by arousing their protest and backing their struggle against continuing Western exploitation than by trying vainly to make a few model "progressive" states independent of the West?[14]

One major circumstance that helped to focus Soviet attention on these possibilities was the developing countries' increasingly vociferous venting of their grievances at United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) beginning in 1964. The central complaint that emerged from these conferences was that the granting of major credits in foreign currency, often at considerable interest, was of little benefit to the development of the receiving countries as long as these countries were not enabled at the same time to balance their foreign trade; yet this was being prevented, on the one hand, by "discrimination" on the part of the industrially advanced countries against the developing countries' manufactured exports and, on the other, by undervaluation of the latter's raw material exports in an "unequal exchange" for imports of the advanced countries' modern machinery. As many of the developing countries faced a cumulative deficit in their foreign trade because of unstable and mostly falling raw-material prices on the world market and limited foreign demand for the products of their new industries, they found themselves unable to repay development credits with interest, and the resulting indebtedness became increasingly burdensome, to the point where the intended positive effect of the credits on their economic development was liable to be destroyed altogether. As early as 1965, some Soviet analysts predicted that the point at which new deficits of the developing countries could no longer be covered by new credits, or at which all new credits would be used up for the servicing of accumulated debts, might be reached by 1970 or 1975.[15]

In fact, the charges made by the developing countries contained a number of exaggerations and distortions. The poor market for the developing countries' manufactured products was mostly due not to discrimination on the part of the advanced industrial countries but to the limited quality and range of those products, so that the developing countries actually needed to obtain trade preferences rather than mere equality of treatment to assure outlets for them. As for the charge of undervaluation of the developing countries' raw-material exports, the fall in the relative world prices of most raw materials, both mineral and agricultural, was caused not by deliberate manipulation on the part of international monopolies but rather by the rise in world raw-material output and productivity, the absence of any artificial, war-caused boom in raw-material prices in the interval between the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the fact that most producers of primary goods were weakly organized compared to the leading combines producing industrial machinery.

But whatever the causes of their plight, the developing countries faced a real and serious problem, and—more important—the Soviet bloc was better situated than the capitalist West to offer them at least partial relief. In the case of the developing countries' manufactured products, trade preferences could more easily be granted by countries with centrally-planned economies and with a limited range and quality of home-produced consumer goods of their own than by the affluent Western market econ-

[14] See V. M. Kollontay, "The Liberated Countries: Choosing the Path of Development," *MEMO*, October 1965; P. N. Andreasyan, "The Developing Countries and Foreign Capital," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), May 1967; and S. I. Tulpanov in *Aussenhandel* (East Berlin), June 1967.

[15] L. Stepanov, "Two Policies—Who Helps the Developing Countries and How," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 14, September 1965; P. Khvoynik, "Dictation or Equal Rights," *MEMO*, December 1965; and V. Rymalov, "The Battle for Economic Independence," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, February 1968.

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A 1972 photo of the Ar Rumaylah oil fields of Iraq, developed with Soviet technical and economic assistance.

—V. Yegorov/TASS via Sovfoto.

omies. And in the case of the developing countries' raw-material products, it was also easier for the bloc countries, with their state monopolies over foreign trade, to conclude bulk purchase agreements stabilizing the prices of these products for a time, if their governments made a political decision to do so.

It was this situation that produced the Soviet concept of a "stable division of labor" with a group of developing countries and of an alliance with raw-material producers against the Western imperialist monopolies. Compensation agreements providing for the repayment of Soviet loans by long-term commodity deliveries—say, of Egyptian cotton or Burmese rice—at fixed prices had long been a device of Soviet developmental aid policy. Now they became a pattern for major Soviet investments in the group of countries described above—particularly in oil, gas, and mineral production—with the double aim of promoting the independence of these countries' mostly nationalized raw-material producing plants from the international monopolies and of forging firm economic ties between these countries and the Soviet bloc.

If any final signal was needed on the eve of the 24th Party Congress to encourage the CPSU leaders to proclaim the new strategy, it was provided by the agreement concluded by the members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Tehran in February 1971. With this agreement, a common front of the oil-producing countries against the international oil companies was clearly emerging, and the Soviets at once decided to support this objectively anti-imperialist venture regardless of whether the participating countries were "capitalist" or "noncapitalist," and to orient their own counter-imperialist strategy toward cooperation with the OPEC group. It can thus be said that for once the Soviets correctly anticipated a major development in world affairs—not, of course, in the concrete form it eventually took, but in principle. Fully two and a half years before the oil crisis of the fall of 1973, they foresaw conflict between the oil producers and the Western industrial countries and chose up sides, without regard for the simultaneous pursuit of détente.

The Impact of Technological Change

Since the 24th Congress also enshrined the results of several years' discussion of the "scientific-technological revolution," it was quite natural that the theoretical underpinning of the new strategy should have been elaborated under the rubric of the impact of the scientific-technological revolution on developing countries. The first article on the subject appeared in April 1971,[16] while the Congress was still in session, and publication of the papers and proceedings of a special conference on this theme, held in Moscow under the joint auspices of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations and the Institute for Oriental Studies, began two months later.[17]

The two aspects of the impact of the scientific-technological revolution on the developing countries that emerged as central in these discussions were, first, the changes in the world market situation affecting raw materials and foodstuffs and, second, the need for regional integration as a condition for a more effective international division of labor. In regard to the first, it was pointed out that the agricultural sectors of the developing countries were

[16] A. Yu. Shpirt, "The Developing Countries and the Scientific-Technological Revolution," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, April 1971.

[17] See *MEMO*, Nos. 6-8, 1971.

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Soviet and Indian specialists confer during assembly of the 100-ton converters at the Bokaro iron and steel works in 1973.

—B. Vlasov/Novosti via Sovfoto.

losing some of their markets, either as a result of technical progress in the productivity of agriculture in the advanced countries or as a consequence of the partial replacement of the developing countries' textile and caoutchouc exports by synthetic products. On the other hand, it was noted that the scientific-technological revolution was simultaneously increasing the demand for a number of the developing countries' major mineral exports—*e.g.*, "nuclear raw materials" such as uranium, thorium, and graphite; key materials for electronic industries, such as copper and bauxite; and petroleum for dual use as fuel and as raw material for the petrochemical industry. Apart from demands by the developing countries for stopping the growth of synthetic industries (demands which were rejected as utopian), these market changes were seen to have important consequences in the form of the producing countries' struggle for price stabilization and their growing interest in controlling—and using part of—their own mineral resources. Hence, the increasing pressure from these countries for replacing control by foreign capitalist combines either by outright nationalization or at least by the substitution of mixed companies with the participation of the developing countries' governments; hence, also, the growing importance attached by these governments to projects for establishing secondary industries linked to the extraction of raw materials, such as oil refineries and steel or aluminum works.

On the second point, it was argued that among the chief obstacles to effective use of the gains of the scientific-technological revolution by the developing countries were the narrowness of their internal markets—due not only to the limited size but to the class structure of the local societies—and the difficulties of regional cooperation in a capitalist framework. Expansion of market production in general and of foreign trade in particular, with special emphasis on a division of labor with advanced industrial countries, was seen as indispensable for accelerating technical progress; however, the barriers to development along these lines were claimed to be too high in the "unequal" system of the capitalist world economy. Regional integration in particular was needed to permit industrial growth, most of all in heavy industry, and it was argued that such integration would have to be based on the experience of socialist economic integration.

The political conclusions drawn from this analysis were essentially two. First, the Soviets and their allies should actively support the struggle of the developing countries for sovereign control over the exploitation of raw-material resources and for better selling prices for raw materials in trade, and they should direct their development aid toward the creation of national key industries based on these materials. Second, they should offer the developing countries ways of benefiting from an international division of labor and should encourage the establishment of forms of regional integration outside the capitalist world economy. The practical import of these conclusions became clear at the conference of the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) held at Bucharest in July 1971.

The Bucharest CMEA Conference

The main business of the Bucharest conference was the adoption of a "Comprehensive Program" designed to effect a more integrated division of labor among the countries of the Soviet-East European bloc, but at the same time the conference took special pains to pave the way for cooperation with the

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developing countries by stipulating that nonmembers of CMEA might join in the new program—either fully if they accepted its goals in principle, or partly. The procedure for dealing with applications from nonmembers to join in the program provided for admission by unanimous decision only, but the door was left open for participation in measures that might be taken by only some of the members. In fact, immediate interest in the new possibilities offered by the program was shown by the Arab Committee for Industrial Development—most actively, by the Iraqi government—and representatives of India and even Mexico made visits to CMEA headquarters in Moscow for the purpose of obtaining more information. Meanwhile, CMEA made active use of its observer status in various specialized and regional organizations of the United Nations to seek a common front with the developing countries and to promote cooperation with them.

Early in 1972, the purposes and prospects of this effort were set forth at length in an authoritative article published in a Soviet periodical.[18] The author pointed out that the opening of CMEA's Comprehensive Program to participation by the developing countries was intended to implement Kosygin's call at the 24th Congress for "a stable division of labor, counterposed to the system of imperialist exploitation." One prominent objective was to increase the bloc's assured supply of fuel and raw materials over and above the supplies available from the Soviet Union, and this necessitated changing the hitherto existing situation in which the bloc's share in the Third World countries' exports of fuels and nonferrous metals had been much lower than the share of the West. To this end, the Soviet bloc should help the developing countries to increase their output of such key materials through both capital aid and scientific-technological cooperation, and in return should require the latter to bind themselves by long-term delivery contracts. This, it was noted, would en-

[18] L. Z. Zevin, "Socialist Economic Integration and Cooperation with Third World Countries," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1972. Zevin had pleaded for such a policy years before its final adoption: see his article on "Mutual Benefits of Economic Cooperation between Socialist and Developing Countries," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 2, 1965.

The first portion of the metallurgical works at Iskendrun shown in operation in January 1976. This Turkish facility was built with Soviet assistance.

—Sovfoto.

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tail a coordination of plans with a long-term perspective of 12-15 years on the model of agreements then under negotiation through the Soviet-Iranian Joint Cooperation Commission, with the participation of planning representatives from both sides. The article further suggested that several CMEA countries, acting jointly, might conclude comparable agreements with developing countries, thus helping those countries to increase their export capacities with an assured market.

On this basis, the article indicated, it was envisaged to pass from the building of single big plants in the developing countries to the creation, with the help of several CMEA countries together, of entire "development centers" comprising groups of vertically interconnected plants ranging from the extracting through the early processing stages and including suppliers and services, with the final products destined for use either in the country or in the CMEA area (India's Ranchi industrial complex, built with the cooperation of the USSR and Czechoslovakia, was cited as an example). Another promising approach stressed in the article was cooperation in the creation of "economic border complexes" between the Soviet Union and some of its neighbors, as already undertaken with Afghanistan and India and envisaged for Turkey.

The projected division of labor, however, was not to be confined to the extraction of mineral resources and industries based on them. The article indicated that the CMEA countries would continue to ensure a market for the developing countries' rising manufacturing industries, thus stimulating production growth and improvement in quality. It further expressed the view that while the developing countries should eventually move into more technically advanced types of production, this might take a "rather long time" and that meanwhile these countries should concentrate on labor-intensive industries in order to make use of their large reserves of labor, or on the production of parts for more complicated industrial goods. Here, it should be pointed out, the author was recommending for the developing countries a path of industrial development based on the very same division of labor which other Soviet writers, in discussing the limitations of Western aid programs, were accusing the "Western imperialists" of favoring —namely, concentration on labor-intensive industries with low wage costs and on parts-production that would keep the new industries making such parts dependent on assembly in the "partner country."[19] Similarly, the article argued that the developing countries could not overcome the disadvantages of dependence on monoculture by drastically reducing the exportation of the single products in favor of an all-round industrialization for which they lacked the necessary foreign exchange, but only by building special complexes of processing industries based on that raw product—a prescription well known in Western development policy.

One final hope that was expressed in connection with the opening of the CMEA Comprehensive Program to participation by the developing countries was that those countries which joined in the new division of labor would come to accept conducting their accounts with the CMEA countries in the "transferable ruble"—an accounting unit introduced in 1964 to free intrabloc trade from the cramping need for bilateral clearing balances. Accordingly, at its meeting in April 1972, CMEA empowered its International Investment Bank to establish transferable ruble accounts for nonmember countries with the explicit purpose of making the bloc's trade with developing countries independent of Western currencies.[20] Actually, however, the developing countries have generally insisted not only on settlement, but also on accounting, in convertible currencies. The reason is obvious. The transferable ruble, used in intrabloc trade at contractual prices, is not convertible at fixed exchange rates into the currencies even of the individual member countries of CMEA, owing to differences in the nationally-controlled price levels of the CMEA countries; and the developing countries, still doing more trade with the West than with the Soviet bloc, have not been interested in accumulating balances that could be used only in trade with the bloc countries.

A First Balance Sheet

When the CPSU Central Committee Plenum met in April 1973, the time for a first stocktaking of the results of the new strategy had come. Although the subject was not specifically mentioned in the session's communiqué (which included the announcement of major changes in the Politburo), it evidently was taken up in the course of the Plenum's general debate on foreign policy, for soon afterwards the Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Eco-

[19] See, *e.g.*, N. Lidleyn, "Several Bourgeois Conceptions of the Industrialization of Developing Countries," *MEMO*, December 1974.
[20] *Einheit* (East Berlin), No. 6, 1972.

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

A January 1975 photo of the hydroelectric project being built on the Euphrates River in Syria with technical assistance from the USSR.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

nomic Relations, S. Skachkov, disclosed in an article in *Kommunist* that the meeting had once again "underlined" the directive of the 24th Congress calling for efforts to bring about a stable division of labor between the Soviet bloc and the developing countries.[21]

Skachkov claimed that this new division of labor was in fact already emerging and was beginning to erode the imperialist monopoly of economic relations with the developing countries. Soviet aid to these countries, with its emphasis on key industries and on diversification, was responsive to the demands emanating from UNCTAD; in contrast to "imperialist" aid, it aimed at making expansion of the specialized production of the individual developing countries a starting point for the building of viable economic complexes, while giving preference to the state sector of the local economies. The dual concentration of Soviet attention on neighboring countries and on countries with a "socialist orientation" was reflected in Skachkov's special mention of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey in the first category, and of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, Somalia, and Guinea in the second.[22] Examples from several of these countries were cited to show the promotion of local enterprises of key importance to the growth of their national economies and the development of integrated complexes centered on oil, steel, aluminum, and power dams. Emphasis was also placed on Soviet geological prospecting in these countries as a factor in developing their raw material resources

[21] S. Skachkov, "Economic Cooperation of the Soviet Union with the Developing Countries," *Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1973.

[22] Calculations based on the tables in *Monatsberichte* (cited in footnote 8) reveal that Soviet aid to the three regions discussed here—Afghanistan, India, and Bangladesh; Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey—amounted to 73.2 percent of aid to the Third World for the entire period 1954-73, and to 79.8 percent in 1971-73 alone. If the other countries with a "socialist orientation" named by Skachkov—Algeria, Yemen, Somalia, and Guinea—are added, the percentage for the three years 1971-73 rises to 88.3 percent, and to 96.5 percent if Chile is included.

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S. Skachkov (left), the Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, and India's Minister for Planning, Shri D. P. Dhar, exchange the instruments of protocol for an Indo-Soviet economic cooperation agreement in New Delhi on February 17, 1973.

—Pana-India via Keystone.

under national control, on the training of specialized technical cadres for them in the Soviet Union, and on mass on-the-job training of workers by Soviet experts.

At the same time, Skachkov frankly listed the benefits of this policy for the Soviet economy. Among these were an assured supply of fuel and raw materials, a regular flow-back of foreign exchange from the repayment of long-term credits, the continuing dependence of the new plants in the countries concerned on Soviet experts and spare parts, and the creation of permanent links between particular projects and particular Soviet "parent enterprises." The special benefits accruing to the Soviet Union from the creation of cooperative "border complexes"—in fields ranging from hydroelectric power generation and fishing through mining and transport to the struggle against epidemics and pests—also received specific mention. On the other hand, Skachkov did not fail to stress the importance of improving the quality and shortening the delivery times of Soviet machinery exports as well as of assuring the supply of replacement parts for the future success of this kind of cooperation. Finally, he emphasized the need for long-term, intergovernmental agreements with the countries producing vital raw materials as a basis for long-term "perspective planning" at home.

The outside observer who looks at this balance sheet will be inclined to agree that the new strategy, with its astute combination of economic and diplomatic ingredients, has proved both more realistic and more successful than some of the more ideologically-inspired Soviet policies of the preceding decades. It has certainly contributed to a broadening of the fuel and raw materials base of the Soviet bloc in a critical period, as well as to a general expansion of the bloc's foreign trade. It has also helped, within certain limits, to strengthen the political influence of the Soviet Union in the strategically important regions beyond its southern borders and to increase the independence of the traditionally pro-Western countries in those areas from the Western alliance system of which they still form part. Finally, it has been a factor in the developments that have tended in recent years to produce confrontations between the Third World in general and the producers of oil and some other raw materials in particular, on the one hand, and the advanced industrial countries of the West, on the other—developments which began with the formation of a Third World bloc in UNCTAD and reached an initial climax in the oil crisis of 1973-74. The potential for further confrontations still remains, although developments began to take a new direction in late 1975 thanks to constructive Western attempts at negotiation. In any event, the new Soviet strategy has made it possible for Moscow to profit from such confrontations while staying on the sidelines.

Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that the relative success of the Soviet Union's latest Third World strategy has been due in part to factors outside Moscow's control. The major factor of this nature that has eased Soviet economic penetration of selected areas has been the relative decline of Western investments in the Third World. Although the absolute volume of these investments has continued to rise throughout the post-colonial period, their share in total Western exports of capital has diminished compared to capital flows between advanced industrial countries. This fact has been recognized in recent discussions among Soviet analysts, one of whom has coined the formula that the West has reacted to the

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Third World's reduced dependence on the West by reducing its own dependence on the Third World[23]—a statement that holds true even for food and raw materials from that area with the exception of a few, though still vital, items. The same analysts also point correctly to the connection between the relative decline in "imperialist" investments in the developing countries and the growth of profitable investment opportunities in the advanced capitalist countries' own expanding internal markets.[24] With all the classical driving forces of imperialism—the interest in the acquisition of outside markets, of raw materials, and of outlets for capital investment—thus weakened, other Soviet analysts have argued that the political need to keep the Third World countries within the capitalist world system and not let them slip under the control of the "socialist camp" remains the only major motivation behind Western "neocolonialism."[25]

Moreover, the limited success of the current Soviet strategy *per se* is evident from the fact that it has not so far caused any of the key Third World countries to "slip under" the control of the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, the most important of the "socialist-oriented" Arab countries, Egypt, after gradually increasing its independence from Soviet control over a period of years, dramatically demonstrated that independence by concluding the Sinai agreement with Israel in the late summer of 1975 and, even more strikingly, by denouncing Cairo's treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR in February 1976. Even in the case of India, which not only has maintained its 1971 friendship treaty with Moscow but has also come increasingly to be regarded by the Soviets as a "socialist-oriented" country since Premier Indira Gandhi's assumption of emergency powers in June 1975,[26] the Soviet leaders are clearly under no illusion that they could control her. As for Turkey and Iran, not even the American withdrawal from continental Southeast Asia and the collapse of SEATO, Turkish-American tension over Cyprus, and the enormously increased self-confidence of the Shah's government have so far induced either of those Soviet-courted countries to leave CENTO. Both welcome the improvement of their relations with the Soviet Union as a reinforcement of their independence, but they still cling to a loosened alliance with the West as reinsurance. In short, while the Soviets have on the whole strengthened their influence in their target area, they have not succeeded in turning any significant part of it into a zone of their exclusive or even predominant influence. To this political limitation of their success must be added an economic one: their share in the foreign trade and capital imports of their preferred target countries has notably increased, but it remains in most cases substantially smaller than that of the West.[27]

The final result of the new Soviet strategy, then, is a remarkable paradox. The West has lost much of its traditional motivation for economic imperialism and is being obliged to retreat before some of the new economc demands of the developing world; yet it retains superior, if reduced, economic influence in the contested areas. The Soviets have acquired an economic as well as a political motivation for their "counterimperialism" in the sense of an effort to establish a reserved sphere of influence embracing a group of developing countries; but despite unmistakable progress in this direction, they remain imperialists without an empire—at least in that part of the world.

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[23] P. Khvoynik, "The Economic Interests of Imperialism in the Third World—Trends and Perspectives," *MEMO*, June 1973.

[24] V. Seynis, "Changes in the Economy of Capitalism and Some Peculiarities of Neocolonialism in the 1970's," *Ekonomicheskiye nauki* (Moscow), January 1974.

[25] See E. Teryabin, "Imperialism and the Third World, a Shaping of Contradictions," *MEMO*, November 1973, and Seynis, *loc. cit.*

[26] In his report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU, cited above, Brezhnev stressed the "enormous importance" of the Soviet-Indian treaty and "its role as a stabilizing factor in South Asia and on the continent as a whole." He continued: "Close political and economic cooperation with the Republic of India is our steady course. Soviet people are sympathetic toward—more than that, they feel solidarity with—India's peace-loving foreign policy and the courageous struggle of the country's progressive forces to solve the difficult social and economic problems confronting it."

[27] Exceptions must be made for the relative Soviet and Western shares in development aid received by Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and—for certain periods—also in their foreign trade. For a statistical comparison of Soviet and US aid, see Table 1 in Marshall Goldman, "Soviet Foreign Aid since the Death of Stalin," in W. Raymond Duncan, Ed., *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, Waltham, Mass., Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970, p. 32.

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Books

Medvedev's Marxism—Modernity with Freedom?

By Carl A. Linden

ROY A. MEDVEDEV, Ed.: *Dvadtsatyy vek (The Twentieth Century): A Socio-Political and Literary Digest.* London, T.C.D. Publications, 1976.

The Twentieth Century is Roy Medvedev's answer to *Kontinent.* The dissident Soviet historian, opposing pole to Solzhenitsyn within the "Democratic Movement," [1] edits this new *samizdat* journal in Moscow. And now his twin brother Zhores, in exile in London, has published the first issue of the journal's edition for readers in the West. It consists of articles selected from the larger *samizdat* version and is devoted for the most part to political and philosophical criticism of *Kontinent* and of Solzhenitsyn and the circle of writers associated with him in the collection *From Under the Rubble.*[2]

The title *The Twentieth Century* itself reflects the debate which has developed among Soviet dissidents over the last few years. It implies that the journal is up to date and its adversaries out of touch with the contemporary world. According to Roy Medvedev's Marxian hypothesis that truth changes with time and place —that what was true yesterday is not true today, and that what is true today will not be true tomorrow—this means that only a reformist and humanized socialism is appropriate or even possible for the Communist East and ultimately for the democratic West as well. *The Twentieth Century* rejects the escape route out of Soviet-style despotism proposed by Solzhenitsyn and the dissidents leaning to his side, through a rejuvenation of Russia's historical identity and culture and a revival of its literary, ethical, and religious traditions. Clearly, the appearance of this new journal, like that of *Kontinent,* registers the shift which has taken place in recent years within the "Democratic Movement"—a shift away from unity in protest against the Soviet regime's suppression of civil rights, toward division over questions of the movement's own direction and platform.

Rivalry between Medvedev and Solzhenitsyn began in the late 1960's in a behind-the-scenes tug-of-war to win over as an ally Andrey Sakharov, the only figure among the dissidents close to Solzhenitsyn in prestige. Sakharov still stands between the two adversaries, although he has moved further away from Medvedev's position, which he generally shared in 1968, toward acceptance of some of Solzhenitsyn's criticisms of socialism. But the original Medvedev-Solzhenitsyn rivalry for Sakharov's support has broadened into a contest for the intellectual leadership of the Democratic Movement as a whole and, indirectly, of the entire educated class in the Soviet Union. At issue in immediate terms are the political orientation of the Democratic Movement and the direction in which an embryonic public opinion in post-Stalin Russia is to be nurtured. On a deeper level, the development of the debate in which the dissidents are now engaged—how well or how poorly they carry it forward—is a critical matter both for the dissidents' self-understanding and for their insight into the predicament of their country. The outcome of the debate in this respect—no matter who wins the most adherents—may decide whether or not the

[1] See Hilary A. Sternberg, "The Human Rights Movement in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1976, pp. 82-84.

[2] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *From Under the Rubble,* Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1975. See Robert G. Kaiser, "Russian Dissident Literature," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1976, pp. 92-95, for a review of this work.

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Democratic Movement exerts a profound or only superficial influence on the future of modern Russia.

THE GREAT DANGER facing the dissidents is that they will sink into wrangling and sterile polemics. Up to now this has not occurred, though the peril has grown. Despite some rhetorical excesses, both sides have by and large sustained a mutual commitment to the tradition of *glasnost', i.e.* the Russian (not Soviet) tradition of responsible and public testing of differing viewpoints. That tradition does not exclude but presumes sharp, searching, and spirited debate which reveals rather than obscures the core of debated issues. The result is a civil (not Marxian) dialectic which takes the partisans of the debate beyond themselves toward greater understanding of the issues which join and separate them.

The first Western issue of *The Twentieth Century* does not propound a rigid line. While the authors of the journal are uniformly of a social democratic reformist and humanist persuasion—in fact, a good deal more uniform in political orientation than *Kontinent's* contributors—there is diverse thinking on its pages. And R. Lert, the journal's assistant editor, takes care to caution Medvedev himself not to be too quick to brush aside the moral, nationality, and religious issues raised by adversaries within the dissident movement.

Of course, official Soviet tolerance of *The Twentieth Century* almost certainly does not stem from a desire to promote *glasnost'*. Yet it is clear that this latest venture of the Medvedev twins, especially the formal publication of a *samizdat* journal abroad, could not take place without the powers-that-be in Moscow turning a blind eye to editorial transactions between the brothers. Two motives for the regime's forbearance particularly suggest themselves.

The first, and perhaps most likely, is the hope that a process of fragmentation within the dissident movement can be aided by a kind of holding-the-coat tactic. Not interfering with the Medvedevs' challenge to *Kontinent* and *From Under the Rubble,* this argument goes, will help produce a self-destructive conflict among the dissidents. At the least, the authorities' expectations may be that the division between émigré dissidents and their counterparts still in the USSR will be exacerbated and that the sympathizers of the dissidents within the Western intellectual community and media circles will themselves be divided into hostile camps backing one or another segment of the dissident movement. The result sought, then, is the mutual discrediting of the dissidents and of their moral support in both East and West.

A similar motive may have played a part in the regime's apparent tolerance for a time of the *samizdat* Russian patriotic journal *Veche.* The editor, Vladimir Osipov, was able to circulate *Veche* from 1971 to 1974, when he was jailed and the journal suppressed. Some regime elements evidently believed that there was advantage in pitting the then emerging Russian patriotic grouping of the Democratic Movement against its

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liberal and left-leaning groupings. It seems clear, however, that the Soviet authorities, or at least the dominant elements among them, were not happy with the results of their experiment.

The second possible motive for permitting the Medvedev venture to proceed is less likely but, if present, would lend support to Roy Medvedev's principal thesis, set out in the opening essay of *The Twentieth Century,* that there are significant reform-minded elements within Soviet leadership circles. According to this thesis, tolerance of the Medvedev enterprise would reflect the influence in regime councils of elements not unsympathetic to Roy Medvedev's views. And the brothers did suggest in *A Question of Madness* [3] that such elements played a part in obtaining Zhores Medvedev's release in 1971 from incarceration in a psychiatric hospital. Thus it can be argued that just as the *Veche* episode seems to have indicated the presence of official elements sympathetic to the patriotic dissidents, the continued appearance of *The Twentieth Century* testifies to the presence in official circles of elements favoring liberalizing reform.

OF COURSE, it is possible that both the above motivations came into play, representing the opposing purposes of different official elements. Different motives can stand behind the same practical decision. If this is the case, then the appearance of *The Twentieth Century* tends to support another major thesis offered by Roy Medvedev in the journal's first essay—namely, that it is an error to see the Soviet regime as a single-minded entity rather than as an institution subject to inner stresses and strains arising from the counterpoint of divergent views. Medvedev also argues that to a certain extent there exists a reciprocal relationship between the Soviet regime on the one hand and Soviet society and the pressures which it generates on the other. It may be difficult to fault Medvedev's hypotheses, but there is certainly no Marxian inevitability that the outcome of competition inside the regime will be movement in the direction of the fundamental reforms desired by Medvedev or by other societal elements agitating for change. While Medvedev is optimistic about the potential for reform from what he calls the "technocratic" wing of the regime, his assistant editor raises serious doubt about the likelihood that technocrats will be authors of basic reform.

Yet Roy Medvedev's entire gradualist platform rests on the validity of these expectations. It is here that his argument with Solzhenitsyn and the "Russianizers" comes to a head—not over who is on the "left" and who is on the "right" among the dissidents, but over who sees more deeply and more accurately into the nature of Soviet rule. Attempting to base his position on Marxism-Leninism as if it were a creative source for a genuine public and intellectual culture, Medvedev attributes Soviet ideocratic despotism not to Marxist-Leninist origins but rather to massive historical aberrations which he refers to as "pseudo-communism" and "pseudo-socialism." His "Russianizing" opponents argue in refutation that Marxism-Leninism can only produce a "pseudo-culture." The Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 did not found a new culture, they say. Rather, it encaged the Russian nation and the other nations of the empire in a rigid ideocratic power structure. The crucial evidence of this in their view has been Soviet society's manifest incapacity to tolerate a free public life or to produce a genuine literature, poetry, or philosophy. Excellence in these areas of culture, they point out, has developed despite, rather than because of, Marxist-Leninist rule.

In fact, the ideological postulates which Roy Medvedev proposes tend to resemble reformist social democracy far more than official Marxism-Leninism. His entire way of thinking makes far more sense if it is seen as envisioning a return to the rational and socially conscious humanism out of which Marxism originated and from which, in turn, Leninism arose. Here Medvedev has a case. The prior ground of humanist social philosophy was not inconsistent with the defense of human rights and civil freedom. Hence, Medvedev's implicit argument seems to be that if Russia's "progressive" intelligentsia was deceived and entrapped by a Stalinism which had disguised its real nature in Marxist-Leninist guise, then that same intelligentsia, having learned by rude experience to distinguish between hollow dogma and authentic theoretical principle, can now find its way out of its quandary and gradually lead the Soviet Union away from its Stalinist past.

IN A REAL sense, then, Medvedev, like Solzhenitsyn, is looking "backward," not historically but philosophically, for an escape route away from Soviet despotism. Medvedev turns to humanism, and Solzhenitsyn to the Christian tra-

[3] Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores Medvedev, *A Question of Madness*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1972.

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dition—the two great cultural streams of modern Western thought here running in their Russian channels. Neither solution in itself is unreasonable; when at a dead end, it makes sense to go back to a point before the wrong turn was made and start again. But such a step backward can be salutary only if it is followed by movement forward along a more desirable path. There is a danger that arguments between the dissident factions over practical courses of action or platforms will obscure the root issue of all the problems with which the dissidents must contend, be they contributors to *The Twentieth Century* or to *Kontinent*. This is the issue of freedom. It was the cause of freedom which brought the dissidents together in the Democratic Movement in the 1960's, despite their remarkable political and philosophical diversity. In that cause is the origin, the present basis of unity-in-diversity of the dissidents, and the assurance of their future as a movement. Only if that cause remains first among the dissidents' concerns will their fragmentation into irreconcilable and mutually destructive sects be averted. The dissidents of the Democratic Movement can hope for success only if they keep in mind the fact that the ultimate goal of their debate in the spirit of *glasnost'* is the recovery, through reflective point and counterpoint, of the grounds on which responsible human freedom can be defended and advanced in political and social life.

It is in this respect that the first Western issue of *The Twentieth Century* is most disappointing. Its contributors brush aside their dissident opponents' views on freedom without offering a substantial exposition or defense of their own understanding of the issue. S. Blagin in his critique of Solzhenitsyn's essay on "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations," [4] for example, scorns rather than thoughtfully considers Solzhenitsyn's thesis of "inner freedom" as the precondition of other human freedoms, a notion not at all ideosyncratic in the long debate in Western philosophy on the subject of freedom. Similarly, Roy Medvedev, who focuses his invective and ire on Solzhenitsyn and I. Shafarevich's criticism of socialism, unfortunately declares most of it not worthy of a "scientific polemic." He does not so much as mention one of the most serious challenges in *From Under the Rubble* to the rational humanist position on which he and his journal take their stand. It is offered by the young historian Vadim Borisov.[5] He submits that while individual rational humanists have often championed freedom, as a group they have found themselves without a logical base in their own philosophy for the defense of freedom against modern theories and ideologies which reject the notion that human beings possess any inherent dignity or rights. Their philosophy, he argues, leaves unbridged a gap which the founders of the American republic were wise enough to fill with the proposition that all men are created "with certain inalienable rights." Curiously, the only contributor to *Kontinent* whom Medvedev praises without criticism, Lescek Kolakowski, is the one Marxian humanist who has taken this defect of Marxist-Leninist thought as critical and has gone outside of Marxism, back to Kant, to seek argument in defense of the absolute standing of the individual human being.

Here is a genuine philosophical issue, with profound practical implications, that contributors to *The Twentieth Century* and all other dissident elements within the Democratic Movement need to address. Is freedom a matter of political and social outcome and valuation alone, or is it a condition of being human requiring nurture and protection in society? Official Marxism-Leninism has always pictured freedom for all men only as an end-product of history, a matter for the future, and on this basis has denied freedom to human beings in the present. Can this view be correct? On what grounds does an authentic Marxist-Leninist, as Medvedev portrays himself, question it?

The main preoccupation of the dissident movement in the USSR and of *The Twentieth Century* especially must be more thought and less rhetoric about freedom. Out of understanding comes sound theory, which indeed must precede practice. Without this, the educated class to whom both Medvedev and Solzhenitsyn look as a potential source of change in the USSR is not likely to find the courage or force of conviction necessary to begin to extricate itself from the despotism that stifles Soviet public life.

The dissidents, for their own reasons, are bringing their debates to us in the West in the form of such journals as *The Twentieth Century* and *Kontinent*. Perhaps their love of freedom, of which there can be no doubt, will help us as well in the task of not thoughtlessly losing our own public freedom.

[4] This essay appeared in *From Under the Rubble*.

[5] See Vadim Borisov, "Personality and National Awareness," in *From Under the Rubble*.

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Women's Lot in Communist Societies

By Barbara W. Jancar

GERHARD F. SCHILLING and M. KATHLEEN HUNT: *Women in Science and Technology. US/USSR Comparisons.* Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 1975.
GREGORY L. MASSELL: *Surrogate Proletariat. Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1974.
SHEILA ROWBOTHAM: *Women, Resistance and Revolution. A History of Women and Revolution in the Modern World.* New York, Pantheon, 1973.
HILDA SCOTT: *Does Socialism Liberate Women? Experiences from Eastern Europe.* Boston, Beacon Press, 1974.
WILLIAM M. MANDEL: *Soviet Women.* New York, Doubleday, 1975.
RUTH SIDEL: *Women and Child Care in China. A Firsthand Report.* New York, Hill and Wang, 1972.
SUSAN JACOBY: *Moscow Conversations.* New York, Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1972.

THE CAPACITY of Communist governments to realize the original Marxist goals of equality between the sexes has become a subject of interest in the West. The resurgence of the women's movement in the early 1960's, symbolized in the United States by the publication of Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique,* turned public attention to the obvious fact that the right to vote did not carry with it the right to equal pay for equal work or equal status at home and at work. Had communism been any more successful in promoting equality between the sexes? Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania pioneered the scholarly investigation of woman's place in Soviet society with a conference in 1968 on women in Russia. Since then, the scope and breadth of scholarly research has increased to a point where an evaluation of various contributions seems in order. The seven works listed particularly lend themselves to comment as examples of the type of research currently being undertaken.

These books reflect a wide range of approaches and methodologies. The Schilling/Hunt study makes a statistical comparison of the employment patterns of women in science and technology in the two superpowers and analyzes the economic impact and potential of the two patterns. Massell's work is a sociological study of the political ramifications of the Soviet drive to liberate women in Central Asia in the 1920's. Rowbotham offers an excellent history of the relation of women to revolution. Scott's work is a journalistic study of the successes and failures of the Communist program of female liberation in Eastern Europe, with a focus on Czechoslovakia. Mandel and Sidel —authors with a stated commitment to the aims and purposes of communism — have produced works highly laudatory of Soviet and Chinese policies toward women. Finally, Jacoby's book consists of portraits of Soviet personalities, about a quarter of which are women.

There is virtually no dispute among all the authors over data. Proportionately more women are employed in the Communist countries than anywhere else in the world. Proportionately more women are found in the traditional Western "male preserves" of law, medicine, and science in Communist societies than elsewhere. In varying degrees, according to their capabilities, the Communist states have provided an

This critique incorporates conclusions from the author's own research, to be published in a forthcoming book, Women Under Communism.

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infrastructure of social services and insurance to enable women to leave work to have children, and then, when the women return to work, to send the children to nursery school and kindergartens. Every Communist country has some form of protective labor code, which again varies in types of jobs opened or closed to women. In general, these codes prohibit heavy physical work and night shifts for women, although protective labor policy in China appears far from universal in its application. Data presented on women in politics, as in Schilling/Hunt and Massell, indicate that proportionately more women are deputies at the local, regional, and national level than in the West. Sidel's book tells of the Chinese' success in birth control and child-rearing. Rowbotham traces the involvement of women in revolution.

WHAT VARIES a great deal from book to book is the interpretation of the data. What do all the facts and figures add up to? What do they tell us about the lot of women in Communist societies? What lessons can be learned from the Communist experience? It is difficult to draw any overall conclusions, not least because the volumes address themselves to different audiences: the popular masses, the scientific technocrats, the social scientists, the feminists. Not one of the books provides a wholly rounded evaluation.

The most biased accounts are those by Mandel and Sidel. These authors content themselves with rosy pictures of the lives of women under communism—lifestyles perceived as the product of the progressive wisdom of the Soviet and Chinese regimes. Mandel's investigations of happy women in the work force and the advantages of the Soviet day-care system apparently so absorbed him that he had no time to notice the exhausted faces of women in the Moscow streets or hear them talk about their problems with kindergartens and pre-kindergarten institutions. Sidel marvels that she never saw an act of aggression on the part of a single child during her stay in China, ignoring the dangers inherent in the systematic suppression of hostility (as demonstrated, somewhat paradoxically, in the period of Communist revolutionary struggle, when the release of the pent-up energy of women after centuries of submissiveness was important, in Sidel's view, to the destruction of the old order). Both Mandel and Sidel unquestioningly support the official Communist view that only Communists can liberate women and, indeed, that only communism *has* liberated women. Liberation is assumed to be the sum of all the legislation and rulings passed first by the Soviet regime and then by other Communist regimes assuring women a place in the economy, the government administration, and the home. Clearly, accepting everything the Communist regimes have done for women as liberation without evaluating the impact *on* women is a fallacious and meaningless exercise. Still, if one can divorce the ideological prejudices of these authors from the content of their books, they offer a good deal of information that will give the reflective reader insight into the position of women in both Soviet and Chinese society.

Hilda Scott is very much attuned to the problems that confront women in Communist countries as they try to raise a family and work at the same time. Her interpretation of the data is that women can never be liberated anywhere unless there is a fundamental restructuring of the family. She criticizes the Communist regimes for what she terms lack of "theoretical enlightenment," but she does not elaborate on this conclusion. Nor does she draw any implications from her statement that modern family patterns are inhibiting the progress of women, despite the fact that Communist regimes everywhere have endorsed the bourgeois nuclear family as the basic social unit in the construction of communism.

Schilling and Hunt are primarily concerned with the impact of women in science and technology. The authors' collection of data leads them to the important finding that female employment in the Soviet Union has reached a plateau where women are making no further progress, while the status-level of female employment in the US is still on the rise. However, they predict that over the next decades, the situation in the United States will gradually approach that which now prevails in the USSR. They do not attempt to analyze why the leveling-off point leaves women in the middle layers of education, in the middle layers of the work hierarchy, and in lower-status sectors of the economy or branches of the professions.

Finally, Massell and Rowbotham draw some conclusions from an historical perspective about the ability of governments and movements to mobilize women to effect their own liberation. Massell concludes that there are limits beyond which a revolutionary regime cannot go in commanding radical social change, such as the emancipation of women, without forfeiting

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the minimum consent of the population among whom the change is being implemented and calling into question the regime's legitimacy. In Central Asia, the Soviets were forced to retreat after "*khudzhum*"—the assault of the late 1920's on traditional Moslem family behavior—and to adopt more moderate policies in the 1930's in order to consolidate their rule. Sheila Rowbotham's study demonstrates the extent to which women have been exploited as revolutionary groups, without ever achieving their own revolution. Both books maintain that to alter traditional allegiances and behavior is more revolutionary than to change economic institutions. Depriving the family of its traditional economic and social functions and transforming it into the affective support institution it is today in highly industrialized societies comprise a change more radical than the socialization of industry. Rowbotham concludes her analysis with the proposition that so far no practical connection has been established between the Marxist theory of class exploitation and sexual exploitation. Feminism as an organizing principle does not automatically follow revolution but must be made a distinct movement, whose ties with Marxist theory, in her view, will become more explicit as the experience of individual women enriches the movement.

TAKEN SEPARATELY, the books under review represent a fragmented and uneven picture of women in Communist societies. Taken together, they form a composite oriented generally along three lines of thought:

(1) Marxism as an ideology of economic revolution has proved wanting as a conceptual vehicle for feminism. The track records of the Communist countries in employing women are just that: measures of female employment patterns in all walks of life. But liberation does not automatically follow upon high employment.

(2) A central issue in female liberation, which so far no country has resolved, is the nature and scope of the family in industrial society. What types of behaviors and roles characterize the modern institution, and to what degree must traditional sex-role differentiation persist? Communist regimes have opted for a high degree of traditional sex-role playing in their conceptualization of the nuclear family. The emphasis on the woman as first mother and then worker has created tension between the demands made upon her at home and those at work. The guaranteed right to work has meant women must perform a minimum of four roles—wife, housekeeper, child-rearer, and worker—and no Communist state has yet succeeded in creating an infrastructure of social services necessary to reduce this load.

(3) While communism has been successful in implementing the feminist demands of the 19th century for women's entrance into the productive work force and public life, it has failed to modify the 19th-century program to meet 20th-century conditions and attitudes created by such factors as the threat of nuclear war, the pill, and the impact of technology on all aspects of daily life.

These three points may be summed up in a fourth and last proposition: the Soviet and Chinese variants of Marxism have demonstrated that feminism cannot rely on male ideologies for its rationale, motivation, or goals. Throughout history, women have served the patriarchal establishment, whether as supporters of the status quo or as revolutionaries seeking to replace one variant of male political order with another. Women are continuing this support in the Communist countries. High female employment is necessary in countries where immigration and birthrates are low or where the early stages of industrialization demand large inputs of physical labor to offset a weak technology. Abortion and marriage policies which aim at breaking up traditional patterns of loyalty or which support official population goals equally serve the interests of the state. The fact of the matter is that in no Communist country do we find policies toward women—or men, for that matter—directed at their self-actualization. The sole aim established for both sexes is service to the state. While the Chinese slogan, "serving the people," may have greater merit than serving private interest, the meaning of the term is one which continues to be defined by the Chinese ruling group. Likewise, the definitions of patriotism and "*partiynost'* " (party-mindedness) are the prerogatives of the Soviet leadership.

What the books under examination have failed to grasp, some of them in their overeagerness to see only good in Communist political systems, is the heavy-handed, paternalistic nature of the Communist regime, which tells all its citizens that there is only one way to the future, one meaning of women's liberation, one goal: to work. Neither men nor women have many options in life-style. But if men are limited in their choices in Communist societies by the constraints of educational opportunities, influence, and party loyalty, women are even more

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Figure 1: Stages of Modernization and Equality between the Sexes

Traditional Society	Industrializing Society (Capitalist, Communist, or Socialist)		Industrialized Society (Capitalist, Communist, or Socialist)	Post-Industrial Society
women in inferior status				women question status
women are possessions of dominant males	women are mobilized by outside groups	women are concerned with consumer satisfaction		women have leisure time to consider personal fulfillment
roles of men and women are complementary	women attain men's roles while losing none of their traditional roles			sex-role differentiation gradually disappears
	revolutionary activity liberates women from traditional family structure	women's life-styles are integrated into industrial paradigm	industrial-paradigm emphasis is on nuclear family and material needs	search is undertaken for new paradigm

limited by the dual commandment to work and bear children. What is not allowed either sex is sufficient space to develop according to individual inclination. But women fall into a lower category because they bear the special responsibility of producing the next generation, and every Communist country puts this responsibility ahead of a woman's development as an individual.

Thus, while Communist systems have had great success mobilizing women into the work force, educating them, and moving them into what the West has considered high-status professions, women as a group tend to be more apolitical and less visible in positions of political, economic, and social power in the Communist countries (with the possible exception of China) than in the West or the developing nations. In terms of female participation in the work force, the data conclusively show that women tend to be channeled into certain types of jobs which are perceived as industrialization's counterparts to their traditional nurturing roles, and that their careers end at middle-level positions. My own findings from interviews conducted with over 50 Soviet and East European women in 1974-75 indicate that interest in politics is marginal for most women. Their homes and families occupy the center of their lives. While a high percentage of women are represented in the government administration, particularly in the national assemblies and local councils, women that I interviewed did not perceive these organizations as being *political,* the way Americans, for example, perceive the Congress as a political body. Politics to them appeared to be a man's world centered upon party intrigue and party activity. For their part, Communist regimes, again with the exception of China, are increasingly pursuing policies which socialize women in distinctly feminine roles. Told incessantly that she has been liberated, today's mother-worker in European Communist societies is urged to dress, act, and feel feminine, a word which the editors of *Sovetskaya zhenshchina* (Soviet Woman) have described as connoting qualities of gentleness, softness, and motherhood that are appealing to men.

TO PUT SUCH findings as these in perspective demands an objective approach to sexual equality —one which is independent of "capitalist" or "Communist" modes of development. What I would like to propose is a concept of a multistage evolution of equality, as suggested in Figure 1.

In traditional society, sex-role differentiation is marked, with men performing the prestigious status- and power-functions and women performing lesser functions—although these vary from society to society, as the well-known American anthropologist Margaret Mead has pointed out.[1] Industrializing societies of both the capitalist and Communist types have encouraged women to assume male roles while losing none of their "female" roles, by entering man's industrial world. But

[1] Margaret Mead, "Prehistory and Women," *Barnard College Bulletin* (New York), April 30, 1969.

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adoption of male roles in many ways is a step backward for sexual equality. In traditional society, woman plays a complementary role to man's—a role integrated into the productive world of work through, *e.g.*, her participation in raising crops or, in the case of the wealthy, her help in managing the family estate. Industrialization creates a dichotomy between home and work, with the home losing its economic importance and productive work being centered in the factory or enterprise. Women left in the home become increasingly alienated from the world of work. More important, their home skills are ill-adapted for use in the new industrial complex. When women move into the industrial world, they move where their skills can be utilized. With low literacy and low technical experience, they tend to find employment in the industrial sectors which demand low-paid labor, such as textiles or the social services. In time, these sectors become feminized: men move out to higher-paying and more prestigious jobs. An industrializing economy demands the formation of a skilled and specialized labor pool. Entering the labor force with the handicap of lower educational and technical skills, women naturally suffer in the competition for the higher-status jobs. "Women's place is in the home" becomes the slogan to inhibit women from competing in the marketplace of power and prestige. In the capitalist countries, women have retaliated by demanding to perform *all* male industrial roles. In the USSR, women's advance to positions of status and power has been markedly impeded by the drudgery of daily living and the regime's pro-natalist and pro-family policies.

During the industrializing phase, women encounter what may be considered a second setback to the achievement of equality: the revolution of rising expectations. The main objective becomes better living conditions, more of life's available amenities. Private consumption is the goal. Women during this stage not unnaturally concentrate their attention on the home and thus contribute to the increasing sex-role differentiation in the industrial world. Nevertheless, women make some advances toward equality during this phase, insofar as society accepts their presence to a greater or lesser degree in every walk of life.

The last stage is the post-industrial society. Here, the question is not how to better one's material standard of living, but how to improve the quality of life. Self-actualization becomes a key goal. The present women's movement in the United States exemplifies this new stage. The demand is for androgeny: Women and men should be free to perform whatever role a particular situation requires, regardless of sex. Several factors deriving from the industrialized stage have created social conditions which support this demand:

(1) The pill has separated sex from fertility, transferring to women the vital decision whether to bear children or not. The woman's pivotal role in this fundamental decision weakens the primacy of the male as traditional biological decision-maker and hence undermines his special claim to be chief political and social decision-maker.

(2) The invention of the atomic bomb as well as the experience of two world wars has called into question the validity of the traditional male value of aggressiveness. The "female" role of peacemaker and expert in intrapersonal relations becomes non-sex-differentiated.

(3) The increasingly rapid pace of change, as Alvin Toffler points out,[2] has made the female virtue of accommodation more valuable than male steadfastness or stubbornness.

(4) The relative assurance of an adequate living standard has encouraged both men and women to consider the pursuit of non-material objectives as a life-style. Women thus have the time to think about where they are and where they are going.

Figure 2: The Capacity of Authoritarian Regimes to Effect Change in Group Status



[2] Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*, New York, Bantam Books, 1970, Chaps. 2,3.

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The use of a concept such as stages in the progress of female liberation puts both the Chinese and Soviet experiences in objective perspective. It rules out any tendency toward over-criticism—or conversely over-enthusiasm, such as that exhibited by Mandel and Sidel—as well as any need to apologize for Marxism, as Rowbotham attempts to do in her conclusion. The Chinese can be seen as being in the first phase of industrialization; Soviet Central Asia is moving into the industrialized stage, while the rest of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are well into that stage. No Communist country has yet launched into the post-industrial society, the stage reached in the United States and Sweden.

IT MAY BE hypothesized that as the Soviet Union moves into the post-industrial phase, its population, too, will be increasingly less preoccupied with satisfying material wants and more attuned to the quality of life. Women thus may be expected to become more conscious of the problems and prospects of self-realization.

The difficulty that I see impeding men and women in Communist societies from realizing their aspirations for self-actualization in a setting where sex-role differentiation no longer pertains lies in the authoritarian, pedagogic nature of the Communist regimes. Initially, when women are moving out of the domestic environment of traditional society, the command nature of the Communist regimes can produce changes in their status with relative efficiency, because the kinds of change involved are susceptible to rule-making and administrative action: breaking up the traditional family and religious organizations; moving women into the labor force; providing equal educational opportunities. However, the further advance of women to equal status brings into question the whole structure of the male political hierarchy and hence is something which can only be won by women through their own efforts. A share in political leadership cannot be mandated, as history has shown us in the case of religious and racial minorities. The Communist regimes, with their monopoly of ideology—which permits only one view of the future and the place of men and women in it—together with their monopoly of political organization, are ill equipped to enable women to arrive at the level of consciousness and group cohesiveness to make the requisite demands. Hence, I hypothesize that there is a threshold of mandated change, before which authoritarian regimes greatly facilitate progress toward sexual equality and after which they begin to impede the very process they claim to have come to power to promote.

Figure 2 suggests that as modernization progresses, change in status is more effectively realized by the group seeking such change. The fact that Communist regimes provide no possibility of independent group activity for men or women helps explain the "leveling off" of women in middle-hierarchy jobs in the Soviet Union, as noted by Schilling and Hunt. That China has not yet reached this leveling out is explained by her position at the beginning of the industrialization timespan.

When equality is seen as a process, the question whether capitalism or socialism liberates women becomes irrelevant. Sexual equality is not a matter of competition between two types of political systems but may be explained as dependent upon two variables: the degree of modernization and the degree of authoritarianism in a given society, as is shown in the matrix in Figure 3.

The era of scholarly research based on "cold war" politics is past. In the case of women's studies, what is needed is a general developmental perspective within which to assess the ongoing status of women in all societies. The foregoing is but one suggestion of a theoretical framework which adequately handles the data without demanding apologies for "democracy" or "communism," but which suggests structural criteria if the further progress of women in any society is to be achieved.

Figure 3: Systems, Sexual Equality, and Modernization

regime type	early phase of modernization	late phase of modernization
high authoritarian	progressive with respect to sexual equality, high mobilization	regressive with respect to sexual equality
pluralistic	regressive with respect to sexual equality, low mobilization	progressive with respect to sexual equality

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West European Communism in Flux

By Heinz Timmermann

DONALD L. M. BLACKMER and SIDNEY TARROW, Eds: *Communism in Italy and France.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975.
NEIL McINNES: *The Communist Parties of Western Europe.* London, Oxford University Press, 1975.
DONALD L. M. BLACKMER and ANNIE KRIEGEL: *The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1975.

HARDLY A DAY has gone by in recent months without public expressions of concern by Western political leaders over the possibilities and prospects of Communist participation in the governments of France, Italy, and even Spain. Nor is this by any means an unrealistic prospect. The policy of East-West détente has helped to diminish the polarization of domestic politics in the West stemming from cold war days and to bring the Communists out of political isolation. Still more important, the Communists have benefited from the fact that the Western industrial societies' neocapitalist model of development, heavily influenced by John Maynard Keynes, has entered a crisis, at least in the Latin countries. While the forces of the conservative and liberal bourgeoisie have been able to offer no convincing answers to the new problems presented by the crisis, the various traditional forces of the Left have managed to an increasing degree to absorb within themselves the sociopolitical pressures for reform coming from the public at large—as evidenced by the events of May 1968 in Paris and of Italy's "hot autumn" of 1969—and to translate them into concrete action alternatives. In this process—along with the Socialist, bourgeois-liberal, and Christian-Socialist forces—the Communists have been playing an important, and in Italy even decisive, role.

This development spells both an opportunity and a challenge for East and West alike. On the side of the East, the Soviet leaders may expect eventual Communist participation in West European governments not only to have a disruptive effect on the Western alliance but also to afford them better opportunities for exerting Soviet influence in Western Europe. Yet, at the same time, they must fear that the emergence in Western Europe of a pluralistic model of socialism incorporating basic bourgeois freedoms would have considerable repercussions in the socialist countries. It would, above all, necessarily have a destabilizing effect in Eastern Europe, the cornerstone of the Soviet world-power position. For in Eastern Europe the impulses emanating from the West European Communist parties reinforce precisely those processes to which the Soviet leadership had to make concessions through the opening formulas in "Basket Three" of the final document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): that is, the formulas providing for freer movement of information, ideas, and persons.

For the West, the potential dangers that might arise from Communist participation in West European goverments are obvious —a revolutionizing of the West European democratic social order, a hindering of the economic and political integration of Western Europe, and a weakening of NATO. The policy of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) has increased such apprehensions. On the other hand, many observers have been pointing out that the Italian, French, and Spanish Communists, who represent politically large sections of the wage-earning population in their respective countries, could contribute effectively toward achieving something which the conservative forces have been incapable of accomplishing: namely, modernization of the administrative and economic struc-

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tures of the states concerned through up-to-date forms of planning and participation—a change which would help bring about at last an economic and social stabilization of the southwestern flank of the West European community.

What is most significant about the studies under review is that, in probing from different angles into the character of the major West European Communist parties, they provide valuable criteria for a realistic assessment of these parties' true aims and democratic credibility. The central question is: Are we, now as before, dealing with Marxist-Leninist cadre parties loyal to Moscow, which solely for tactical reasons have temporarily wrapped themselves in the mantle of democracy and independence; or are we dealing with parties which, while clinging to important elements of their Marxist-Leninist tradition, are undergoing profound changes in the direction of democratic socialism?

The answers given by the various authors differ. While McInnes tends toward the former interpretation, the joint authors (and editors) of *Communism in Italy and France* seem to be inclined, on the whole, to accept the latter view, at least as regards the Italian Communist Party (PCI)—although a final judgment is rendered difficult by Tarrow's impressive analysis of the ideological, political, and structural differentiations between the two parties, differentiations that are rooted not least of all in national differences and are hardly less pronounced than those that exist within the present-day Socialist International.

ON CLOSE examination, one finds that the authors base their judgments about the character and perspectives of the West European Communist parties fundamentally on three closely interrelated sets of criteria: the parties' international relationships, their attitudes toward the institutions as well as the basic rights and political freedoms of bourgeois society, and their internal organization. Let us therefore comment briefly on the developments in these three central areas.

In the area of the international relationships of the large West European Communist parties, Blackmer rightly affirms (with specific reference to the PCI) that particularly profound changes have taken place since the dissolution of the Cominform Bureau in 1956. Already for a considerable period of time, both the Italian and the Spanish Communists have no longer been willing to support the foreign policy line of the CPSU without reservation, especially since they have come more and more to feel that that line is oriented less toward the interests of the CPSU's fraternal parties than toward the national interests of the Soviet state. Their basic readiness to collaborate in the economic and political integration of Western Europe is, in fact, diametrically opposed in its motivation to the thinking of the CPSU, which would like to prevent the emergence of a strong bloc of countries on the western flank of its sphere of hegemony.

If the French Communists, in contrast, have thus far unequivocally supported the Soviet foreign policy line, they probably did so because of their traditionally close ties with the CPSU since the time of Maurice Thorez. Yet it should not be overlooked that the PCF's concurrence in many foreign policy positions of the CPSU does not of itself signify the unconditional subordination of the French party to Soviet foreign policy. Tarrow rightly points out that this concurrence is attributable in part simply to a *convergence* of the quite different interests of both sides—as can be shown, most of all, in regard to the issues of NATO and the European Community. This affinity of interests served for a long time to conceal the gradual emergence of original ideas among the French Communists. Yet a crisis was bound to develop from the moment that the CPSU, for reasons of Soviet national interest, chose to continue treating the Giscard government as a privileged partner even when that government started to throw overboard the "positive elements" of Gaullist foreign policy and return to a policy of "Atlanticism," viewed as destructive by the PCF. Only this serves to explain the PCF leadership's surprisingly sharp criticism of Soviet policy toward France—criticism that recently reached its peak with PCF Secretary-General Georges Marchais' reproach that Moscow, in its foreign relations, was adopting an "opportunistic posture" incompatible with proletarian internationalism.

Yet, the West European Communists are not about to sever, of their own accord, the bonds which tie them, in the name of "proletarian internationalism," to the party and country of the October Revolution. This relationship is part and parcel not only of their history but also of their ideological, political, and structural identity, as some of the authors in the volumes under review convincingly show. And it is a relationship that the party leaderships continue to regard as a necessary bulwark against the danger that their parties may degenerate into

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organizations of the social-democratic type.

On the other hand, these leaderships have begun to infuse new content into the formula of "proletarian internationalism." Indeed, largely at their insistence, the term "proletarian internationalism" was no longer used in the final document of the June 1976 Conference of European Communist Parties in Berlin; instead, that document spoke of "internationalist, comradely, and voluntary cooperation and solidarity."[1] Although the October Revolution remains, to be sure, the historical point of reference for the West European parties' activities, they refuse to recognize Moscow's *current* interests as identical *a priori* with the interests of the entire world Communist movement. As they see it, internationalism today means acting in real solidarity with oppressed peoples and movements and taking evenhandedly into account the interests of all participants in the "anti-imperialist struggle"—not only those of the socialist states, but also those of the Communists in Western countries as well as those of the national liberation movements in the Third World. For the large West European Communist parties, the hallmark of "internationalist solidarity" is not loyalty to the Soviet Union but the capability —as General Secretary Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) put it—"to lead the struggle in our own country ourselves."

THIS EMANCIPATION of the West European Communist parties from the CPSU finds full expression in an increasing orientation of their policies toward national and regional concerns and traditions. Naturally, this process of adaptation is by no means one that has gone forward in straight, parallel lines in the different West European countries; on the contrary, it has had to surmount much resistance and many setbacks. In his discussion of the PCF's domestic "alliance politics" in the Blackmer-Tarrow volume, Ronald Tiersky shows that the reorientation of the party's position on the issues of "alternation" in power and the free play of political and social forces in the event of its participation in the government has by no means always been the outcome of discussions solely within the party, but has instead come about only after considerable pressure from the PCF's Socialist alliance-partner. In contrast, the PCI's policies of broad political alliance and party representation in all state and social domains—as analyzed in the valuable studies of particular aspects of party activity by Alan Stern, Peter Lange, Jerome Milch, Stephen Hellmann, Robert Putnam, Giacomo Sani, and Peter Weitz (all in the Blackmer-Tarrow volume) — have advanced the party's adaptation process so much that Tarrow seems justified in asking: To what extent can the PCI still be considered a Communist party at all?

In this context it is above all the large West European Communist parties' reevaluation of the basic rights and political liberties won by bourgeois democracy that is likely to prove of great long-range significance. For some years a qualitative change has been going on in this area, a change that the various authors of the books under review do not always seem to fully appreciate. The reevaluation referred to finds one expression in the fact that the Italian, Spanish, and now also the French Communists are beginning to engage in a critical analysis of the evolution of communism in Eastern Europe from the Stalinist era to the present and are themselves pointing to the immense losses in personal and collective freedoms that are associated with the liquidation of political democracy. While the Soviets have declared an end to discussion of the subject, the West European Communists are only now beginning to look back at the issues raised by the 20th CPSU Congress and to engage in a serious and systematic study of the causes of Stalinism and its consequences for Soviet socialism. The results of this analysis are in turn influencing their own reevaluation of political democracy.

A brief look back at history will help to clarify the change that has taken place. From the start, the Comintern looked upon political democracy as democratic in name only or, worse, as a means of disguising the dominance of the big bourgeoisie. Consequently, when fascist despotism emerged in Europe alongside constitutional democracy, the Communists regarded both with hostility, thus dividing the anti-fascist forces, and the result was that the fascists succeeded in liquidating both bourgeois democracy and the organizations of the workers' movement in some West European states. Contrary to widespread assumptions, even the Seventh Comintern Congress of 1935, despite its call for the formation of a popular front against fascism, did not reflect any fundamental reevaluation of political democracy, which the Communists still

[1] For excerpts from the official English translation of the final conference documents, see *The New York Times*, July 1, 1976, p. 12.

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saw not as an indispensable component of a progressive, just, and humane model of society, but merely as a more advantageous environment in which to carry on the struggle for socialism. This revised view of political democracy was purely of a tactical-instrumental character: it could be retracted at any time such action might be dictated by a change in the political constellation or by the intervention of outside forces —as occurred, for example, during the Cominform period, from 1947 to 1956.

The qualitative leap that we see today—as expressed, for example, in the November 1975 joint declaration of the PCF and PCI—lies in the affirmation that the further socialization of society must incorporate and further develop not only the fruits of the socialist upheavals of the 20th century but also the achievements of the "great bourgeois-democratic revolutions" of the 19th century. In sum, West European Communists no longer dismiss the rights and freedoms of bourgeois democracy as democratic in name only; now they recognize these rights and freedoms as having fundamental value also for socialist societies.

WE WILL have to wait and see whether these assurances are genuine. Potentially they could decisively alter the character not only of the West European Communist parties themselves but also of their relations with the East European Communists, on the one hand, and with the West European Socialists, on the other. However, the history as well as the structure of the parties bids us to be cautious in our judgment. McInnes marshals detailed evidence to support his contention that little has changed either in the Communist parties' ideological and political pretentions to leadership or in their character as Leninist cadre parties in which decisions flow exclusively from top to bottom.

This characterization still applies in some important respects to the PCF. In the 1950's, the PCF shrank from a mass party with more than 800,000 members to a rigidly hierarchical and centralized cadre party of approximately 250,000 members in which approximately every third member was a party functionary. Despite a resurgence in party growth in the last few years, the total membership still remains below 500,000.[2] Yet, the party continues to conceive of itself as *the* party of the working class and, as such, feels called upon and authorized to determine the direction and dynamics of the process of social change. The emphasis in its organizational work still lies on setting up party cells in enterprises, and it opposes with all its strength attempts by the Socialists to compete with the Communists in the industrial sphere by setting up their own plant cells, since this would weaken the credentials on which the Communists base their claim to leadership as *the* party of the working class.

In contrast to the PCF, the PCI no longer makes such an exclusive claim to leadership. The Italian party now defines the working class, which is to assume power in state and society, to include all "honest working people"—a definition that embraces 80-90 percent of the Italian population—and it sees this enlarged class as represented by parties and groups of diverse ideological and political orientations. Furthermore, as Tarrow properly points out, the PCI's policies of "presence" and broad political alliance have greatly changed the nature of the party organization itself over the last 25 years. In order to make possible the integration of broader strata of the population and to facilitate consensus with other groups, the party has to a large extent shifted its network of basic organizations from enterprise cells to residential district organizations, and in so doing it has relegated to the background an essential structural element of a militant Leninist party in favor of a traditional socialist organizational principle. So far as the decision-making process within the party is concerned, to be sure, the PCI continues to uphold the principle of democratic centralism—a course that is undoubtedly attributable, not least of all, to the deterrent example of the disintegration of the other Italian parties into a multitude of independent *correnti.* Nevertheless, the party leadership has for some time tolerated the emergence of diverse nonorganized *tendencies* within the party ranks. Moreover, the trend toward increased regionalism in Italy and the related strengthening of regional party organizations could further promote the development of a certain degree of decentralization in intraparty decision-making.

In sum, the studies under review show that in the West European Communist parties concepts inherited from the past are in sharp conflict with new ideas. Just as it would be wrong to leave out of consideration the historical derivations of these parties, it would be equally wrong to ignore

[2] See Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism in 1976," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1976, p. 33.

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the profound changes that have taken place in their attitudes in certain areas—for example, in regard to the relationship between democracy and socialism. To write off the parties' pronouncements on these matters as nothing but tactical maneuvers would be to deny altogether the strength of ideas. The credibility of the West European Communists' professions of democracy have to be gauged not least by what it would cost them if they were to return to a course ideologically and politically oriented toward Moscow—costs in terms of severe losses in membership and votes, and possibly even splits in party ranks. These risks, it seems, are becoming ever greater and more determinative of the future course of the West European Communist parties.

Moscow, Peking, and South Asia

By G. W. Choudhury

J. P. JAIN: *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh.* New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1974.
J. P. JAIN: *Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh.* New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1974.
TREVOR DRIEBERG, HARJI MALIK, and D. K. JOSHI: *Towards Closer Indo-Soviet Cooperation.* Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1974.
DEVENDRA KAUSHIK: *Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan.* Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1974.
OUSEPH VARKEY: *At the Crossroads: The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the Communist Party of India, 1959-1963.* Calcutta, Minerva Associates, 1974.
ANWAR HUSSAIN SYED: *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale.* Amherst, The University of Massachusetts Press, 1974.

IN ONE WAY or another, all these books deal with the policies and objectives of the USSR and/or China toward, and their relations with, the South Asian countries of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward these countries have, of course, been greatly influenced by the Sino-Soviet rift. This rift, one of the greatest schisms of modern history, has had major strategic and diplomatic ramifications throughout Asia, with the two Communist giants increasingly competing for the support of Asian countries.

In his two books under review, J. P. Jain presents a typical Indian view of Soviet and Chinese policies. According to him, the USSR is working for "peace" and "stability" in the area, while China is "expansionist," helping the underground revolutionary movement on the subcontinent. Jain finds "no wrong" with Soviet expansionist designs in the South Asian-Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf complex. At the same time, he charges China with trying to exacerbate regional tensions and conflicts to further her own national interests.

The volume by Trevor Drieberg, Harji Malik, and D. K. Joshi gives almost an official Soviet interpretation of the USSR's objectives and policies in South Asia. According to these authors, the Soviet Union is "for coexistence," and Moscow's Asian Collective Security Plan, whose virtues Leonid Brezhnev extolled before the Indian parliament in November 1973, is aimed at bringing "unity" and "cooperation" among the Asian countries. They ignore the view expressed not only by China but also by less partial observers that the Plan is nothing but a Soviet version of SEATO. And the authors find no fault with the USSR's growing naval activities in the Indian Ocean.

Devendra Kaushik's work on Soviet relations with India and Pakistan affords another example of the same biased assessment of Soviet military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural activities in South Asia. Ouseph Varkey, while

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providing a useful account of the role and attitude of the Indian Communist Party—specifically, of its two factions, one pro-Moscow and the other pro-Peking—with respect to the Sino-Indian border dispute which culminated in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, treats the dispute itself from an excessively anti-Chinese perspective.

In a curious sort of way, then, the foregoing books collectively attest to the impact of the Sino-Soviet rift on the South Asian political situation. They reflect the growing success with which Moscow has wooed India in pursuing its rivalry with Peking. So successful have Soviet efforts been, indeed, that China now looks upon India as the USSR's chief collaborator on the international scene.

Anwar Syed's study of the Sino-Pakistani relationship also exhibits its share of blind spots. In assessing the rationale and the likely future course of this relationship, Syed presents some worthwhile information, and his style is not polemical. Nevertheless, his perceptions are unmistakably those of a Pakistani. For example, the weakest part of his analysis lies in his discussion of the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of united Pakistan in the early 1960's and current Prime Minister of the truncated country, in bringing about the Sino-Pakistani entente. When Bhutto launched his campaign against US "neocolonialism" with the publication of his *Myth of Independence* in 1969—a book which Syed, incidentally, praises unqualifiedly—he was more eager to court the leaders in the Kremlin than those in Peking. President Ayub Khan once warned him: "You are trying to drag me in a futile venture; the Russians won't be our friends because of their long-standing commitments to India and Afghanistan." [1] Syed also fails to stress properly that the Sino-Pakistani entente, like the Indo-Soviet one, is closely related to the Sino-Soviet rift.

None of the six books, in short, offers an adequate picture of either Soviet or Chinese policies toward the South Asian subcontinent. In light of this deficiency, it would appear desirable to sketch the nature of these policies, with particular attention to those of recent years, and to highlight the importance of the Sino-Soviet conflict in shaping them.

BOTH SOVIET and Chinese policies toward South Asia have gone through several distinct phases. During the late 1940's, the USSR and China alike subscribed to the theory of "two camps" in the international arena, so India's avowed policy of nonalignment had no appeal in either Moscow or Peking. Pakistan, the smaller of the two states that emerged after the withdrawal of British imperial authority from the subcontinent, excited even less enthusiasm than India.

However, while Soviet relations with India and Pakistan remained minimal until 1953, China soon after the Korean war erupted began to cultivate friendly relations with India. Peking's efforts culminated in 1954 with the signing of the agreement on the status of Tibet, which embodied the *pancha shila,* or five principles of coexistence.

Nonetheless, the first major turning point in the policies of both Communist powers came in the mid-1950's when Pakistan joined the CENTO (originally Baghdad Pact) and SEATO military alliances and received American arms. Following up on earlier Chinese initiatives toward India, the USSR commenced to woo Jawaharlal Nehru, who was greatly offended by Western military aid to Pakistan. The developing entente proved beneficial to both countries, with the USSR capitalizing on the friendship in its dealings with the nonaligned Afro-Asian countries and India receiving Soviet diplomatic, economic, and—subsequently—military support.

Peking, for its part, pursued a similar course, at least for the first years after the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states. However, the era of *Hindi-Chini bhai bhai* (the Indians and Chinese are brothers) did not last very long. By 1959, as a result of border disputes and armed clashes, the two largest Asian countries were drifting toward a war. This finally broke out in late 1962.

The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 had a profound effect on South Asian politics and on the policies of both the USSR and China. It ended Indo-Chinese friendship and ushered in an era of confrontation between the two Asian giants. Moscow, beset with increasing difficulties of its own with China, adjusted its policy to take full advantage of the situation. While India's forging of closer links with the United States as the result of Washington's prompt response to New Delhi's request for military supplies to cope with China did cause some initial doubts in Moscow, the USSR and the US soon appeared to share the common goal of building up India against China. In other words, containment of China in South and

[1] From an unpublished document of the government of Pakistan dated April 19, 1963. The analysis in the ensuing pages draws heavily upon interviews and research that the author carried out in Pakistan during 1967-71 and on his own personal experiences during that period.

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Southeast Asia became a Soviet as well as an American objective, and India fitted well into this broad strategy.

Meantime, China moved very close to Pakistan. Peking was assisted in its rapprochement with the United States' "most allied ally" in Asia by a fundamental reorientation in Pakistan's policy. The shooting down of the U-2 American reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Unon in 1960 had already exposed the risks to Pakistan, from whose territory the plane had taken off, of its commitments to the West. When the Western powers responded promptly to India's plea for noncombatant military aid against China, Pakistan reacted violently, if not hysterically, and began to entertain second thoughts about these commitments. Consequently, President Ayub took steps in the direction of reducing military commitments to the West and normalizing relations with China and the Soviet Union. In the case of China, this effort paid off when the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war broke out. Peking gave Rawalpindi strong assurances that it would extend military backing to Pakistan.

The new friendship between China and Pakistan raised speculation and suspicion in many capitals. In New Delhi, it was regarded as a "Peking-Rawalpindi axis" against India. In Washington, "Ayub's flirtation with Mao," as it was termed, constituted a complicating factor in American-Pakistani relations until it received the blessing of President Richard M. Nixon during his 22-hour visit to Pakistan in August 1969. (Not only were Pakistan's links with China approved, but their potential to provide links between Washington and Peking was also fully examined in the dialogue between President Nixon and President Yahya Khan, during which the latter was asked to ascertain China's reaction to the proposed revision of US China policy.) In Moscow, the Sino-Pakistani rapprochement stimulated a new interest in Pakistan. The Soviet leaders were unhappy at seeing China extend her influence into the subcontinent through Pakistan, and a desire to curtail her influence became a major factor in Soviet overtures to Rawalpindi in the 1965-70 period.

These overtures began with a Soviet invitation to Ayub to pay his first state visit to Moscow. After he made this visit in April 1965, the USSR commenced to emulate the Western policy of neutrality in Indo-Pakistani disputes —a posture which enabled it to play the role of peacemaker at the Tashkent conference of January 1966 that followed the 17-day war of August-September 1965 between the two South Asian rivals. The Tashkent Declaration that emerged from this conference represented a major diplomatic triumph for the Soviet Union. Whereas the US and other Western countries, which had poured billions of dollars into both India and Pakistan to assist in economic development, had failed to bring about negotiations between the two combatants, the USSR had won the confidence of both, with minimal outlays of material and diplomatic support. The Tashkent Declaration, to be sure, did not resolve the basic Indo-Pakistani conflict; it merely restored the status quo. Nevertheless, it considerably enhanced Soviet prestige, as well as Soviet power and influence, in the Third World, where the USSR was by now in open competition not only with the West but also with China.

By 1968, Moscow was prepared to make another major move. After President Ayub had ordered the United States to close its important strategic communication center at Badabar near Peshawar, the USSR decided to give arms to Pakistan. Moreover, in contrast to what happened to the US in 1954 when it took a similar step, the Soviet Union managed to retain the confidence of India. At least Premier Aleksey Kosygin, during his stopover in New Delhi on his return from Rawalpindi before the official disclosure of the arms deal, seemed to reassure the Indians sufficiently to prevent them from becoming hostile.

THE YEAR 1969, however, ushered in a new phase in Soviet policy. When Kosygin paid a second visit to Pakistan soon after Yahya Khan had become President in March in the wake of a political upheaval that had led to Ayub's ouster, the Soviet Premier asked Pakistan to pay the real (*i.e.*, the political) price for the Soviet arms: participation in a Soviet-backed transit-trade conference in Kabul and endorsement of Brezhnev's scheme for an Asian collective security system (put forward publicly at the world meeting of Communist parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969). Pakistan refused to cooperate in either of these projects because of their clear anti-China overtones. As a result, Moscow ended its "honeymoon" with Rawalpindi.

Thus, when the crisis over East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) developed in 1971, the Soviet Union —unlike the US or China, each of which had some formal or informal commitments and obligations to Pakistan—was free to side with India. It would be naive, however, to think that the Kremlin leaders did so only because they wished

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to "restore the democratic rights" of the people of Bangladesh or were moved by the suffering there. Among other factors, they were growing impatient at Pakistan's continued friendship with China. The cool, if not hostile, attitude of Mujibur Rahman, the Bengali leader, toward Peking as well as his friendliness toward India inclined Moscow to be sympathetic to the Bengali cause.

In any event, the USSR was quick to express its strong disapproval of the Pakistan army's atrocities in East Pakistan in March 1971. Nikolay Podgornyy's letter of April 3, 1971, to Yahya—the first denunciation of Pakistan's actions by a superpower—left no doubt of Soviet support for the Bengalis,[2] as pro-Soviet elements in Bangladesh continually point out. When Yahya sent Arshad Husain, a former Foreign Minister and at one time ambassador to the USSR, to Moscow to discuss the situation and justify the military actions in East Pakistan, Husain reportedly had the worst experience of his life.

However, the Soviet leaders and press did not openly attack Pakistan after Podgornyy's letter. To the contrary, the Soviet attitude appeared to be rather ambiguous. For example, when Kosygin went to Algeria in the summer of 1971, he talked about Pakistan's "territorial integrity."[3]

During July, Pakistan provided another source of annoyance and irritation to the USSR by arranging Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Peking via Rawalpindi, and the USSR now seemed determined to penalize Pakistan for its audacity in playing a part in arranging a Sino-American rapprochement. According to reports, Kissinger also told the Indian ambassador in Washington that China would "intervene" if India attacked Pakistan and that the US might not come to India's aid as it had in 1962 and 1965. Some observers maintain that this intelligence caused the Indians to agree to sign the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971, which the Soviets had first tabled at the time Brezhnev formulated his scheme for an Asian security system and which India, with her strong opposition to military pacts, had originally rejected. The threat of Chinese intervention and American indifference to it left her with no option. This interpretation of events is bolstered when one examines the text of the treaty. Though the treaty was depicted as one of "peace, friendship, and cooperation" rather than as a military pact, a close scrutiny of it reveals its military character.[4]

With the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet treaty, the whole atmosphere in South Asia changed. Once it was signed, the Soviet Union gave full support to India and East Pakistan. When war finally broke out between India and Pakistan in December, Soviet diplomatic, military, moral, and material help was available. Although India achieved her objective of defeating the Pakistani army militarily, it was the Soviet veto in the Security Council that gave her enough time to do so. Dacca fell, and Bangladesh emerged as an independent state on December 16, 1971.

IN THE MEANTIME, the civil war in Pakistan had placed the Chinese in a difficult position. Like the US, China did not condone the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army, nor did it oppose Bengali nationalist aspirations. Indeed, it is quite incorrect to say that Peking supported a military regime against a popular uprising. In March 1971, just on the eve of the civil war, Chou En-lai wrote personal letters to both Mujibur Rahman and Bhutto, the leaders of East and West Pakistan respectively, in which he urged them to arrive at a political settlement. The Chinese leaders had long been uneasy about the implications of a split between the two portions of Pakistan. They had warned Ayub in 1965 and Yahya in November 1970 about "foreign influences" in East Pakistan.

Despite Chinese pleas for restraint and moderation, neither the Pakistani government nor the political leaders of the two segments of the country heeded Peking's counsel. When the civil war finally began at midnight on March 25, 1971, China therefore did not come out openly in support of Pakistan as it had during the 1965 war. It was only after India and the Soviet Union explicitly endorsed the secession movement that China felt compelled to give "diplomatic support" to her South Asian ally. But even then her role was carefully circumscribed. After the dispatch of Podgornyy's letter of April 3, Yahya secretly sent one of his military colleagues, General Gul Hasan, and Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan to Peking, but they had a difficult time in explaining the army's atrocities to the Chinese. When Chou finally wrote to Yahya on April 11, he merely affirmed China's support for Pakistan's "unity" and "integrity"—a far cry from the Chinese messages of support during the 1965 war.

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), April 4, 1971.
[3] See *Dawn* (Karachi), Aug. 8, 1971.
[4] See G. W. Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers*, New York, Free Press, 1975, pp. 220-22.

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After the partition of Pakistan, which involved a diplomatic setback for China, Peking registered its unhappiness at "the clumsy handling" of the East Pakistan problem by the way it treated President Bhutto of truncated Pakistan during his visit to China in early 1972. First, the Chinese failed to give him the same grand reception that they had accorded the two former Pakistani presidents, Ayub and Yahya, in 1965 and 1970. Then Chou lectured him at length on the political dynamics of the subcontinent. (During the course of his analysis, Chou forecast that the Indians would not ultimately be the gainer from the creation of a state with as problematic a future as Bangladesh—a judgment with which one is inclined to agree in light of recent anti-Indian statements in Bangladesh and the conditions of near-anarchy there.)[5]

Nevertheless, the Chinese did not by any means turn their backs on Pakistan. In the joint communiqué issued after Bhutto's visit, China condemned "India's naked aggression" and pledged "firm support to Pakistan." Peking also expressed its backing of Pakistan in the Nixon-Chou communiqué of February 27, 1972.[6] More important, China continued to give Pakistan economic, diplomatic, and military help. For example, the Chinese put pressure on Bangladesh and India for the release of Pakistani prisoners of war by vetoing Bangladesh's entry into the UN until the Pakistani POW's were released in 1974. According to reliable sources, China has maintained its flow of military aid to Pakistan, and total Chinese aid to Islamabad since 1966 now equals the sum of US arms provided to Pakistan during the 1954-65 period. In addition, Peking gave Pakistan assurances against what Pakistan termed Indian "nuclear blackmailing" after India had conducted her first nuclear test in May 1974,[7] although the Pakistanis now worry about the firmness of this commitment in the wake of Peking's recent reopening of ambassadorial-level relations with New Delhi.

The Sino-Pakistani bonds are based on mutual needs. While those of Pakistan are comparatively much greater, China in South Asia has limited strategic alternatives to close relations with Pakistan. Peking's still strained relationship with New Delhi and the continued Sino-Soviet rift have left Pakistan as China's only solid supporter on the subcontinent.

IN VIEW OF Islamabad's persisting ties with China, it is hardly surprising that the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the "new" Pakistan has remained unfriendly since the 1971 Bangladesh crisis. When Bhutto visited Moscow in March 1972, his hosts told him bluntly: "If history were to repeat itself, we would again take the same position [with respect to the dismemberment of Pakistan] because we are convinced that that is correct."[8] This can be interpreted as a clear warning in regard to the turbulence developing in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province of the truncated country. Pakistan has certainly so interpreted it, especially in light of other subsequent developments. In February 1973, for example, Pakistani authorities seized a shipment of Soviet arms smuggled into the area through the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad.[9] From Islamabad's perspective, the 1973 coup in Afghanistan, which was thought to have Soviet blessing, and the new Afghan rulers' threats to revive the "Paktoonistan" issue[10] amounted to a Soviet warning to endorse Moscow's Asian Collective Security Plan or face a distintegration of the country. Official broadcasts from Baghdad for a "greater Baluchistan" and from Kabul in behalf of the creation of "Paktoonistan"—*i.e.*, from capitals where Soviet influence has been high—have been viewed as other portents of Moscow's interest in the further fragmentation of Pakistan. The establishment of Soviet client states in "greater Baluchistan" and "Paktoonistan" would fulfill the old Tsarist ambitions for a "warm-water" port in the south via the Arabian Sea.

Equally predictable has been the strengthening of Soviet-Indian relations. As a result of its role in the Bangladesh crisis, the Soviet Union has registered a big diplomatic gain in South Asia. No other foreign power is more respected and listened to or has a more important say in India's handling of

[5] Based on an interview with one of Bhutto's top aides, who accompanied him to Peking.

[6] For the text of the Bhutto-Chou communiqué, see *Peking Review* (Peking), Feb. 24, 1972, pp. 7-8. For the text of the Nixon-Chou communiqué, see *ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1972, pp. 4-5.

[7] *The Times* (London), May 30 and June 27, 1974.

[8] *Pravda*, March 18, 1972.

[9] *The New York Times*, Feb. 11, 1973.

[10] For reports of these threats, see *The Guardian* (London), July 19, 1973; *The Times* (London), July 27, 1973; and *Daily Telegraph* (London), Aug. 19, 1973. The "Paktoonistan" issue stems from the existence in northern Pakistan of tribal groups which are ethnically related to the bulk of Afghanistan's population. Because of this ethnic identification, there has been periodic agitation over the years—especially from Afghanistan—for unification of the Paktoon-speaking people by the creation of a state to be known as "Paktoonistan."

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its major problems than the Soviet Union.

However, it must be remembered that India, after its triumph in 1971, has emerged as a major power in its own right. India was always bigger, more important, and more stable than Pakistan, but with the dismemberment of Pakistan, India has become the dominant power in the subcontinent. At its hour of greatest triumph, India is not likely to dance to "strings pulled in Moscow." Indeed, New Delhi recently seems to have grown dissatisfied with the lack of diplomatic flexibility and options that has characterized its position since 1971, for on April 15, 1976, it entered into an agreement with Peking to reestablish relations at the ambassadorial level—although it obviously continues to be wary of the Chinese. For example, there were reports in the Indian parliament on August 20, 1976, that the Chinese were continuing to put out anti-Indian propaganda.

Despite the major role played by the USSR in the birth of Bangladesh, Soviet relations with the new state have been somewhat checkered. After the establishment of Bangladesh, Soviet leaders were the first, aside from Mrs. Gandhi, to send Mujib warm congratulations. However, it appears that Soviet aims even at an early date were to promote those political elements who might establish a genuinely pro-Moscow regime. On January 15, 1972—less than a month after the foundation of Bangladesh—a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast from the Soviet Union claimed that the Communist Party of Bengal (CPB) had been "one of the main forces in the Bengali people's national liberation during the past 22 years," and that it had supported the Awami League in the 1970 election. (As if Mujib, the highly popular leader of the emerging Bengali nation, required the electoral support of any party other than his own Awami League!) A Radio Moscow commentary on January 20 again stressed the role of the CPB in the liberation movement. By January 15, 1972, a Bangladesh-Soviet Friendship Society had been set up in Dacca, and the Soviet Union was soon at work trying to penetrate the new state in such fields as science, art, literature, education, public health, the press, radio, and sports, in the name of cultural cooperation.

As a result of the August 15, 1975, military coup in Bangladesh, however, the USSR suffered something of a setback in the new state, and China saw a chance to renew its friendship with the former East Pakistan. (The Chinese, it should be reemphasized had in principle always wanted to have good relations with both parts of the former united Pakistan—that is, they had no special love for the West Pakistanis as opposed to the Bengalis.) While Mujibur Rahman, who lost his life in the coup, had exhibited a single-minded devotion to New Delhi, his successors displayed considerably less enthusiasm toward India (and—indirectly—toward the USSR). Consequently, Peking not only sent greetings to the new government but also at last recognized Bangladesh as a state. While the Sino-Bangladesh relationship is still in its formative stages, both sides seem to be eager for closer and better relations.

The coup, of course, also afforded Islamabad an opportunity to make fresh overtures toward Dacca, and in this sense it provided new possibilities for collaboration between Pakistan and China in South Asia. But it would be naive to think—despite President Bhutto's apparent efforts to leave the contrary impression—that Peking will act in accordance with Pakistan's wishes. China will fashion her policy toward Bangladesh in terms of her perceptions of her own interests and especially in light of the growing Sino-Soviet competition in South and Southeast Asia.

FROM THIS brief synopsis, then, it should be clear that the history of Soviet and Chinese policies toward the Indian subcontinent has been far more complex than the books under review would suggest. And it should be equally evident that the Sino-Soviet rift has contributed in a fundamental way to that complexity.

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The Communist Powers and the Third World

By W. Raymond Duncan

EDWARD T. WILSON: *Russia and Black Africa Before World War II.* New York, Holmes and Meier, 1974.
ROGER E. KANET: *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations.* Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.
CHARLES K. WILBER: *The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries.* Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1969.
ALABA OGUNSANWO: *China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971.* New York, Cambridge University Press, 1974.
ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN: *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World.* New York, Praeger, 1975.

RECENT EVENTS in Africa, Asia, and Latin America underscore a major feature of contemporary world politics: the transformation of Russia and China from continental into global powers. Behind Moscow's enlarged shadow in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, Uganda, and Zambia, and the presence of Chinese railroad builders in Tanzania—to cite only the African region—is a history of increased Soviet and Chinese aid, trade, and cultural and diplomatic activities in the developing countries since the mid-1950's. For example, the cumulative total of economic and military aid extended to such countries had by 1975 amounted to some US$21.6 billion for the USSR and approximately US$4 billion for China.[1] But while the magnified presence of Moscow and Peking in Third World countries is not difficult to pinpoint, two related questions of key importance are less amenable to easy analysis. First, what foreign policy perceptions and motivations lie behind Soviet and Chinese diplomacy in these areas? Second, to what extent does the global expansion of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the Third World spell actual or potential increase in influence?

These questions bear directly upon the stability of Soviet and Chinese relations with the United States, and hence upon the whole future of world peace. The present epoch, presumably one of détente at the superpower level, is in reality fraught with continuing conflict —especially in the Third World where major pressures for change in the international order are at work and where the great powers continue to compete for influence. Moreover, long-standing ethno-religious conflicts, the introduction of actual or potential nuclear capabilities, and escalated acquisition of arms by oil-rich countries all tend to augment the destabilizing forces operating in Third World areas, enhancing the prospect of crises with great-power involvement and possible nuclear outcomes. Nor is this potential crisis scenario diminished by the Third World's new role in great-power diplomacy involving energy, trade, and raw materials. The developing countries are themselves determined to maximize their own power in the quest for economic development, as demonstrated at the fifth summit conference of

[1] The actual amount of Soviet economic credits and grants extended to less developed countries (excluding Cuba) during the years 1954-74 is estimated at US$9.6 billion. Chinese economic credits and grants amounted to approximately US$3.5 billion for the years 1956-74 (PRC aid started in 1956). Total Communist economic commitments to Third World countries for 1954-74 exceeds US$18 billion when East European aid (US$5.3 billion) is included. It should be noted that less than one half of this aid has been drawn (actual use of goods or delivery of services). Soviet military aid is computed at approximately US$12 billion for 1954-74, with Chinese military aid running at about US$413 million in the period 1964-73. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State, *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974,* Report No. 398, Washington, DC, Jan. 27, 1976, pp. 1, 13, Tables 8 and 9.

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nonaligned countries held this August in Colombo, Sri Lanka.[2]

Parallel with these trends in the Third World itself, we have witnessed the growth of Soviet and Chinese military power, the reaffirmation by the 25th CPSU Congress of the old class-struggle thesis, and Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov's envisioned projection of Soviet naval power "to utilize the world ocean in the interest of building communism,"[3] while Washington has reaffirmed its determination to resist Communist expansionism. All these developments have combined to thrust Soviet and Chinese policies toward the Third World to the forefront of the international political stage.

However, the two central issues posed above have generated considerable debate among scholars and policymakers, as well as in some sectors of American public opinion. On the first—*i.e.*, the perceptions and motivations underlying Soviet and Chinese Third World policies and actions—much of the debate has centered on the question of whether Communist expansionism is motivated by ideology or national interest. One side holds that Soviet and Chinese behavior is inspired primarily by Marxism-Leninism and the wish to broaden the world Communist empire; the other, that national drives for territorial security, great-power status, and economic well-being are the key determinant of the diplomacy of Moscow and Peking in the Third World. These opposing viewpoints, moreover, are also reflected in the continued questioning of détente and how it affects Communist policy. Regardless of the interpretation placed on Communist motivations, there seems to be general agreement that both the Soviet Union and China have expanded their activities in the Third World.

This, in turn, leads to the second issue—whether this increased *presence* has resulted in increased *influence*. The tendency has been to equate the two, but this assumption is now being reexamined and questioned.

RECENT SCHOLARLY research on Soviet and Chinese policies in the less developed countries—as typified by the books under review—has begun to evolve something of a consensus on the first question. This school of opinion contends that Soviet and Chinese behavior is best understood as power politics, somewhat akin to classical *Realpolitik,* although in a setting quite distinct from the 19th-century Europe in which the latter flourished. While today nuclear war must be avoided at all costs, the competiton for political and military power against perceived adversaries goes on. As in pre-Marxist days it remains to a large extent a quest for security and great-power status, involving constant calculation of national security interests in terms of geography, land and sea power, and economic conditions, and the exploitation of opponents' distresses as the power equation shifts. Only to a lesser extent does the competition constitute an effort to expand the Communist world. In short, the new era is basically a product of history—primarily the legacy of geopolitical considerations inherited from an age of balance-of-power politics, with an overlay of Marxist-Leninist ideology focusing on the changing power relations, or "correlation of forces," among states.

The underdeveloped countries form a key area of strategic struggle in which this blend of old power-oriented traditions and contemporary nuclear and ideological concerns can be seen at work. The postcolonial Third World is in a fluid stage of transition, searching for models of economic development, showing independence in its foreign policies, and expressing nationalist aspirations. It seems to the Soviet Union and China to offer opportunities to enhance their political and military power vis-à-vis each other and the United States, without direct nuclear confrontation, while in the long run potentially raising the prestige of Communist models of development.

This interpretation of Communist motives tends to be confirmed by Edward T. Wilson's analysis of Tsarist and Soviet policy toward Africa. The author finds that both regimes have accorded continuing importance to considerations of power and security. While other scholars discount any significant involvement of Russia in Africa before World War II, thereby suggesting that it was expansionist Marxism-Leninism that led to greater Soviet activities after the war, Wilson provides another story. It is one in which calculations of security led first the Tsars and later the Soviets to attend to Africa, analyzing both domestic and international forces at work

[2] Among other resolutions of the conference were proposals for establishment of a commercial bank for the Third World, a new reserve currency, and an association of producers to obtain better prices for their raw materials. See *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Aug. 23, 1976, p. 4.

[3] See Roland Evans and Robert Novak, in *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, July 30, 1976, p. 4a, which reports this passage from Gorshkov's new book, *The Sea Power and the State*. The book reportedly was designed for internal consumption by Communist Party leaders and cadres within the Soviet military, but excerpts of the book have reached Western military and intelligence circles.

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there as they might affect Russian interests in the crucial arena of power competition—Europe. History thus connects early Tsarist concern with Ethiopia, the lands adjacent to the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal (after 1869 under British influence) with later Soviet-Comintern attempts to influence the world of black Africa. It should be noted, however, that the latter policy—which had evolved by 1927—grew out of a fear that black troops might be used by Europeans to fight aggressive wars, possibly against Russia, whereas the former reflected Russian maritime interests and a desire to insure freedom of movement in the Suez area at a time when British imperialism was the central threat.

This legacy of concern for European power considerations is also clear in the attempts of both Tsars and Soviets to exploit divergent forms of African nationalism as a means of weakening the positions of European states in sub-Saharan Africa. On equally pragmatic grounds, the Comintern curtailed its support of black discontent in Africa after 1935, when the USSR began to advocate protective alliances in Europe against the growing fascist threat. Then, former enemies—the British and French—became friends, and former friends—men like the black leader, George Padmore[4]—were cut off from financial and political support.

The work edited by Roger Kanet, *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations*,[5] stresses the further evolution of realism and pragmatism in Soviet dealings with the Third World in the postwar years. According to Kanet, Moscow in this period became more pessimistic about the prospects for expansion of socialism and more willing to widen its diplomatic and economic relations with countries of more varied ideological hues. The prime considerations in these calculations, as the eight individual contributions on specific regions presented in the Kanet volume show, have been desires to increase Soviet influence vis-à-vis both China and the United States and to weaken Third World reliance on Western power. Flexibility in tactics, a "de-ideologized" view of options, and practical power considerations have underlain evolving Soviet tactics. The result has been a wide range of activity. In the Middle East, the USSR has engaged in an active military and political competition with the United States; there and in South Asia, Moscow has concentrated on cultivating a few key states for strategic reasons (India, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan) and on building a Soviet naval presence (in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea). In Latin America, Moscow has expanded trade and credit relations with a number of countries, and in Africa, too, the Soviet Union has been working economically and politically with existing governments.

In the effort to cultivate influence in the Third World, the Soviet Union has persistently portrayed its own model of development as highly relevant to the needs of the less developed countries. However, as Charles Wilber's book demonstrates, one can raise a number of substantive questions about the actual relevance of this model in today's world. The Soviet model does, of course, offer some insights into aspects of Third World societies that impede economic development—*e.g.*, feudal-minded agricultural systems, ineffective planning, and low levels of industrial investment. It likewise provides available strategies of change which differ markedly from capitalist approaches—collectivization of agriculture, centralization of planning, and maximization of state ownership of enterprises. The problem is how to apply the logic of what was accomplished under Soviet conditions to what exists in Third World settings. Models look attractive in theory, but transferring them to societies with different cultures and at different points in their historical development is no easy matter in practice. In the latter half of the 1960's—*i.e.*, even before the publication of Wilber's important study in 1969—Soviet writers began to demonstrate a bitter awareness of this fact of life.[6] By increasingly stressing the problems of traditional attitudes which were impeding the advancement of socialism in the Third World, they showed a growing realism in their assessments of the nature and rates of change there and of what Soviet aid and trade might be expected to accomplish.

(It might be noted that neither the Soviet writers nor Wilber commented on one major obstacle to economic development in Third World regions—the high rate of military spending by the Soviet

[4] On the work of George Padmore as a father of Pan-Africanism, see especially, Wilson, *Russia and Black Africa*, Chapter 12.

[5] The words in Kanet's title should be "Developing States" rather than "Developing Nations," since the contributors are discussing the interaction of sovereign political states rather than of the ethnic national groups which comprise their populations.

[6] On the "extreme backwardness of social relations" and "political backwardness of the peasants" in Africa, for example, see K. Brutents, "African Revolution: Gains and Problems," *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1967, p. 21; and on Africa's "cultural backwardness inherited from colonial days," see Alexander Sobolev, "Some Problems of Social Progress," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), January 1967, p. 10.

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Union in Africa and Asia.[7] In the short run, this effort may serve the interests of Soviet geopolitical strategy and power politics, *e.g.*, the acquisition of port facilities or political support, which is much on Moscow's mind these days. But in the long run, it diverts scarce resources from capital formation and builds new obstacles to social change—both of which are essential to the process of economic development, as outlined by Wilber. The experience of Egypt illustrates this point.)

In order to fit the Soviet model to the realities of the less developed countries, the Soviets have gradually adapted it. As Kanet emphasizes, Moscow, in its advice to less developed countries, now focuses on the processing of local foodstuffs and raw materials rather than on the development of heavy industry. The need to control population growth and the importance of regional cooperation and control over natural resources are also now part of the model. Moscow even accepts the notion that Western financial and technical assistance can be useful under certain circumstances.

CHINA'S POLICY in Third World states has been in many ways comparable to that of the Soviet Union, as emerges from Alaba Ogunsanwo's treatment of China's relations with Africa between 1958 and 1971. The central theme of this work is that China's behavior, much like that of any other great state, has reflected pragmatic policies dictated by national interests, even if overlaid with a Marxist-Leninist emphasis on power relations between the imperialist and anti-imperialist world. As Peking entered into Africa, it sought to increase China's status as a great power and to counter Soviet and United States efforts to isolate her. Whenever possible, she tried to promote an anti-Western and anti-Soviet stance within the African countries. These goals were pursued through a variety of tactics, including normal state-to-state relations (aid, trade, technical assistance, and diplomatic relations), support of national liberation struggles (*e.g.*, in Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique), and special treatment of those countries where a Chinese presence seemed most consonant with local interests (Tanzania, Guinea, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan, Algeria, Mauritania, and Zambia). Throughout, China consistently stressed the importance of her own development model, which emphasizes self-reliance.

With few exceptions, China's policies toward the Third World have continued to reflect pragmatic national self-interest. To be sure, we have the apparent aberration of the years from 1966 to 1968 (during the Cultural Revolution), when Peking's stance seemed to become more ideological and Chinese diplomacy suffered a number of setbacks, as in the Central African Republic, Dahomey, and Ghana, where pro-Chinese leaders were overthrown and Chinese military and technical personnel expelled. Nevertheless, even during this tumultuous period, China pragmatically concentrated on a few states with which she found a mutuality of interests —for example, Tanzania, Zambia, Guinea, Mali, and Congo-Brazzaville. Moreover, after the Cultural Revolution, China expanded the range of her normal state-to-state relations. In doing so, she increasingly identified herself as a "Third World" rather than as a "socialist" state, thus aligning herself with aspirations of the developing countries and thereby widening her appeal not only within Africa but in Asia and Latin America as well.

HAVING MADE these observations about Soviet and Chinese perceptions and motivations and the actions that have resulted from them, we come to our second, more perplexing question: Has the struggle of the USSR and China for power in the new era of changing alignments and Third World quest for economic development inevitably led to expanded *influence?* A close reading of Kanet, Wilson, and Ogunsanwo suggests a negative answer, for each of these works includes plentiful examples of policy miscalculations and negative outcomes. However, it is Alvin Rubinstein's extremely thoughtful work, with its insightful contributions from eight scholars, that directs our attention specifically to this question and gives some basis for responding.

Rubinstein argues that the key to analyzing Soviet and Chinese relations with a Third World country is not to equate *presence* with *influence*. It is rather to ask what the country might have done differently without the Soviet or Chinese presence. To what extent is behavior of state B influenced by the presence of state A (Russia or China) to state A's benefit? What Rubinstein looks for are specific examples of this *influence* network, something all too frequently missing in works dealing with comparative Communist foreign policies.

[7] Russia has emphasized arms as opposed to economic assistance in recent years. Military aid extended by the USSR was twice as large as its economic program during the five-year period 1970-74, and in 1974 the ratio was 2.25 to 1. *Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974*, p. 13.

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That *presence* does not necessarily mean *influence* is demonstrated in case after case examined in Rubinstein's book. The Soviet presence in India—a country whose relations with the USSR have been close over the years—turns out to have produced little influence on India's key domestic and foreign policy decisions. Cultural differences and mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and Egypt grew even as Moscow's presence loomed large in Cairo. Despite Soviet and Chinese efforts to influence them, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Al-Fatah have maintained their independence of action. The Persian Gulf countries have shown high degrees of suspicion and hostility toward the USSR and China even in an age when both Communist powers maintain presences in the area. Moscow's access to port facilities in Africa has resulted from "business-like" relations, not from the exercise of "influence." In short, these studies argue that Third World countries deal with Moscow and Peking in response to perceptions that some useful purpose will be served and to a convergence of interests with those states, not in response to the wishes of the two Communist powers.

Implicit in all of this is the limited nature of Soviet and Chinese influence. The possibilities for expanding Communist influence in the Third World are further complicated and limited by ethnic conflicts underlying civil wars in a number of the target countries (a factor noted but perhaps not sufficiently stressed in the Rubinstein book). And, as if to underline Rubinstein's thesis that presence does not equal influence, we have the call from the August 1976 summit conference of nonaligned states for *all* great powers (including the USSR) to withdraw their navies and military presence from the Indian Ocean.

This said, however, it must be acknowledged that over the postwar decades the Soviet Union and China have evinced an increasing ability to mesh their policies with the objectives of many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. There is therefore every reason to expect them to continue exercising these skills in the quest for increased national power, a pursuit which will result in further competition in the Third World between Moscow and Peking and between these states and the United States and other Western countries (détente notwithstanding). Attainment of the rank of superpower, as Rubinstein correctly observes, impels a country to become involved in a host of political contests involving national interests. However, whether the broadened and more sophisticated Communist presence in the Third World will yield the expansion of influence sought only time will tell.

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Radicalism in Japan

By Paul F. Langer

ELLIS S. KRAUSS: *Japanese Radicals Revisited: Student Protest in Postwar Japan.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.
BENJAMIN C. DUKE: *Japan's Militant Teachers: A History of the Left-Wing Teachers' Movement.* Honolulu, The University of Hawaii Press, 1973.

SINCE THE END of World War II, Japan has undergone a process of major political, economic, and social change which has been both amazingly nondisruptive of traditional social relations and surprisingly nonviolent. In this respect, Japan stands in stark contrast to a number of other Asian nations where political and social organizations have been convulsed by frequent revolutions, coups, and civil wars. Despite the unprecedented pace of economic growth and the attendant rapid restructuring of the Japanese economy, Japan, ruled by a succession of conservative but nonauthoritarian governments, has continued to enjoy an impressive level of social and political stability as well as an exceptionally high degree of civil liberty. No wonder that Japan is widely looked upon as a bright spot in a generally dark international picture.

Yet, at times, this comforting image of contemporary Japan is blotted by seemingly contradictory events. Thousands of young Japanese activists appear on our television screens as they fiercely battle a phalanx of riot police, armed like samurai with shields and helmets. Such confrontations with the guardians of the Japanese establishment have earned the *Zengakuren* (All-Japan Students' Self-Government Federation) radicals international renown. So have the many reports of their bloody, internecine factional strife. More recently, manifestations of Japanese radicalism have spilled over onto the international scene, as *Sekigun* (Red Army) militants have operated in alliance with Middle Eastern extremists to carry out dramatic acts of terrorism abroad.

This phenomenon of violent radicalism raises troubling questions about tensions within Japanese society and the stability of the existing social order. One recalls the powerful current of prewar nationalist extremism and how it arrested and eventually reversed Japan's progress toward a more liberal regime. Do the currents of extremism continue to run deep in Japan, and do they now find expression primarily in leftist radicalism? Are there identifiable sources of discontent? The question of the causes of contemporary Japanese radicalism thus poses itself. Is this radicalism largely a reflection of trends that one can observe in other developed countries, or is there something specifically Japanese about it? To what extent is it a generational problem? What role do social inequities and distinct social groups play?

Although the Japanese radical movement has itself produced a substantial body of literature, the fact that this literature tends to be almost entirely of a theoretical and polemical nature has denied us the specific data and information that would allow us to probe these questions with some degree of realism and confidence. Moreover, while it is true that in recent years Japanese political scientists, cultural anthropologists, and psychologists have published a number of valuable studies that aid our understanding of the contradictions and tensions inherent in contemporary Japanese society at large,[1] these studies, by their very nature, tend toward broad, theoretical generalizations and do not

[1] Among such studies available in English are Hiroshi Minami, *Psychology of the Japanese People,* Honolulu, East-West Center, 1970; Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970; Takeshi Ishida, *Japanese Society,* New York, Random House, 1971; Isaiah Ben-Dasan (pseud.), *The Japanese and the Jews,* New York, Weatherhill, 1972; and Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Dependence,* Tokyo, Kodansha International, 1973.

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fill the need for specific, detailed case studies that could corroborate or modify our notions about Japanese society, particularly with regard to the sources and role of radicalism in the context of postwar Japan. In view of this need, the two works under review, focusing on specific manifestations of Japanese anti-establishment spirit, are most welcome.

KRAUSS' STUDY focuses on the radical student population—"radical" here meaning left-wing radical—which has been a key element in the anti-establishment movement in Japan. American and Japanese anthropologists have studied Japanese communities at various moments in time and restudied them a number of years later to determine the size and direction of ongoing changes in life-styles and organizational patterns. To the best of my knowledge, however, Krauss is the first to have restudied in depth a segment of the Japanese radical movement. His findings should therefore provide new insights into the evolution of radicals in contemporary Japanese society, with all that this development portends for the future of Japan.

The year 1960 was a turbulent one in Japan. Mass demonstrations (in which students played a major, if not *the* major, part) led to violence in the streets, forced the cancellation of US President Dwight D. Eisenhower's planned visit to Tokyo, and eventually led to the fall of the Nobusuke Kishi government. Japan seemed on the verge of a major political upheaval. In the aftermath of these events, the well-known Japanese sociologist Kazuko Tsurumi was able to interview some 100 students who had been involved in the events of 1960. The student sample was drawn primarily from prestigious campuses that traditionally have provided the Japanese government and business community with their top personnel. Krauss was able to use these data as a point of departure for his restudy. A major objective was to establish what happens to radical students once they leave the campus—obviously a crucial question for any analysis of the sources and significance of Japanese radicalism.

On this point, it has been widely assumed in Japan and accepted in the West that the Japanese student activist, once he graduates, allows himself to be absorbed into the governmental and business establishment and has no difficulty accommodating to it. From student radical to proud member of the giant Mitsubishi combine is the way this evolution has often been described, thus suggesting that the radical student movement, which forms the inspirational nucleus and often also supplies the shock troops of Japanese anti-establishment movements, is essentially a generational problem. Krauss' findings, however, cast doubt on this hypothesis.

Although he was able to reinterview only a little more than half of the original sample and these respondents were all located in urban areas, he discovered that a substantial portion, particularly those who had been the most activist, had failed to enter government service or to seek employment in top business firms—the careers to which their training and qualifications would normally have led.

It would seem logical to expect that if in fact the majority of the students who had actively participated in the 1960 movement had not subsequently been absorbed by the establishment or at least not been willing to accommodate to it, a much greater degree of political instability than actually exists woud be evident in Japan today. Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion, from reading Krauss' study, that a not insignificant portion of the activist student elite carried over radical beliefs into their post-university lives as academics, researchers, media workers, and small businessmen. We can only speculate about the significance of that fact for the evolution of Japanese society. It may well be that the continued alienation of an admittedly small group of Japanese intellectuals will have political effect only in the event that an economic or some other form of national crisis should create major social dislocations and discontinuities. In a more optimistic vein, one might see these elements combining with other forces in Japanese society to press for a more activist government role in removing social and economic inequities.

Krauss' and Tsurumi's investigations offer some interesting insights into the social backgrounds of Japanese student radicals. For one thing, they reveal that a relatively much larger percentage of these radicals comes from high- and medium-status families (*e.g.*, managers, professionals)—as for that matter, do the majority of students enrolled in Japan's academic institutions[2] — than from

[2] See Herbert Passin, *Society and Education in Japan*, New York, Teachers' College Press, 1965, p. 121. Passin presents the statistics listed below, citing a survey undertaken by the Japanese Education Ministry (Mombusho), *Nihon no Seicho to Kyoiku* (Japan's Growth and Education), Tokyo, 1962.

	USSR	USA	Japan
University students:			
Higher-class origin	50	63	73
Lower-class origin	50	37	27

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lower-status families (*e.g.*, shopkeepers and farmers). Thus, in most instances, there had been no adverse economic circumstances in the family that might have influenced the student's turn toward radical activism. Also, contrary to what might be assumed, the Japanese pattern does not seem to conform to the usual "student rebel" syndrome. In fact, there appears to be a reverse correlation in Japan: those families that could be described as permissive were found to be much more likely to have produced radical offspring than those which tried to impose traditional values.

AS A RULE, relatively few young people who become convinced that society requires radical change actually attempt to implement these convictions through direct or violent action, and fewer still continue such action into adulthood. For most, radical action is not a continuum, but rather an intermittent response to stimuli, pressures, or provocations. What, then, prompts a Japanese to translate radical beliefs into militant action? Duke's history of the left-wing teachers' movement in Japan has something to say on that score, at least by implication.

The postwar history of Japanese education has been marked by a continued, sharp confrontation between the conservative educational authorities in Tokyo and Nikkyoso, the militant National Teachers' Union, which has played a major role in most anti-government mass actions. At issue have been the rights and duties of teachers as well as the content of education and the government's social and foreign policies. Duke concludes his historical account of the movement's origin and evolution with an attempt to analyze the causes of its militancy. But while he sees "innumerable factors" underlying the organization's militant policies, he fails to discuss them, with the sole exception of "Nikkyoso's left-wing leadership" (p. 189). That leadership, he notes, is composed of men who support either the Socialist or the Communist Party, both of which stand in strong opposition to the conservative government. Duke, however, does not see Communist influence as a decisive element in the militant policies and actions of the teachers' organization; rather, he seeks an explanation in "postwar poverty and . . . conservative reforms of the American Occupation reforms" superimposed on the legacy of nationalism and economic depression from prewar Japan (p. 202).

It is true that for some time now the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has been evolving in the direction of its West European counterparts, strengthening its autonomy from Moscow and Peking while building broad, popular support through a strategy of moderation. This is one of the reasons why major portions of the activist Japanese Left find it difficult to view the JCP any longer as a revolutionary force and reject cooperation with it. But granted that Duke's analysis capsulized above is correct, what does it tell us about the factors that have so frequently prompted the Teachers' Union—and other Japanese labor organizations—to engage in militant anti-government action?

As Duke points out in analyzing the attitudes of the leaders of the Teachers' Union, the residual effects of prewar Japanese conditions and the often inflexible stance of postwar Japanese governments have contributed importantly to the present situation. So, of course, has the Marxist world view, which in this century has markedly shaped the Japanese intelligentsia's outlook on political and social change. Even so, to judge by the way conflicts tend to be resolved among Japanese, violence and violent change are not characteristic features of Japanese society. Nor does radicalism appear to have a broad base in Japan—perhaps, as social anthropologist Professor Chie Nakane has suggested,[3] because Japan is a homogeneous society founded on a vertical organizational principle and hence rather stable. At any rate, both the realities of postwar Japan—including the gradual advance toward a welfare state and the conservative government's increasingly felt need to widen its political base and modify its policies to that end—and the worldwide transformation of Marxist dogma under the impact of changing economic and social conditions appear to militate against the appeal of Japanese movements advocating radical, violent, or abrupt change. Given a continuation of these trends, it seems unlikely that radicalism as a political force will have much of a future in Japan.

[3] See Chie Nakane, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

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CORRECTIONS

In the essay-review, "The French CP's Many Faces," by Roy C. Macridis (*Problems of Communism,* May-June 1976), a passage from Ronald Tiersky's volume, *French Communism, 1920-1972,* is incorrectly quoted. The quotation (appearing in column 2, page 59) should read: "The French Communists will surely continue to change, but in a still incompletely structured direction whose end point remains itself delicately vulnerable to the will of men and the accidents of history. . . ."

In the article, "Khrushchev Reconsidered," by George W. Breslauer (*Problems of Communism,* September-October 1976), a typographical error changes the meaning of a quotation from Jerry Hough's article, "Political Participation in the Soviet Union" (*Soviet Studies,* January 1976). The quotation (in paragraph 3, column 1, page 19) should read: "with the exception of a few of those on [not *in*] the past, nearly all debates are richer and freer than they were under Khrushchev."

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